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The thesis argues that synthesising a domain-specific classification 
scheme/taxonomy with Branford’s standardised AcciMap approach will improve 
the reliability and validity of its outcomes. Based on Waterson et al. (2017)’s 
review of the AcciMap methodology, this argument discussed the need for 
improving the AcciMap approach rather than simply developing novel accident 
analysis approaches. One recommended way to achieve this includes combining 
the AcciMap approach with existing error-based classification schemes as part of 
the “remixing process”. Recent studies implementing this process include the 
UPLOADS classification scheme based on the AcciMap methodology for 
investigating led outdoor activities (Australia). This example supports the need 
to develop a health-specific AcciMap approach, as Goode et al. (2017) argued for 
accident analysis, including health IT analysis.  
The Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy approach built on Branford’s standardised 
AcciMap method was proposed. This novel approach was applied to analysing a 
significant health-IT related incident (Septra overdose of a patient) as detailed 
in the Digital Doctor book (Wacther, 2015). Standardised AcciMap and Medi-Socio 
AcciMap taxonomy approaches were applied to this incident to identify 
contributing factors, causal relationships (links) and formulate safety 
recommendations. In assessing the reliability of both AcciMap versions, 
professionals (Clinical safety/human factors practitioners, NHS) participated in 
the Septra overdose incident analysis. The validity assessment involved safety 
experts experienced in using the AcciMap method and applied the two AcciMap 
approaches to the incident.  
Qualitative and quantitative measurements were used to analyse and compare 
findings between professional users (reliability) and expert results (validity) 
based on causal/contributing factors, causal relationships and safety 
recommendations. These studies indicated lower reliability and validity scores 
for the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy than the standardised AcciMap version, 
particularly relating to contributing factors and safety recommendations. 
Outcomes on reliability and validity studies, including usability, were discussed. 
Also, study limitations, research reflections, and recommendations were 
presented for future research. 
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1.0 CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
Accident investigation and analysis support safety management to improve safety 
and quality of service (Woloshynowych et al., 2005; Cacciabue and Vella, 2010; 
Pillay, 2015). Safety-critical systems, including nuclear power, manufacturing, 
railways, aviation, aerospace, and healthcare, achieve these objectives using 
different accident analysis approaches underlined by their methodology of 
application and theories of accident causation on which they were built 
(Johnson, 2003, 2004). Healthcare systems in the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
USA have been carrying out these safety management processes to enhance 
patient safety through the use of Root Cause Analysis (RCA) techniques 
(Woloshynowych et al., 2005; NHS England, 2015).  
 
These techniques are used in analysing incidents/accidents in uncovering “root 
causes” and developing preventive and mitigating measures (action plans) to 
ensure that they do not occur in the future. For example, simple Root Cause 
Analyses (RCA) tools like Fishbone diagrams and the Five whys technique have 
been relied upon by clinical safety practitioners in the National Health Service 
(NHS) for incident analysis (Canham et al., 2018). Other RCA techniques include 
the Swiss Cheese Model (SCM), bow tie analysis, and the London protocol 
framework, have also been used for incident analysis in healthcare (Vincent, 
Taylor-Adams and Stanhope, 1998; Johnson, 2004; Vincent, 2011).  
 
1.2 Evolution of Accident Analysis 
In past decades, there has been a progression of accident analysis from the 
traditional accident analysis (RCA) to Systemic Accident Analysis (SAA) 
approaches (Canham et al., 2018). SAA approaches were developed to address 
limitations of RCA techniques for accident analysis (Leveson, 2011), where the 
author argued that RCA techniques were considered inadequate for analysing 
complex interactions within socio-technical systems (Qureshi, 2007; Leveson, 
2011). It is further argued that accident approaches employing the “systems 




they (adverse outcomes) occurred than linear-based approaches (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013, 2014). According to Waldman (2007): 
 
“Systems thinking embodies an approach to understanding how things 
work, and the central thesis is that the effects or outputs of any system 
are dependent on the interaction of its parts and that studying these 
parts in insolation will not provide an accurate picture of the system.” 
(Waldman, 2007) 
 
The concept of systems thinking also “considers a system in its totality taking 
relationships among the factors into account from multiple stakeholders at a 
time” (Raza and Standing, 2008). Thus, rather than determining root causes, the 
analysis focuses on establishing underlying contributing factors, particularly 
systemic factors (Underwood and Waterson, 2013). An example will be 
comparing the AcciMap approach's application with a linear-based technique like 
the Events and Causal Factor Charting (ECFC) on a medication error incident 
regarding a patient's overdose (Igene and Johnson, 2019). The latter technique 
linearly presents causes until the root cause is identified. However, the 
application of a systemic accident analysis (SAA) approach (e.g., AcciMap) 
embodying systems thinking does not focus on identifying the root cause(s) but 
on existing latent conditions and systemic factors within and outside an 
organisation that facilitated the events occurring at the “front-end”.  
 
However, despite the benefit of systemic accident approaches, there has been a 
notable “research-practice” gap in applying them practically in healthcare 
systems (Underwood and Waterson, 2013). One of the reasons for their slow 
adoption includes usage characteristics relating to their usability, reliability, and 
validity. These properties are considered very important in determining the 
usefulness of these approaches for accident investigation and analysis in 
healthcare (Underwood and Waterson, 2013; Waterson et al., 2015). However, 
the authors opined that these approaches do not incorporate all three 






1.3 Accident Mapping (AcciMap) Approach 
Accident Mapping (AcciMap) is a popular retrospective systemic accident analysis 
approach that graphically depicts a multi-causal diagram of contributing factors 
and analyses systemic failures concerning the adverse outcome (Branford, 2007; 
Branford, Naikar and Hopkins, 2009; Branford, 2011). The prominent feature of 
this approach is in providing a ‘big picture’ of the accident regarding decisions 
and conditions within and between different socio-technical levels (Rasmussen 
and Svedung, 2000; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002; Branford, 2007). In addition, 
causal/contributing factors are linked using “causal relationships” depicting 
“cause and effect” within and between six (6) designated levels (Rasmussen and 




Figure 1-1: Generic AcciMap Model adapted from Rasmussen and Svedung (2000) 
 
The AcciMap approach is one of the most cited and utilised systemic methods for 
accident analysis (Salmon, Cornelissen and Trotter, 2012; Underwood and 
Waterson, 2014; Salmon, Hulme, et al., 2020). It is also more closely aligned 
with state-of-the-art accident causation models in comparison with other 




Waterson et al., 2017; Hulme et al., 2019; Salmon, Hulme, et al., 2020). Also, 
this approach has been applied in analysing major accidents in different safety-
critical systems, including outdoor activities (Salmon et al., 2010, 2017; Salmon, 
Cornelissen and Trotter, 2012), food industry (Nayak and Waterson, 2016), 
railway accidents (Underwood and Waterson, 2014), aerospace (Johnson and de 
Almeida, 2008), and public health (Vicente and Christoffersen, 2006). 
 
1.4 Rasmussen’s Sociotechnical Framework for Risk Management 
The AcciMap approach is also a component of the broader Risk Management 
Framework (RMF). This framework recognises both past stable conditions and the 
dynamic society characterised by rapidly changing technology, fast information 
and communication development, increased scale of industrial installations, and 
an aggressive environment that influences short term goals of decision-makers 
(Rasmussen, 1997). Rasmussen also argued that these factors contribute to a 
scenario where forces and constraints can influence continuously changing work 
practices and must be considered during accident investigation and analysis 
(Vicente and Christoffersen, 2006). A system can become unstable at the 
boundary of safety regulation, thus requiring resilience to maintain control and 
remain outside the accident region (see figure 1-2). 
 
 





The Risk Management Framework (RMF) underpinned the notion of safety as an 
emergent characteristic of complex socio-technical systems and is also; 
 
“a prominent systems-theory based model for describing work systems 
composed of various labels, and argues that safety is impacted by the 
decisions and actions across all levels (e.g., politicians, chief executives, 
managers, supervisors), not just by those of front line operators alone” 
(Donovan, Salmon and Lenné, 2015)  
 
The Risk Management Framework considers two critical factors; Structure 
Hierarchy and System Dynamics (Rasmussen, 1997; Svedung and Rasmussen, 
2002; Qureshi, 2007). Structure Hierarchy is associated with different levels 
ranging from work to government (See figure 1-3). Each level is connected by a 
flow of information in a top-down approach from the external level to the 
frontlines (physical level) (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). This flow of 
information from the top denotes decisions taken by different external entities 
where data regarding the state of the system from the lower level (Waterson et 
al., 2017) is taken upwards, helping to “inform decision making and action at 




































System dynamics is associated with conditions in the work environment that can 
affect the behaviour of operators (Qureshi, 2007). Their decision making and 
activities are required to remain within the workspace bounds determined by 
safety, functional and administrative constraints (Rasmussen, 1997; Qureshi, 
2007). Systems can also lose control of the processes designed to assert control if 
there isn’t a ‘vertical integration’ (Cassano-Piche, Vicente and Jamieson, 2006). 
Interactions within and between these system levels also control the 
performance and safety of the system (Waterson and Jenkins, 2010; Trotter, 
Salmon and Lenné, 2014).  
 
While this framework underpins the AcciMap approach, additional tools for 
further analysis of the socio-technical system include ActorMaps, Conflict Maps, 
and InfoMaps (Waterson and Jenkins, 2010). Actor Maps graphically depicts a 
“layout of decision males, planners and actors who have been involved in the 
preparation of accidental conditions” (Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). InfoMaps 
graphically presents strong communication lines within a system, and Conflict 
Maps offers any potential tensions and conflicts between actors that could 
contribute to adverse outcomes preconditions (Johnson and de Almeida, 2008; 
Waterson et al., 2017).  
 
1.5 Research Application in Healthcare Systems 
The proliferation of computer technology (health IT systems) has seen health 
organisations transit from paper-based to an electronic-based system to provide 
more efficient patient care (Koppel et al., 2005; Harrison, Koppel and Bar-Lev, 
2007; Wears and Nemeth, 2007; Wears, 2015). Health IT systems include 
Computer Order Provider Entry (CPOE) systems, Clinical Decision Support 
Systems (CDSS) (where the CPOE works as a component), Electronic Health 
Records (EHR), and Bar-Coding systems etc. They help clinicians provide 
adequate care to patients, prevent financial losses and death (Koppel et al., 
2005; Institute for Medicine, 2012). Unfortunately, unintended consequences and 
new forms of errors can occur due to interactions with clinical users that can 
adversely compromise patient safety (Ash et al., 2007; Herrick, Gorman and 
Goodman, 2010; Magrabi et al., 2016). The Institute of Medicine (IOM) report 
also highlighted the need for improving patient safety by ensuring the safe use of 




(Institute for Medicine, 2012). The unintended consequences of using Health IT 
systems leading to patient harm present a safety-related challenge that fits the 
purposes of this research with the application of the proposed AcciMap approach 
in the analysis of a case incident. 
 
1.6 Research Problem 
Despite the popularity of the AcciMap approach within the academic research 
community, its reliability and validity have been a subject of research discussion 
(Waterson et al., 2017). The term “Reliability” is generally a broad term that 
focuses on the approach’s consistency or repeatability of results obtained from 
using an accident analysis method by multiple users (Kirwan, 1992; Branford, 
2007). This term has often been used interchangeably with “Consistency” 
relating to the agreement between various users/raters. “Validity” refers to 
“whether a measurement instrument actually measures what it is purported to 
measure”, and this involves comparing outcomes of users with a “gold standard” 
of measurement (Long and Johnson, 2000; Branford, 2007). These terms will be 
elaborated in Chapters Six and Seven, but for this thesis and in addressing the 
second research question, the term “reliability” is used.  
 
As highlighted earlier, reliability and validity are essential criteria for 
determining an accident analysis approach’ suitability (Underwood, Waterson 
and Braithwaite, 2016). Based on studies of Baber and Stanton (2002) and Kanis 
(2014), they argued that accident analysis approaches that do not indicate 
reasonable levels of reliability and validity could not be considered appropriate 
for conducting accident analysis (Baber and Stanton, 2002; Kanis, 2014; 
Waterson et al., 2017). Due to the subjective nature of the AcciMap approach, 
its reliability and validity have been considered from being “low” to “mixed” 
compared to some other approaches like HFACS (Human Factors and 
Classification System) and STAMP (Systems Theoretic Accident Modelling Process) 
to an extent (Salmon, Cornelissen and Trotter, 2012). Branford (2007) 
investigated these criteria in developing a standardised AcciMap approach based 
on the original formats (Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000; Vicente and 
Christoffersen, 2006). She also created guidelines for conducting AcciMap 
analysis to improve the reliability and validity of outcomes (contributing factors 




The concept of a “domain-specific” AcciMap approach has also been explored in 
other safety-critical domains, particularly in the led outdoor field through the 
development of the UPLOADS (Understanding and Preventing Led Outdoor 
Accidents Data Systems) approach (Goode et al., 2017; Salmon et al., 2017). 
Their studies argued that for the AcciMap approach to be considered valuable 
and reliable for any safety-critical domain, it must be “domain-specific” (Goode 
et al., 2017). However, there hasn’t been any existing AcciMap approach specific 
for incident analysis in healthcare. In addition, there hasn’t been any study to 
compare findings between any original AcciMap and proposed AcciMap versions 
for reliability and validity evaluation. This thesis addresses this by adopting a 
methodology to develop a taxonomy-based AcciMap approach (Goode et al., 
2016, 2017; Salmon et al., 2017). This new AcciMap approach is based on 
Branford’s standardised AcciMap approach.  
 
1.7 Thesis Statement 
The purpose of this study is to investigate and evaluate the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach in the context of analysing IT-related incidents in healthcare and 
determining if outcomes from its application are more reliable and valid. The 
synthesis and application of a health-specific classification scheme consisting of 
contributing factors within the AcciMap approach will: 
1.) Improve the reliability of results (causal/contributing factors, causal 
relationships (links), and safety recommendations relating to the adverse 
event between multiple analysts. 
2.) Improve the validity of results (contributing factors, causal links, and safety 
recommendations) produced by multiple users compared to expert results.  
 
1.8 Research Questions 
To achieve the study objectives of the thesis, the following research questions in 
addressing the thesis statement are as follows: 
1.) What is the perception of using the standardised AcciMap approach for 
accident investigation in the National Health Service (NHS)? 
2.) Does applying a contributory factor AcciMap taxonomy improve the 





3.) Does applying a contributory factor AcciMap taxonomy improve the validity 
of results from health IT analysis compared to Branford’s AcciMap 
approach? 
 
1.9 Scope of Research 
The research is undertaken in the United Kingdom (UK) involving the National 
Health Services (NHS) from Scotland and England. While the healthcare system in 
both countries is under the umbrella of the NHS, they each have their 
independent safety management system responsible for ensuring patient safety 
within different trusts (England) and boards (Scotland). The research also 
involves collaboration with human factors and clinical safety professionals from 
NHS boards (Scotland) and trusts (England). Other NHS associated entities 
include the National Services Scotland (NSS) (Glasgow), Healthcare Improvement 
Scotland (HIS) (Edinburgh), and the NHS Digital (England). The NHS Digital is 
mainly responsible for providing HIT systems for clinicians, analysts, and 
commissioners in health and social care (Habli et al., 2018). 
 
Case incidents involving health-IT systems and how they affected patient safety 
are selected to apply both standardised AcciMap, and Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approaches. These incidents occurred outside the UK health system and are also 
selected based on the nature of errors committed that the NHS may not have 
experienced. They also present opportunities for lessons to be learned and 
applied in their respective trusts and boards. Practical studies implemented in 
this thesis include a pilot AcciMap training workshop with Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland (HIS) and the National Services Scotland (NSS). 
Subsequent field training and analysis workshop on implementing both 
standardised and Medi-socio AcciMap approaches was also implemented across 
different NHS practices, specifically NHS, Nottinghamshire, and Durham. Finally, 
during an expert analysis workshop, the proposed Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy 






1.10 Thesis Outline 
Figure 1-4 details the thesis structure, including the introduction and study 
motivation in addressing the existing gap in knowledge relating to the 
development and assessment of the proposed AcciMap approach. The grey areas 
indicated chapters that directly address each research question (see section 
1.8). The following summary of the subsequent chapters are outlined below: 
 
❖ Chapter Two: Presents a background study and literature review on 
existing accident analysis approaches based on theories of accident causation 
and safety perspectives. In particular, it presents the AcciMap approach, the 
remixing process, and the need for addressing its reliability and validity. The 
chapter also provides a background review of the utilisation of health 
information technology in healthcare systems which serves as a research 
platform in addressing the research questions. 
 
❖ Chapter Three: Presents a pilot AcciMap training workshop in 
collaboration with Healthcare Improvement Scotland (HIS). This study involved 
addressing the first research question in determining the perception of 
Branford’s standardised AcciMap approach by clinical safety practitioners from 
different NHS boards in Scotland. In addition, training and application of the 
AcciMap method on the “Wrong Patient” case incident were implemented where 
outcomes (contributing factors and safety recommendations) were compared and 
discussed. 
 
❖ Chapter Four: Presents a continuation of the study from the previous 
chapter in addressing the first research question. It explores the application of 
Branford’s AcciMap approach to a health informatics case incident (CPOE 
medication dosing error) between a clinical domain expert (e-pharmacy) and an 
AcciMap expert (creator of the standardised AcciMap version). AcciMap outcomes 
were produced and qualitatively compared and contrasted for similarities and 
differences. An interview was conducted with the clinical expert on the 
experience of applying the AcciMap method. 
 
❖ Chapter Five: Presents the development of the proposed Medi-Socio 




existing socio-technical models, human factors/error taxonomies, health IT 
classification schemes and relevant literature. A taxonomy development 
approach was applied to determine system categories and corresponding 
subcategories (contributing factors). The proposed taxonomy was further refined 
based on review and feedback from patient safety, human factors specialists, 
and IT specialists within the NHS. 
 
❖ Chapter Six: Presents the reliability assessment (qualitative and 
quantitative) of applying the standardised AcciMap and Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approaches by the professional group (NHS clinical safety practitioners). 
Contributing factors, causal relationships, and safety recommendations based on 
the analysis of the Septra overdose incident are compared using a qualitative 
approach (content analysis). In addition, a quantitative assessment (index of 
concordance) was applied to determine the per cent agreement based on the 
results of both AcciMap approaches in addressing the second research question. 
 
❖ Chapter Seven: Presents the validity assessment of the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach compared to Branford’s AcciMap approach in addressing the 
third (final) research question. AcciMap results, including contributing factors, 
causal relationships, and safety recommendations from their applications by the 
professional group, are compared with findings of experts’ application of both 
approaches. Quantitative assessment was also applied using the Index of 
Concordance (IoC) measurement for calculating per cent agreement. 
 
❖ Chapter Eight: Presents conclusions and discusses the main findings 
concerning the research questions. It also highlights contributions to knowledge, 


















2.0 CHAPTER TWO: Application of the AcciMap approach for 
Health IT analysis: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a two-fold literature review; the first aspect broadly 
reviews accident/incident analysis in practice, different accident analysis 
approaches and examines Branford’s standardised AcciMap approach. The 
AcciMap method, as introduced in Chapter One, is further elaborated to include 
its evolution and relevance as a Systemic Accident Analysis (SAA) approach for 
accident analysis in safety-critical domains and particularly in healthcare. The 
second aspect reviews the impact of information technology on patient safety in 
healthcare systems and the risks associated with its use by clinical operators 
within the socio-technical system. This chapter also discusses the research 
problem and the domain context for applying Branford’s standardised AcciMap 
approach for health IT analysis. Finally, the research gap is identified and 
discussed regarding the need to improve the standardised AcciMap method by 
developing a proposed health-specific AcciMap taxonomy approach and assessing 
its reliability and validity. 
 
2.2 Background 
Different accident analysis approaches, particularly sequential or linear-based 
models, have been utilised to describe what happened as a cause-and-effect way 
have been the more popularly used for incident analysis in healthcare (Belmonte 
et al., 2011; Ferjencik, 2011). However, newer approaches, most notably 
Systemic Accident Analysis (SAA), have been developed to analyse complex 
interactions within socio-technical systems that contributed to adverse outcomes 
or near misses (Qureshi, 2007; Salmon, Cornelissen and Trotter, 2012; Waterson 
et al., 2017). SAA approaches (e.g., STAMP, FRAM) are argued to be more 
suitable for accident analysis within the socio-technical context and addresses 
shortcomings of the more popular RCA techniques (Leveson, 2011). As already 
highlighted in Chapter One, these SAA approaches incorporate the concept of 
“systems thinking” in understanding why an adverse event happened, examining 
the entire socio-technical system, identifying weaknesses and developing safety 




the means of implementing a deeper analysis of the broader socio-technical 
system beyond the actions occurring at the frontline, identifying existing 
weaknesses and developing appropriate safety recommendations. However, its 
reliability and validity need to be evaluated to fully realise the benefits of 
adopting a systemic accident approach, especially transferring research to 
practice. These characteristics, including usability, are crucial for healthcare 
organisations to adopt them into live accident investigation and analysis 
(Underwood and Waterson, 2013).    
 
Healthcare systems are complex socio-technical systems made up of “a web of 
dynamic relationships and transactions where in many instances, they drift into 
failure” (Waterson and Jenkins, 2010). The term “socio-technical” relates to the 
interdependency between technologies and the people in the work system 
(Klein, 2014). However, the author noted that this term is as imprecise as 
another related term, “system” (Klein, 2014). This tendency for systems drifting 
into failures can occur due to the combination of technological, environmental, 
and social systems as they grow in complexity. The healthcare system is also a 
complex “socio-technological” and an adaptive system with continuous and rapid 
development resulting from combining user demands, technological 
advancements, and commercial considerations (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008). 
Healthcare systems continuously grow even more complex due to these dynamic 
interactions, including those between clinicians and health information 
technology (HIT). The safety approach implemented in healthcare can be “ultra-
safe”, which focuses on risks being excluded and power is given to regulators 
and supervisors to ensure front-line practitioners are not exposed to unnecessary 
risks (Vincent and Amalberti, 2016).  
 
2.3 Definition of Safety-related Terms 
In understanding safety-related terms commonly used across different safety-
critical domains and within the context of the thesis, it is essential to identify 
and define them, particularly with accident analysis in healthcare and in 











Cause This is defined as either a direct cause or contributing factor in a causal 
chain that eventually leads to an accident or adverse outcome 
(Woloshynowych et al., 2005).  
 
Root Cause “The most basic cause that can be reasonably identified and that 
management has control to fix” (Paradies and Busch, 1988). Root causes 
can sometimes be attributed to deficiencies in management systems 




These two terms have either been used interchangeably to convey similar 
meanings or to specific meanings associated with them. Typically, an 
“accident” can be described as an adverse outcome or event where either 
a patient or patients have experienced severe consequences (e.g., serious 
injuries or death) because of a chain of decisions and contributing factors. 
However, an “incident”, while having a similar definition with 
“accident”, describes an event or outcome that may not necessarily be 
regarded as adverse or very serious but may still be considered very risky 




This consists of influencing and causal factors that are either positive or 
negative that affect the safety of patients (NPSA, 2009). 
 
Active Error This is a type of error where either an action or decision results in an 
adverse (undesired) outcome with consequences (Ives and Hillier, 2015). 
 
Adverse Event Defined as an event that proceeds to harm a person (patient). They may 
either be preventable or non-preventable (Ives and Hillier, 2015) 
 
Human Error This is a type of error leading to an undesired outcome occurring due to 
multiple contributing factors, including but not limited to workload, time 





A type of error that does not produce an immediate set of consequences 
but are triggered under certain conditions in the system (Ives and Hillier, 
2015). 
 
Near Miss This is defined as situations “where an accident could have happened had 
there been no timely and effective recovery” (Thomadsen and Lin, 2005). 
  
Safety This is defined as the prevention of harm to patients in addition to being 
free from accidental damage and medical errors (Institute for Medicine, 
2012; Salahuddin and Ismail, 2015). In addition, a recent definition of 
patient safety highlighted the prevention of medical errors and improving 
the condition of patients from adverse outcomes or injuries (Vincent, 
2011). 
 
Risk The term “Risk” has several definitions used by different authors. It is 
defined as the likelihood of an unwanted or adverse event that results in 







Wilhelmsen, 2012). Risk can also be regarded as “the chance that 
someone or something that is valued will be adversely affected in a 
stipulated way by the hazard” (Woodruff, 2005). 
 
Hazard A Hazard constitutes any condition that is deemed “unsafe” or a potential 
source of an undesirable event with the increased likelihood of harm 
(Reniers et al., 2005; Marhavilas, Koulouriotis and Gemeni, 2011).  
 
System A system is formally defined as “a set of elements or parts that is 
coherently organised and interconnected in a pattern or structure that 
produces a characteristic set of behaviours often classified as its function 
or purpose” (Meadows, 2009).  
 
System Safety This term focuses on different aspects, including people, processes, 
environment, and technology, that affect safety (Ives and Hillier, 2015). 
Safety can be compromised due to errors induced by system design, poor 
training, management decisions etc. 
 
Systemic factors This comprises organisational and managerial causal/contributing factors 
that created conditions for active errors to occur at the frontline or 
physical level (Emslie, Knox and Pickstone, 2002; Leveson, 2011).  
 
 
2.4 Accident Analysis – Current Practice in Healthcare 
Investigating and analysing adverse events involves uncovering failures, learning 
from system weaknesses, and developing actions to prevent them from 
reoccurring (Salmon, Cornelissen, and Trotter, 2012; Canham et al., 2018). 
Another purpose is to promote a safety culture (vigilance) in identifying risks and 
mitigating them (NHS England, 2015). For example, in NHS organisations 
(England and Wales), healthcare staff report incidents and the data (patient 
safety incident) are collected by the National Reporting and Learning System 
(NRLS) (Wheway and Jun, 2021). The national patient safety team then reviews 
the data collection and analyses to formulate safety recommendations and risk 
reduction strategies (Wheway, 2020; Wheway and Jun, 2021). Formal 
investigations implemented in the NHS depends on the nature of the incident, 
and they consist of a concise internal investigation (Level 1), comprehensive 
internal investigation (level 2), and independent investigation (level 3) (Canham 
et al., 2018). Level 1 type of investigation applies to not complex incidents, 
while level 2 type investigation applies to complex incidents requiring a 




investigation is used where it may be challenging to conduct an objective inquiry 
due to individuals' organisational capacity or capability (NPSA, 2008).  
 
One of the tools commonly used for incident/accident analysis across safety-
critical domains is the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) approach. RCA is a systematic 
and qualitative management tool used for identifying root causes by asking 
‘why?’ until no additional answer is determined (Walshe and Boaden, 2005). In 
the healthcare sector, an RCA model was developed by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations (JCAHO) for investigating sentinel 
events (Walshe and Boaden, 2005). In addition, a comprehensive approach to 
RCA was developed in the UK by the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), 
including associated training programmes for healthcare providers in England 
and Wales (Walshe and Boaden, 2005). NPSA’s RCA model comprises of ten (10) 
stages: 
1.) Report incident 
2.) The decision to investigate and to set up an investigation team 
3.) Gathering data 
4.) Mapping chronology of events 
5.) Identifying care/service delivery problems 
6.) Identifying contributory factors and root causes 
7.) Developing safety recommendations 
8.) Writing a report 
9.) Implementing solutions 
10.) Evaluating and auditing solutions 
 
These stages can also be broadly categorised into four phases making up the 
whole investigation and analysis processes comprising of; (1.) Plan, (2.) 
Investigate and analyse, (3.) Report, and (4.) Act (Woloshynowych et al., 2005). 
These activities constitute a critical part of a Safety Management System (SMS), 
which is “an organised approach to managing safety, including the necessary 
organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures” (Cacciabue 
and Vella, 2010). Safety management is also a proactive measure, and its 
development was made necessary due to past occurrences of significant 
accidents, including the Chernobyl incident in the late 1970s (Cacciabue and 




management is crucial for effectively handling adverse outcomes caused by 
human error and system malfunctions (Reason, 1995; Cacciabue and Vella, 
2010). While the term “human error” is attributed to be the leading cause of 
accidents (Hollnagel, 2008), it is not considered a well-defined category 
concerning human performance (Woods et al., 1994). The authors argued that 
human error associated with actions (individual and organisational) is a social 
and psychological process rather than a technical or objective term (Woods et 
al., 1994; Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008). Regarding safety management, for 
example, the NHS Digital’s clinical safety management system, which focuses on 
reporting incidents on the use of health IT/computer systems, include the 
following processes (Mawson, 2018): 
1.) Reporting incidents relating to health IT systems that may impact 
(negatively) patient safety, 
2.) Enabling the manufacturer’s organisation to report on incidents that can 
impact patient safety, 
3.) Providing communication links within the manufacturer’s organisation and 
health organisation using health IT systems, 
4.) Provision of sufficient and suitable resources allocated by the manufacturer 
to resolve any incident reported and, 
5.) Enabling manufacturers to send safety alerts to health organisations, advise 
users regarding potential safety incidents, and provide mitigation measures. 
 
2.5 Review of Accident Approaches 
Different accident analysis approaches (Appendix A-1) are developed based on 
different methodologies (Johnson, 2004; Wienen et al., 2017), theoretical 
underpinnings and accident causation theories (Fu et al., 2020) (Appendix A-2). 
Over the past decades, these approaches have evolved from RCA techniques to 
systemic methods for analysing socio-technical systems (figure 2-1). Accident 
analysis approaches are broadly composed of three model types: simple linear, 
complex linear, and complex non-linear models. The following subsections 











2.5.1 Simple Linear Models 
These models assume that accidents occur due to events linking together 
sequentially or linearly until the root cause(s) is identified and eliminated (Toft 
et al., 2012). Simple linear models like sequential (linear-based) approaches, 
which describe sequences of events (actions) leading to adverse outcomes 
(Qureshi, 2007; Wienen et al., 2017). They also allow investigators/analysts to 
determine ‘what’ happened (focusing on the adverse outcome) and can be used 
along with secondary forms of analysis to determine ‘why’ they happened 
(negative or near-miss occurred) (Johnson, 2004). Examples include Root Cause 
Analysis (RCA) techniques like fishbone diagrams and 5-Whys techniques used for 
incident investigations in healthcare (Canham et al., 2018). Other notable 
simple linear models include Multilinear Events Sequencing (MES) and Sequential 
Timing and Events Process (STEP). The main criticism of these linear models, 
according to Leveson (2011), is in their limited ability to analyse and convey 
multiple complex interactions between different entities within a complex socio-
technical system. 
 
2.5.2 Complex Linear Models 
This model type assumes that serious outcomes occur due to the intersection of 
unsafe acts and latent conditions within complex socio-technical systems 
presenting linear pathways (Wienen et al., 2017). Factors identified close to the 
target are denoted as proximate events (active failures), while factors away 
from the accident are considered organisational, environmental, and external. 
Different types fall under this type of model include some of the following: 
 
2.5.2.1 Epidemiological Models 
These models incorporate the ability to depict an adverse outcome as a product 
of complex interactions between different system components (entities and 
actors). The critical factor relates to analysing latent conditions existing in the 
system resulting in unsafe actions, which can eventually lead to the adverse 
event (Wienen et al., 2017). An example of this type of model is Reason’s Swiss 
Cheese Model (SCM), which describes the occurrence of system errors like 
medical mishaps  (Reason, 1990; Perneger, 2005). This model is based on the 





not adequately dealt with by barriers and safeguards (Reason, 2000) (see figure 
2-2). These barriers and safeguards by themselves may not be perfect due to 
human infallibility and limitations in how systems are designed and operated 
(Emslie, Knox and Pickstone, 2002; Carthey, 2013). These issues eventually lead 
to an adverse event (active error) that directly affects the patient (Reason, 
1990, 1997, 2000; Elliott, Page and Worrall-Carter, 2012).  
 
Figure 2-2: The Swiss cheese model of Accident Causation (Reason, 2000) 
 
In addition to the definition in table 2-1, active failures are also considered 
direct errors made by a worker/operator causing an immediate effect on the 
patient (La Pietra et al., 2005). Also, latent failures typically referred to as the 
“inevitable resident pathogens”, are said to be conditions based on errors made 
by management personnel of an organisation (i.e., hospital management) (La 
Pietra et al., 2005).  
 
2.5.2.2 Systemic Models 
These models were developed for analysing complex and multiple interactions 
with socio-technical systems. They are also suitable for examining human 
failures, including system failures as major contributing factors to adverse 
outcomes (Hollnagel, 2004; Toft et al., 2012). In applying systemic models, 
adverse outcomes/accidents can happen due to the intersection of causal 
factors (human, technical, and environmental) existing in a specific time 
coincidentally (Hollnagel, 2004; Qureshi, 2007). They also regard accidents as 
emergent features occurring based on interactions between system components 





performance (Qureshi, 2007). Another example of this model type is the AcciMap 
method. 
 
2.5.3 Complex non-Linear Models 
These models do not focus on identifying contributing factors from the accident 
but on identifying existing system constraints and feedback loops. This view 
means that an accident can occur resulting from the combination of mutually 
interacting variables occurring in real systems and how they can be understood 
and prevented  (Toft et al., 2012). Notable examples of these type of model 
that addresses the limitations with linear accident models include STAMP 
(Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process) (Leveson, 2004)(Appendix A-3) 
and FRAM (Functional Resonance Accident Model) (Hollnagel, 2004; Woltjer, 
2008). The STAMP model regards systems as interrelated components kept in 
dynamic equilibrium by control and information feedback loops. On the other 
hand, the FRAM approach models complex systems by focusing on their 
functional aspects and defining functions’ dynamic interactions and modelling 
variability where it denotes the source for successes and failures (Hollnagel, 
2012; Riccardo et al., 2018) 
 
2.6 SAA Approaches – Research-Practice  
As earlier highlighted, Systemic Accident Analysis (SAA) approaches have been 
considered more suitable for analysing complex systems than linear-based 
methods (Leveson, 2011). They also support resilience engineering aspects and 
help healthcare systems anticipate any changes regarding risks before adverse 
outcomes occur (Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson, 2006). The resilience 
engineering perspective is considered a new emerging paradigm where concepts 
derived from previous perspectives are used to develop a coherent 
understanding of resilience in socio-technical systems (Hollnagel, Woods and 
Leveson, 2006). However, despite its benefits, they have not been readily 
adopted as part of current practice regarding incident analysis in healthcare due 
to over-reliance on RCA techniques (Canham et al., 2018). Furthermore, there 
has been no study published in the literature on the practical application of the 
AcciMap method in live accident investigation and analysis in healthcare 





Even though the concept of systems thinking has been advocated by the NHS 
authorities and Human Factors Ergonomics (HFE), their application for accident 
analysis has been “researched-focused” rather than “practice-focused”. Example 
studies have compared systemic approaches (including the AcciMap method) 
with other non-systemic techniques, essentially highlighting their advantages 
(Salmon, Cornelissen and Trotter, 2012; Underwood and Waterson, 2014; Dixon, 
Waterson and Barnes, 2018). However, these benefits have yet to be fully 
realised by healthcare safety practitioners and adopted for live accident analysis 
within practices. Notably, from studies of Underwood and Waterson (2013) and 
Canham et al. (2018), the former extensively discussed the “research-practice 
gap” term regarding the use of SAA approaches, including STAMP and FRAM 
across multiple safety-critical domains. The latter focused on comparing RCA 
and the STAMP outcomes based on important usage characteristics, including 
usability, reliability, and validity within the healthcare context.  
 
In examining the “research-practice gap”, their findings were obtained after 
interviewing forty-two (42) participants experienced in incident analysis from 
different safety-critical domains and from across ten countries (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013). Table 2-2 summarises key findings focused on the SAA 
dimensions, awareness, adoption, usage, organisational, and industry influences 
on the research-practice gap. Their study further discussed the benefits of 
adopting SAA approaches for “gaining an improved understanding of accidents 
which may lead to more effective recommendations” and promoted across 
safety-critical domains (Underwood and Waterson, 2013). This point raises the 
need to investigate the perception of applying an SAA approach as a tool for 
incident analysis, specifically by safety practitioners from the healthcare 
domain. Unfortunately, as earlier stated in this section, there have not been any 
studies that specifically evaluated the application of the AcciMap approach and 
understanding safety practitioners’ perspectives. This fact makes the first 
research question in determining the perception of the AcciMap method for 





Table 2-2: Summary of findings based on the SAA dimensions (Underwood and Waterson, 2013) 
Dimension Sub-Category Conclusions 
SAA 
Awareness 
The current level of 
SAA awareness 
While some systemic approaches are being utilised in some safety-critical industries, most practitioners (in practice) 
were still largely unaware of the most frequently cited approaches, including AcciMap, STAMP and FRAM but still very 
popular amongst researchers. 
Demand for SAA 
information 
There is a reluctance to obtain new information that may necessitate adopting a systemic analysis tool. In addition, 
lack of time and resources in learning and researching new approaches due to the high work demand in their respective 
industries. 
The extent of training 
impacting awareness 
The extent of training for accident investigations is dependent on the kind of role of practitioners in question. Those 
with lower levels of responsibility may not get a high level of relevant training. 
Accessibility of SAA 
information 
In close relation to SAA training, individuals who did not receive formal training in SAA approaches for accident 
investigations may have limited access to SAA information, including scientific journals and conferences. 
Communication of SAA 
information 
Researchers gain knowledge relating to SAA from conducting research, conferences, and networking with colleagues 
within the academic community. However, practitioners have cited the lack of communication between the academic 
research and practice communities due to these approaches being considered either too “conceptual” or providing little 
to no benefit. 
SAA Adoption The practicality of the 
analysis method 
Practitioners’ requirements are not being extensively considered, especially regarding the simplicity and practicality of 
utilising SAA approaches. 
Personal adoption 
criteria 
Practitioners’ training and experiences in using different accident models/methods may influence the choice of their 
approaches for conducting accident investigations. 
Accountability 
influence on analysis 
approach 
The need to assign liability for an accident is influenced by the approach the safety practitioner utilises. For example, 
some practitioners focus on safety improvements, thereby avoiding apportioning blame, while others assign blame by 
focusing on the accident’s commercial and legal implications. In addition, there was a need to demonstrate liability, 






Dimension Sub-Category Conclusions 
Model validation Many practitioners consider this sub-category an important influence in adopting SAA approaches, focusing on how such 
approaches are extensively proven and tested. 
SAA Usage  Usage resource 
constraints 
Utilising more complex analysis techniques will depend on resources (funding) available, especially in analysing 
significant incidents. Time constraint is also considered a factor when conducting accident investigations. 
Model reliability Factors that affect the reliability of outcomes include the background and experiences of individuals where results 
produced have variations. These variations result from the qualitative nature of systemic analysis tools, making it 
difficult for participants to reach firm conclusions. 
Data requirements of 
SAA 
Several factors relating to data requirements were considered to impact the ability to apply systemic analysis methods. 
They included the system-wide data required to perform SAA not being available and accident information databases 






Organisational policy Organisational policies, in most cases, impact the type of accident analysis method used by individuals despite the 
freedom of choice regarding which approach to use. In addition, a link between organisational policy and safety culture 








The degree of regulation significantly influences the technique types used for accident investigations and risk 
assessments in industries. Also, there was an indication that SAA regulations are not in place due to the lack of SAA 
awareness rather than the decision to reject them. 
Industry 
characteristics 
The appropriateness of applying SAA approaches within any industry is dependent on the domain’s characteristics, 
including the degree of operational complexity. For example, the STAMP approach is considered suitable in highly 
automated environments where software reliability is required.  
Resistance to change The cost and effort needed to implement SAA methods through new regulations can create a situation where there is 
resistance. 





2.7 Branford’s Standardised AcciMap Approach 
Branford (2007) investigated reliability and validity through the development of 
a “standardised” AcciMap approach (see figure 2-3) adapted from different 
variations of the initial AcciMap framework (Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000; 
Vicente and Christoffersen, 2006). This standardised approach also included 
guidelines for applying causal analysis and determining safety recommendations 
(Branford, 2007; Branford, Naikar and Hopkins, 2009). The main difference 
between Rasmussen and Branford’s AcciMap representation is that the former 
has six (6) abstraction levels while the latter was condensed into four (4) levels 
(Branford, 2007, 2011). The latter approach did not include “Equipment and 
Surrounding level”, and both “Technical & operational management” and 
“company management & local area government” were merged as 
“organisational”. The external level of Branford’s approach includes the merging 










Figure 2-3: Standardised AcciMap Structure (Branford, 2007; Branford, Naikar 






The processes involved in analysing incidents using Branford’s AcciMap guidelines 
for AcciMap construction include the following: 
1.) Creating a blank AcciMap format on which to arrange the 
causes/contributing factors  
2.) Identifying the adverse outcome of the incident 
3.) Identifying contributing factors based on the incident report 
4.) Determining the appropriate AcciMap level for each contributing factor 
identified 
5.) Preparing the contributing factors representative of each AcciMap level 
6.) Inserting causal links (relationships) to depict cause and effect between 
contributing factors 
7.) Filling in the gaps left in the causal chains where information is missing 
8.) Checking the causal logic and making sense of the sequence of events 
9.) Formulating safety recommendations that are practical and feasible 
 
These steps (guidelines) were developed as a means of enhancing the reliability 
of outcomes, safety recommendations and the validity of results, especially 
when measured in the absence of a “gold standard” (Branford, 2007). 
 
2.8 The Relevance of the AcciMap approach 
The AcciMap approach is arguably the most cited systemic accident approach 
(Salmon, Hulme, et al., 2020). This argument was attributed to the extensive 
study on the evolution of the AcciMap method between 2000 to 2015 (Waterson 
et al., 2017). However, it is not practically utilised for incident analysis as 
popularly as RCA techniques which have been well established as the toolkit for 
incident investigation, particularly in healthcare organisations. For example, in 
the UK, NHS boards and decision-makers have invested in programmes to help 
train staff to effectively conduct RCA despite evidence of its limitations 
(Braithwaite et al., 2006; Bowie, Skinner and De Wet, 2013). Although the NHS 
has acknowledged the need to apply approaches that adopt a systems approach 
to incident analysis, noting that “systems approach to safety recognises that 
incidents are linked to the system in which individuals are working” (NHS 
Improvement, 2018).  At the national level, the Healthcare Safety Investigation 





incidents/accidents across NHS trusts, has utilised the AcciMap approach 
amongst other SAA approaches. 
 
The AcciMap approach allows users to perform deeper analysis regarding system 
weakness within and outside the socio-technical system (Waterson et al., 2017). 
This attribute makes the AcciMap method very applicable for accident analysis in 
healthcare. Branford’s thesis identified the advantages/benefits of applying the 
AcciMap approach (Branford, 2007) as summarised below: 
• Allows analysts to identify causal/contributing factors and extension of 
analysis beyond the organisational level. This benefit supports the inclusion of 
external factors, thus providing a comprehensive understanding of why an 
accident occurred within the broader socio-technical context and promoting 
the implementation of high-level corrective measures (Branford, 2007). 
• Allows analysts the freedom of identifying causal factors without the 
restriction of using pre-defined causal categories typically featured in 
taxonomies/classification schemes. The method further enables analysts to 
highlight all possible causal factors, thereby reducing the probability of not 
identifying all of them. However, the disadvantage is that outcomes produced 
by multiple users may not be reliable (Branford, 2007).  
• Provides unrestricted diagram formations, thereby not restricting how causal 
relationships are depicted in AcciMap outcomes. Some accident approaches 
like the Incident Cause Analysis Method (ICAM) assume that events resulting in 
an accident are sequenced in an order illustrated as causal trees (Branford, 
2007). This causes ‘direct’ causal factors that do not fit into a sequence to be 
overlooked. 
• Provides the advantage of organising causal factors into different abstraction 
levels illustrating the socio-technical context where the events took place. 
Causal factors are classified into their respective levels to differentiate 
between those within the organisation’s control and the control of regulatory 
bodies and the government. Branford also cited other similar models like the 
Why-Because-Analysis (WBA) (Ladkin, 1999, 2005) and Snook’s Causal Map 
(Snook, 2002), having the ability to classify factors based on their causal 





these factors can be arranged to explain why they contributed to the events 
at the physical level. 
An essential benefit of the AcciMap approach is providing understanding and 
context regarding using health IT systems. This benefit also includes analysing 
how they can unintentionally but negatively impact patients' safety and 
identifying systemic factors that contributed to it. However, based on the 
findings of Underwood and Waterson (2013), the reliability and validity of 
systemic accident approaches, including the AcciMap method, have been 
questioned and cited as reasons why they have not been quite utilised in clinical 
practices. Therefore, for the AcciMap approach to be considered a valuable tool 
in healthcare, its reliability and validity will need improvement through the 
process of “remixing” with other techniques (Waterson et al., 2017). 
 
2.9 Review of AcciMap Research Studies 
While the AcciMap approach is part of the broader Risk Management Framework 
(Chapter One), it has been utilised mainly as a standalone tool for either 
analysing case studies or in comparative studies with other accident causation 
approaches (Waterson et al., 2017). In their subsequent findings, twenty-seven 
(27) significant studies were identified that applied the AcciMap approach 
(Appendix A-4). The AcciMap method was either used in a comparative analysis 
with other systematic or accident causation approaches or investigated major 
case incidents within different safety-critical domains. Their study also 
identified various safety-critical industries where the AcciMap method was 











Table 2-3: Summary of the number and methodology of AcciMap studies 
between 2000 and 2015 based on different safety-critical domains (Waterson et 
al., 2017)  
Domain No. of Studies Study Methodology Author(s) 
Public Health 4 • Case Study Analysis – Testing 
RMF/AcciMap framework 




Cassano-Piche et al. 
(2009) 
• Qualitative - Case Study Analysis Waterson (2009) 
    
Oil and Gas 2 • Qualitative - Case Study Analysis Hopkins (2000) 
Tabibzadeh and 
Meshkati (2015) 
Rail 2 • Accident causation comparison 
on Case Study 
Ladkin (2005) 
 
• Qualitative - Case Study Analysis Salmon et al. (2013) 
Aerospace 1 Accident causation comparison on 
Case Study 




3 Case Study Analysis – Testing 
RMF/AcciMap framework 
Salmon et al. (2010) 
 
 Accident causation comparison on 
Case Study 
Salmon et al. (2012) 
 
 Application of hybrid approach on 
Case Study 
Trotter et al. (2014) 
Policing/Security 2 Qualitative - Case Study Analysis Jenkins et al. (2010) 
Jenkins et al. (2011) 
Manufacturing 1 Qualitative - Case Study Analysis Le Coze (2010) 
Nuclear 1 Qualitative - Case Study Analysis Andersson (2010) 
Aviation 4 Qualitative - Case Study Analysis Branford (2011) 
Application of hybrid approach on 
Case Study 
Debrincat, Bil and 
Clark (2013) 
Gong et al. (2014) 
Qualitative - Thematic Analysis Harvey and Stanton 
(2014) 





Domain No. of Studies Study Methodology Author(s) 
Case Study Waterson (2014) 
Qualitative - Case Study Analysis Scott-Parker et al. 
(2015) 
Newman and Goode 
(2015) 
Stefanova et al. 
(2015) 
Chen et al. (2015) 
Emergency 
Response 
1 Qualitative - Case Study Analysis Salmon et al. (2014) 
Civil Engineering 1 Qualitative - Case Study Analysis Fan et al. (2015) 
 
However, their findings did not identify any study concerning the AcciMap 
approach used specifically within clinical practices during that same period. 
Based on the systematic literature search using the Scopus database 
(ScienceDirect), the keyword search “healthcare” AND (“healthcare” OR 
“medical” OR “clinical”) were used to identify any previous studies. However, 
there were no recorded studies found from the results. Furthermore, from 
further refinement using another keyword search, “AcciMap” AND “health IT”, 
no studies using the AcciMap approach for analysing health-IT/software-related 
incidents were found. Applying the AcciMap method to investigate this incident 
type (health-IT/software-related) is an important research study, especially in 
the growing area of health IT analysis and in realising the benefits of the systems 
thinking paradigm. 
 
2.10 Remixing of the AcciMap approach 
Waterson et al. (2017) study highlighted and explained the different remixing 
processes of the AcciMap approach. This study also included theory elaboration 
and use, practical trade-offs (reliability, validity, and utility), and the 
“bricolage” of the AcciMap approach. The third remixing process of the AcciMap 
method; the bricolage method, involves the “construction of new forms of 
AcciMap, alongside combining components (e.g., error taxonomies, Swiss 
Cheese, HFACS) from other methods and models in order to embellish or 





authors reasoned that rather than developing another “novel” approach, the 
AcciMap method could be synthesised with existing accident analysis approaches 
(methods and models) (Stanton and Salmon, 2009; Goode et al., 2017; Hulme et 
al., 2019; Stanton et al., 2019).  
 
Their study also cited Salmon et al. (2012)’s work to support their argument in 
comparing AcciMap, HFACS and STAMP approaches. In that study, they argued 
that combining a method like the HFACS with the AcciMap method could 
enhance the reliability of outcomes and allow such “hybrid” AcciMap versions to 
be applied to multiple incidents. This point was derived from Salmon et al. 
(2012) study when comparing the AcciMap approach with HFACS and STAMP 
approaches. The authors specifically argued that the high reliability of the 
HFACS (taxonomy) could be synthesised with the AcciMap method. Their 
conclusions led to the development of the UPLOADS (Understanding and 
Preventing Led Outdoor Accidents Data System), an incident reporting and 
learning system for analysing incident data from led outdoor activity data in 
Australia (Goode et al., 2017; Salmon et al., 2017). There have also been other 
studies detailing the remixing of the AcciMap method with different accident 
causation approaches summarised in table 2-4 below. 
 
Table 2-4: Summary of studies on the remixing of the AcciMap approach with 
other approaches (2000 to present) 

























• Identifying and 
evaluating system-
wide protective 
practices from a set 
of led outdoor 
activity domain 
near-miss incidents. 
• Analysing the 
network of 
protective factors 
and relationships to 
provide a more 
comprehensive and 
richer analysis. 













































factors using the 




categories based on 
driving and 
dependence power 
values using the 
MICMAC method. 
• Determining the 
dominant 
contributory factors 
in a systemic 
accident using the 
degree of vertex by 
the MICMAC method. 























• Addressing two basic 
issues of accident 
analysis; 1.) what is 
failure and 2.) how 
does the failure 
happen. 
• Combination of 
system factors and 
control functions to 
form a matrix model 
for analysis and 
classification. 
















• Enhancing safety by 
analytically 
analysing causes of 
marine accidents. 



















































deficiencies and lack 
of emphasis on 
latent unsafe factors 
outside accidents. 
• Enhancing the 
reliability of the 
graphic aspect and 
logicality of the 
taxonomic aspect to 
improve the 














• Causal analysis of 
recorded 
breakdowns in a 
safety-critical 
organisation utilising 
the strengths of both 
approaches. 
Aviation Debrincat, Bil 
and Clark 
(2013) 
The Walkerton E. 





in a dynamic 
society 
Integration of 
Fault Trees with 
the AcciMap 
approach 










This remixing process can be applied in developing a hybrid AcciMap approach 
specific to analysing software/IT-related incidents in healthcare. It was also 
already highlighted earlier in this chapter how authors (Goode et al., 2017); 
Stanton et al., 2019) argued the need to develop a domain-specific AcciMap 






2.11 Application of the AcciMap approach for Health IT Analysis 
There has been no historical study based on the literature review regarding 
applying the AcciMap approach to clinical incidents based on Waterson et al. 
(2017)’s analysis. Only a few NHS trusts (e.g., NHS Nottinghamshire) and the 
Health Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB), a national regulatory body (instituted 
in 2017), utilises the AcciMap approach as part of their accident analysis toolkit 
in conducting causal analyses. However, at the start of this research, NHS boards 
in Scotland had not utilised the AcciMap approach for incident investigation. 
While this research involves investigating and assessing the AcciMap method, its 
culmination in developing a health-specific AcciMap approach will be applied for 
health IT analysis. This proposed AcciMap approach will then be compared with 
the standardised AcciMap approach to assess their reliability and validity based 
on causal/contributing factors, causal relationships, and safety 
recommendations. The application and assessment of both AcciMap versions will 
require using case incidents where clinical software contributed (directly or 
indirectly) to compromising patient safety.  
 
2.12 Health Information Technology (HIT) 
A “Health IT-enabled healthcare system” is regarded as both a safety-critical and 
a complex sociotechnical system (Begun, Zimmerman and Dooley, 2003; Singh 
and Sittig, 2015). This system also consists of the interconnection of elements 
comprising of people (users of IT systems), technology (software/hardware), 
processes, organisation, and the external environment (where policies are 
developed and enforced) (Sittig and Singh, 2010). Figure 2-4 shows the 
connection of these system components. The term “Health IT” broadly comprises 
“all computer software used by health professionals and patients to support 
care” (Magrabi et al., 2016). Health IT also describes various technologies 
implemented for clinical purposes, including collection, transmission, display, 
and data storage (Salahuddin and Ismail, 2015). Its implementation has helped 
reduce medical errors that could lead to patient harm and improve clinical 
processes, workflow, and communication between clinicians for increased 







Figure 2-4: Sociotechnical System underlying health-IT related adverse events 
(adapted from Sittig and Singh, 2010; Harrington, Kennerly, and Johnson, 2011) 
 
This fact is further supported based on the prediction made in 2001 by the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on the Quality of Health Systems on the 
crucial roles of health IT. These roles include “facilitating access to medical and 
medication information, assist with calculations, perform checks (in real-time or 
afterwards), assist with monitoring, and support communication between 
healthcare professionals” (Institute for Medicine, 2001). In addition, the design, 
implementation, and use of health IT systems have added another complexity 
layer to an already complex healthcare system (Magrabi et al., 2016). According 
to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) in their landmark report on “To Err is Human,” 
these incidents are regarded as “software-related or health IT-related” incidents 
(Institute for Medicine, 1999; Kohn et al., 2000). Some of the issues affecting 
patient safety include usability, interoperability, health IT product fit with 
workflow, organisational, and external factors (policies).  
 
2.12.1 Health IT and Patient Safety 
Health IT utilisation has provided substantial benefits for health organisations by 
promoting safer and more efficient administering of healthcare (Herrick, Gorman 
and Goodman, 2010; Institute for Medicine, 2012; Singh and Sittig, 2015). These 
technologies include the Computerised Provider Order Entry System (CPOE), 
Electronic Medical Records (EMR), Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSS), 





include smart infusion pumps, ventilators, pacemakers, computer systems for 
diagnosis and assessment (Thimbleby, 2013; Thomas and Thimbleby, 2018). 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) report pointed the importance of promoting patient 
safety through efficient design, implementation, and safe use of health IT 
systems within the sociotechnical context (Institute for Medicine, 2012). Its use 
also serves as a proactive safety management activity to reduce medical errors, 
prevent patient harm, and ensure safety.  
 
2.12.2 Health IT Risks and Errors 
Despite these benefits and the ever-evolving computer and information 
technology, it has also introduced unintentional consequences (Koppel et al., 
2005; Koppel, 2006; Buntin et al., 2011; Magrabi et al., 2016; Kim, Coiera and 
Magrabi, 2017). Technology (software/hardware) as a component of complex 
socio-technical systems is not isolated from other parts but requires interactions 
with intended users (clinicians) (Leveson, 2002). For instance, computing 
systems installed and utilised by practitioners can potentially have “computer 
bugs”, resulting in unintended consequences eventually leading to patient harm 
(Magrabi et al., 2016; Thomas and Thimbleby, 2018). According to the authors, 
these computer bugs are regarded as a “computer-related error” and can be 
overlooked by programmers and manufacturers (software vendors). Cheung et 
al. (2014), in their review of incidents associated with health IT, also noted after 
implementing CPOE systems in hospitals that while prescribing error rates 
reduced (between 29% to 96%), new forms of errors were introduced. An 
example will be when a user unintentionally selects a wrong item or patient due 
to these items being close to each other on the screen (juxtaposition error) 
(Cheung et al., 2014).  
 
Notable examples of computer-induced accidents include the famous Therac-25 
accident (Leveson, 1995) regarding a massive overdose of radiation and the 
London-Ambulance Computer Aided Dispatch System (Finkelstein, 1993). While 
these examples are acknowledged as major software-related problems, errors in 
software systems were not the only factors that contributed to their respective 
adverse outcomes (Johnson, 2002). In addition, systemic factors (existing within 





and implemented can negatively impact patient safety (Institute for Medicine, 
2012). One notable example of this was a study that examined the reasons 
behind the failed UK National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT) 
(Waterson, 2014). The report summarised Ken Eason’s analysis of why the 
national project was discontinued due to its failure in implementing a set of new 
HIT systems. Therefore, it's imperative to highlight cases where health-IT 
systems played a role in patient harm and analyse why it happened and how to 
prevent them from reoccurring.  
 
2.12.3 Investigation of Health IT-related Incidents 
Health IT analysis has become an emerging speciality and is considered a more 
specific area under the umbrella of the patient safety literature on incidents 
occurring in the healthcare system (Makeham et al., 2017). According to the 
authors' systematic literature review, they identified twenty-one (21) 
investigations relating to HIT incidents where the majority of them ranged from 
clinical settings in six countries, including the UK, USA, the Netherlands, China, 
Australia, and Hong Kong (Makeham et al., 2017). Further in their review, they 
identified that: 
• Out of the 21 investigations, 3 were detailed and in-depth reviews on 
inpatient healthcare settings in the USA. From these three studies, 2 of them 
involved medication management systems including bar-coding and order 
entry systems (to be analysed in Chapter Four). 
• Of these 21 studies, 13 reported on patient deaths, where 83 of them died 
due to health IT-related incidents. 66 of these deaths were from sentinel 
events investigated by the US Joint Commission. 
• 15 out of 16 investigations focused on reports relating to patient harm, while 
the remaining was a near-miss. 
Although their review did not include the Septra overdose incident (Wachter, 
2015), which took place at the University of California (UCL) teaching hospital as 
this could also be classified as an in-depth case study (Chapter Six). 
Furthermore, based on the summary of findings from Magrabi et al. (2016) study, 
they identified health IT-related incidents as a growing problem and how they 





• US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) received 260 IT-related incident 
reports, where 44 of such incidents were linked to patient injuries, and six 
reported deaths (Magrabi et al., 2012). 
• Australian Incident Management Systems (AIMS) received 117 IT-related 
incidents between 2003 and 2005, where 38% (n = 44 incidents) of the 
incidents resulted in adverse consequences caused by treatment delays. 
However, no deaths were reported (Magrabi et al., 2010). 
• Regarding CPOE systems, the rate of computer-related paediatric errors 
resulted in 10 errors per 1000 patient-delays and 3.6 errors per 1000 patient-
days relating to the rate of serious computer-related paediatric errors (Walsh 
et al., 2006). 
• IT-related medication errors where 4,416 incidents submitted to the Dutch 
Central Reporting System indicated that 16% (n = 707 incidents) of these 
incidents resulted from IT. Some of the notable errors include incorrect 
medication selection and prescription failure relating to CPOE systems 
(Cheung et al., 2014). 
• At the local level, EHR-related problems from 3,099 incident reports 
submitted to the Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority between 2004 and 
2012. Over 2,700 incidents were near-misses, and 15 resulted from patient 
harm (Sparnon and Marella, 2012). 
 
In another related study, an analysis was undertaken involving a ten-year data 
collection of incidents in England and Wales taken from the National Reporting 
and Learning System (NRLS). From the data, 2,627 health-IT related failures 
were identified, where out of this, 82% (n = 2154 failures) did not result in 
patient harm, 13% (n = 342 failures) caused low harm, and the remaining 4% (n = 
105 failures) contributed to patient death (Martin et al., 2019). These example 
studies indicate the necessity of analysing IT-related incidents. While these 
examples focus on analysing quantitative data, the thesis will address the 
application and evaluation of the standardised and proposed AcciMap versions on 
qualitative data (using narrative case incidents). The domain-specific taxonomy 
to be developed based on the standardised AcciMap can then be applied to 






2.13 Current Gap in Knowledge 
Despite the impact of Rasmussen’s work in the academic community and the 
popularity of the AcciMap as a systemic accident analysis (SAA) approach, there 
is little evidence that his methods have had similar success in practice (Salmon 
et al., 2017). This evidence is supported by how National Health Services (NHS) 
trusts (and boards) have been very dependent on the use of RCA approaches like 
fishbone diagrams and barrier analysis (Canham et al., 2018; Dixon, Waterson 
and Barnes, 2018). Systemic accident approaches are being gradually utilised for 
incident analysis in clinical settings either as standalone or with existing 
techniques like RCA and HFACS (Dixon, Waterson and Barnes, 2018). Also, as 
earlier highlighted in this chapter, validity, reliability, and usability (ease of 
learning) are considered essential characteristics in determining their 
appropriateness for accident analysis (Underwood and Waterson, 2014; Ryan, 
2015). However, for this thesis, only the reliability and validity of the proposed 
AcciMap approach will be evaluated relating to research questions two and 
three.  
 
A study that implemented the conclusion made from the work of Salmon et al. 
(2012) was the development of the taxonomy-based AcciMap approach 
(UPLOADS) specific to analysing outdoor activities data (Goode et al., 2017; 
Salmon et al., 2017). The additional purpose of their classification scheme was 
to analyse and classify multiple incident data, similar to how the HFACS 
approach is utilised. This concept can also be applied in developing a proposed 
AcciMap version for healthcare and specifically for health IT analysis to bridge 
the research-practice gap regarding using SAA approaches in practice. An 
important observation from the testing of the reliability and validity of the 
UPLOADS scheme based on the study methodology of both Salmon et al. (2017) 
and Goode et al. (2017) was that there was a set of causal/contributing factors. 
These factors, particularly from the latter study, were pre-determined and 
classified based on the UPLOAD taxonomy, with causal relationships identified 
and safety recommendations formulated. Their work also identified other ways 
of analysing incident data for testing their approach, including not using any pre-
determined factors for classification. This option will require participants to use 





comprehensive incident to identify causal/contributing factors, classify them in 
sub-categories, and identify causal relationships. This approach will be applied 
in the reliability assessment in Chapter Six. 
 
In addressing the research questions, the perception of using the standardised 
AcciMap approach will require evaluation, particularly among patient safety 
practitioners from the National Health Service (NHS) bodies and trusts. 
Observations and results of the initial assessment can significantly influence the 
development of the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. Chapters Three and Four will 
address the evaluation and perception of Branford’s AcciMap approach with 
patient safety practitioners. Chapter Five provides the methodology for 
developing the proposed (Medi-Socio) AcciMap framework based on existing 
taxonomies and applied for health IT analysis. Reliability (Chapter Six) and 
validity (Chapter Seven) assessments will compare the AcciMap approaches in 





















3.0 CHAPTER THREE: Application and assessment of the 
Standardised AcciMap approach 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the first research question on evaluating clinical 
safety/risk management practitioners' perception of their first-time application 
of Branford’s standardised AcciMap approach for accident analysis. A case study, 
“Wrong Patient” (Chassin and Becher, 2002), was used as part of the AcciMap 
training workshop involving practitioners across NHS boards in Scotland who have 
never applied a systemic accident approach in their respective practices. 
Subsequent sections will evaluate results from the survey instrument and 
AcciMap results comprising contributing factors, causal links and safety 
recommendations. The survey instrument focused on the usage characteristics 
criteria adapted from a previous study (Underwood, Waterson and Braithwaite, 
2016) was used to evaluate their responses. Contributing factors, causal links 
and safety recommendations were compared between each team and expert 
outcomes from the incident. The benefits and limitations of applying the 
AcciMap approach based on their first-time use were discussed at the workshop's 
close. 
 
3.2 Research Methodology 
In exploring, applying, and assessing Branford’s AcciMap approach with the 
proposed AcciMap taxonomy, a qualitative study involving a case study approach 
is considered most applicable in this study and subsequent chapters. Case study 
analysis consists of investigating “a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident; and multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin, 1984). Using 
case studies to test a hypothesis also helps provide “empirical enquiry” in giving 
a detailed and in-depth explanation of that particular phenomenon (Yin, 1984; 
Wilson, 1979 cited in Branford, 2007). However, for this thesis, a case study 
approach is applied to address each research question. While each incident was 
randomly selected, they provided an opportunity for clinical safety participants 
to be familiar with them from a neutral standpoint and understand events and 





The independent user’s analysis of the incident and the resulting AcciMap 
outcomes are compared with one another (reliability) and with those of experts 
(validity). These outcomes will then be used qualitatively (visual observation) 
and quantitatively to assess and compare Branford’s standardised AcciMap 
method and the proposed Medi-Socio AcciMap version. This process allows for 
insight to be gained regarding similarities and variations to determine where and 
why they occurred or potentially could have occurred (Branford, 2007). 
However, one limitation of applying the case study approach is dealing with 
different cognitive biases, such as subjective, researcher, and recall biases 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001). The nature of conducting case study analysis between users 
and from expert analyses is that it involves subjective judgements regarding the 
identification, placement, and classification of contributing factors identified. 
This study also extends to determining the similarity of contributing factors and 
safety recommendations from different users.  
 
Quantitative analyses of results obtained also involve making subjective 
judgements on these aspects. However, as Branford’s thesis noted, quantitative 
data derived from “intersubjective” decisions during content analysis are less 
open to criticisms regarding the data analysis. Another criticism of the case 
study approach is that findings from a single case cannot be generalised 
(Branford, 2007). However, it was noted that a sample representative of a 
broader population through random sampling would be necessary to generalise 
from a case study. Furthermore, such investigation will require repeating with a 
different set of users for the typicality of the results to be maintained 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001). However, single cases are beneficial for experimental 
purposes, especially at the preliminary stage, where hypotheses can be tested 
systematically using a more significant number of incidents. 
 
In addressing the first research question, this study will involve a case incident, 
“Wrong Patient”, published in the Annals of Medicine journal (Chassin and 
Becher, 2002). The incident was selected because the events took place in the 
USA and were unfamiliar to the participants. Participants will then apply the 
AcciMap approach and associated guidelines to identify causal/contributing 





were trained to use the AcciMap method within the first hour. Then, participants 
were given two hours for the AcciMap analysis exercise. The following sections 
outline the study methodology. 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
A total of fifteen (n = 15) participants accepted the invitation and took part in 
the AcciMap training workshop. Information and consent forms were given to the 
participants and filled out before the workshop. Participants were composed of 
eight (8) territorial (regional) NHS boards (out of a total of 14 across Scotland 
who are responsible for improving the health of the population and delivery of 
frontline healthcare services) and three (3) special NHS boards (they provide 
specialist and national services) (NHSScotland, 2020). The roles and 
responsibilities of the participants across different NHS boards in Scotland 
included Clinical governance, Risk management, and Health and Safety 
management (see table 3-1).  
 
Table 3-1: List of participants involved in the AcciMap Training Workshop 
(Edinburgh) 
Participant Role/Responsibility Years of Experience 
(as of 2016) 
1 Head of Clinical Governance and Risk Management N/A 
2 Senior Member, Healthcare Environmental Services N/A 
3 Corporate Risk Manager 15 
4 Lead Clinical Risk Coordinator, Clinical Governance 
Support Unit 
5 
5 Head of Occupational Health & Safety 7 
6 Risk Management Advisor (Patient Safety) N/A 
7 Clinical Risk Manager 10 
8 Risk/Health & Safety Manager, Clinical Governance & 
Health & Safety team 
7 
9 Risk Manager, State Hospital 11 
10 Head of Health and Safety 9 
11 Risk Manager, Scottish Ambulance Service N/A 
12 Risk Management Service Support & Datix Systems 
Administrator 
N/A 
13 Risk & Safety Manager N/A 
14 Lead Clinical Risk Coordinator, Clinical Risk 
Management 
5 
15 Patient Safety Lead, Healthcare Improvement Scotland 4 






In addition, all participants have experience using Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
techniques in their respective boards for incident analysis. The Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland (HIS) provided the ethics approval to conduct the 
workshop with invited clinical safety practitioners. 
 
3.2.2 Training Provided 
Training materials, including the case incident information and the AcciMap 
guidelines (Appendix B-1), were provided and distributed before the training and 
analysis workshop. On the day of the workshop, participants were introduced to 
the AcciMap approach and the broader Risk Management Framework (RMF). A 




During the first section of the training, the clinical safety participants were 
introduced to the theory and practical AcciMap application using an example 
incident (Horsky, Kuperman and Patel, 2005). Participants were then randomly 
divided into three groups: teams A, B, and C, each comprising five members. To 
reduce bias, the incident information only contained the chronology (timeline) 
of events without any initial analyses and discussions from the original authors. 
Each team commenced their study of the incident within the next two hours 
assigned for the exercise. Also, each group was provided with A3 paper and 
sticky notes to construct their AcciMap outcomes. Safety recommendations were 
also developed after the teams completed their evaluations within the two-hour 
window. Each of the team’s discussions as they were analysing the incident was 
also audio recorded. After their analyses, the teams were then required to 
review each other's results before the final discussion. Questionnaires were then 
distributed to participants after the focus group discussions were completed to 
end the workshop. 
 
3.3 Case Incident One - Synopsis 
The incident highlighted a type of medical error that occurred in a US-based 
hospital where the wrong patient underwent an invasive procedure (Chassin and 





and warranted attention. Also, this type of event (wrong patient invasive 
procedure) was under-reported, according to Chassin and Becher (2002). The 
scenario involved a 67-year-old patient admitted to the hospital for cerebral 
angiography but mistakenly underwent an invasive cardiac electrophysiology 
procedure. A second patient, a 77-year-old, was transferred from another 
hospital for a cardiac electrophysiology procedure. Her procedure was delayed 
for two days and was intended to be the first case on the day of the first 
patient’s planned discharge from the hospital. The complete timeline of the 
chronology of events is summarised (Appendix B-2). This incident was selected 
based on reasons regarding the type of error and the location where it occurred. 
This incident was reviewed and analysed using the institution’s root cause 
analysis tool, where several distinct errors were discovered. According to the 
study, “no singular error” was identified, which could have led to the adverse 
event itself (Chassin and Becher, 2002). 
 
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
Data sources from the workshop consisted of audio recordings from each group 
designated as Team A, B, and C and survey data on the evaluation of the 
AcciMap method. In addition, the AcciMap outputs from each group were also 
collected, including safety recommendations. 
 
3.4.1 AcciMap Analysis Workshop 
After the exercise, each team reviewed and compared their findings with what 
other groups did in producing their outcomes. AcciMap results are compared and 
contrasted for similarities and differences in contributing factors using content 
analysis as a qualitative reliability measurement (Branford, 2007). The AcciMap 
results were also compared with external analysis of the case incident to 
determine if similar contributing factors and safety recommendations were 
identified (validity assessment). 
 
3.4.2 AcciMap Evaluation Questionnaire 
The evaluation questionnaire used for the workshop was from previous fieldwork 
utilizing another systemic accident method (STAMP) (Underwood, Waterson and 





Microsoft Excel and R, a statistical software. The questionnaire consisted of 
twenty-two (22) questions relating to important aspects of an accident analysis 
approach, including usability and validity (Appendix B-3). These aspects were 
also used to evaluate the STAMP approach in a small investigation study with 
safety practitioners in the Railway domain. The questionnaire was distributed to 
the participants after the analysis exercise was completed. 
 
3.4.3 Audio Recordings 
Audio recordings were collected from each team after their analyses and final 
group discussions. They were manually transcribed to determine themes relating 
to the identified contributing factors. The audio data was used to ascertain their 
experiences after applying the AcciMap approach, including the advantages, 
limitations, and areas of improvement. 
 
3.5 AcciMap Workshop Findings 
Findings based on the survey instrument and the respective AcciMap results from 
the participants’ analysis of the case study are divided into the following 
sections: 
 
3.5.1 AcciMap Survey Analysis 
The survey's average response to all questions (22) was neutral (in the range 2-
4), as seen in table 3-2. However, there was a range of standard deviations 
across the questions meaning the spread of responses on each question varied. 
For example, question 16 (AcciMap is easy to use in a team-based analysis) has 
the lowest standard deviation (SD) value (0.641), meaning the average 
difference from the mean for each response keeps the response neutral. 
However, this question compares to question 7 (AcciMap provides a 
comprehensive description of an accident) for which the standard deviation is 
higher, with a value of 1.261, which means that the average difference between 
responses and the mean could change the response to be “agree” or “disagree”. 
This point also means there is less certainty that this is a neutral response 
overall. Question 6 (sub-questions 6a to 6e) focused on the effectiveness of the 
AcciMap approach in identifying contributing factors based on “technical 





“external issues”. However, the outcome from those sub-questions indicated 
neutral responses based on their SD value except for sub-question 6e (AcciMap 
effectively analysing contributing factors to an accident from External issues) 
with a high SD score of 1.198, indicating responses were also spread out.  
 
Table 3-2: Descriptive Statistics based on the Survey Questions (questions 4 to 
22) 
Question N Min Max Mean SD 
4.) AcciMap is a suitable method for analysing accidents 13 3 6 3.92 .862 
5.) AcciMap effectively describes the timeline of events 
leading to the accident 
13 0 3 2.23 1.013 
6 a.)   AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to 
an accident from Technical components 
13 3 5 3.62 .650 
6 b.)   AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to 
an accident from Human factor issues 
13 2 5 3.54 .776 
6 c.)   AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to 
an accident from Organisational issues 
13 3 5 3.77 .725 
6 d.)   AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to 
an accident from Environmental issues 
13 3 5 3.54 .660 
6 e.)   AcciMap effectively analyses the contributing factors to 
an accident from External issues 
13 0 5 3.54 1.198 
7.) AcciMap provides a comprehensive description of an 
accident 
13 1 6 3.62 1.261 
8.) AcciMap effectively represents causal relationships 
between each level 
13 3 6 3.38 .870 
9.) AcciMap accurately identifies the causes of an accident 13 3 6 3.23 .832 
10.) AcciMap can be applied to analyse any type of accident 
in NHS boards 
13 2 6 3.54 1.266 
11.) AcciMap is an easy method to understand 13 3 6 3.85 .987 
12.) The terms and concepts used in the AcciMap method are 
clear and unambiguous 
13 3 5 3.77 .725 
13.) It is easy to identify contributing factors that led to the 
accident 
12 3 5 3.83 .718 
14.) It is easy to identify unsafe decisions that led to the 
accident 
13 2 5 3.62 .768 
15.) AcciMap is an easy method to use for accident analysis 13 3 6 3.85 .987 
16.) AcciMap is easy to use in a team-based analysis 13 3 5 3.92 .641 
17.) AcciMap promotes team collaboration during analysis 13 2 5 3.08 1.115 
18.) AcciMap's graphical diagram is a useful communication 
tool 
13 2 5 3.38 .870 
19.) It would be easy for me to become skilled at using the 
AcciMap method 
13 3 6 3.15 .987 
20.) AcciMap analysis can be completed in an acceptable 
timescale (within a few hours of the workshop) 
12 3 5 3.75 .754 
21.) AcciMap method is time consuming 13 1 5 3.08 1.038 
22.) I received sufficient introductory training in the use of 
the AcciMap method to effectively use this method 





Reasons for these neutral responses could relate to their first attempt at 
applying the AcciMap approach using the guidelines, understanding of the 
incident, and lack of substantial evidence at organisational and external levels. 
For example, one of the factors at the organisational level, “electrophysiology 
laboratory computer not in sync with the hospital’s main computer system”, 
contributed to the patient subsequently not being adequately identified by the 
medical staff. However, further investigation will be needed to ascertain why 
that is the case, and the parties responsible would include the technical/IT 
department and hospital management. Other organisational factors were not 
based on explicit evidence but deduced based on the actions of medical staff. 
These include how they interacted with the patient (obtaining consent), 
misidentifying the patient, and inadequate communication with other staff (not 
using the patient's full name). There were also mixed responses from 
participants regarding the application of the AcciMap approach being a time-
consuming process and the sufficiency of the training for effective use (questions 
21 and 22).  
 
Other aspects of the AcciMap method regarding identifying unsafe decisions 
(question 14) and terms and concepts being clear (question 12) also indicated 
mixed responses. These aspects may have been influenced by their level of 
satisfaction regarding the sufficiency of the AcciMap training workshop (question 
22). Generally, the reasons for neutral responses from participants could be 
because of the following reasons:  
• Neutral responses may be genuinely neutral, which potentially means 
participants see little difference or no advantages or disadvantages to other 
methods available. 
• Neutral responses may indicate that a participant has not fully understood 
the AcciMap approach and so do not wish to comment strongly in either 
direction. 
• Neutral responses may be caused by user fatigue, and this may mean that 
the survey may be too long for participants to concentrate for long enough. 
• Neutral responses may occur due to a central tendency. This point means 
that participants may tend to answer more towards the centre of a scale 





However, their responses to questions of interest from the survey can be used to 
substantiate with findings from their respective AcciMap results regarding their 
first-time experience utilising the AcciMap approach. The following subsections 
elaborate on the results.  
 
3.5.2 AcciMap Results 
The AcciMap outputs produced by each Team A (figure 3-1), B (Appendix B-4) 
and C (Appendix B-5) based on initial observation showed similarities and 
differences in contributing factors identified. Each AcciMap output was 
compared with one another (reliability) and compared with findings obtained 
from an external (expert) review (validity) of the incident (section 3.6). 
Contributing factors identified based on evidence are denoted as regular boxes, 
while factors considered inferences are represented as broken boxes. The 
comparative study of AcciMap results between teams and external review are 
based on contributing factors, causal relationships, placement of factors and 













Based on each team's contributing factors, similar factors were identified but 
expressed using different semantics. Their respective findings relating to some 
of the contributing factors from the incident identified are discussed in the 
following subsections: 
 
3.5.2.1 Contributing Factor – Hospital's Computer Systems 
All teams identified the contributing factor relating to the electrophysiology 
laboratory system. This factor was explicitly indicated as “incompatibility of IT 
systems” (Team A), “electrophysiology system and hospital’s main computer not 
communicating with one another” (Team B), and “separate computer systems 
not communicating with one another” (Team C). Team B regarded issues 
relating to technology (Computer systems) not communicating with one another 
(Hospital's primary computer system) and how this contributed to the patient 
being misidentified (“Morrison” being confused with “Morris”). Team C also 
indicated issues relating to computing systems not communicating, leading to 
the patient’s identity not being confirmed before the procedure commenced. 
 
3.5.2.2 Contributing Factor – Patient Misidentification and Communication 
Issues 
Several contributing factors identified by team C attributed to issues relating to 
“patient identification” and “patient being ignored by the physician” stem from 
communication issues regarding the identification of the correct patient (staff 
not verifying the identity of the patient, e.g., using the date of birth). One of 
the participants (Team C) pointed out this factor based on personal experience 
about a patient (ward): 
 
“Every time the ward was handed over, they read the ward’s date of 
birth.” 
 
This step would be a barrier against misidentification, ensuring that the patient 
examined is the right one. They further reasoned those failures exist when 
identifying patients' names, even when two patients may be in entirely different 
hospital areas and the barriers that should be in place to prevent it. Regarding 





this was a result of other factors, including “pressures of waiting time” or 
“inadequate training”. Finally, there were no indications among Team A 
participants regarding communication issues but indicated issues relating to 
other staff (operations) failing to identify the patient correctly. 
 
3.5.2.3 Contributing Factor – Patient’s Uninformed Consent 
While differently worded, one of the contributing factors carried the same 
meaning and identified by teams A and B was the patient giving uninformed 
consent. Team A’s analysis, for example, depicted this contributing factor as 
“lack of informed consent”, to which one of the participants noted an issue of 
consent relating to the patient: 
 
“Lacks the whole human factors elements to it; overburdened and 
exhausted physicians, they do not know the patients, they don’t know if 
they actually spoke about what the procedure is.” 
 
Another participant (Team A) supported this as a contributing factor and 
explained further that: 
 
“Patients cannot frequently recall within hours of giving crucial 
information. But if we know that, why was it not getting spoken about 
earlier.” 
 
Their observations would explain their reasoning for the mix-up regarding the 
patient giving consent. She consented but was not adequately informed about 
the type of procedure she would undergo. Also, the patient experiencing 
nauseating symptoms created a situation where assumptions about her condition 
led to the belief that she was indeed supposed to undergo such a procedure. The 
participants also acknowledged that consent regularly occurs in health practices, 
although the case incident did not state this. Team B participants similarly 
identified “patient giving an uninformed consent” as elaborated by one of the 
participants: 
 
“I assume that in most healthcare establishments, when a patient says 
no, I do not want that (procedure), it happens, they pause and will not 





The concept of “surgical pause” was considered a contributing factor and was 
even deemed one of the holes in the Swiss Cheese by one participant! This 
factor, shared by another participant, indicated the need for absolute clarity 
regarding the “pause” in the process and to look for specific indicators to get a 
green light on whether to proceed with double checking if it is the right patient 
for the procedure. This measure also includes the need for double-checking the 
consent form, getting the paperwork right, checking if the patient understands 
the procedure, and evaluating whether it is safe to carry out the operation. If 
these indicators are not present, then the procedure should not even progress. 
In other words, the team determined that there were margins of failure in the 
system. However, team C did not explicitly include this contributing factor and 
suggested “staff not listening to the patient and was not in agreement” was a 
consent issue. This issue was because the preceding cause of that effect was 
“inadequate policies regarding patient consent” (organisational factor). 
 
3.5.2.4 Contributing Factor – Organisational Issues 
While participants were allowed to make inferences on contributing factors at 
the organisational level, they also identified factors based on the information 
available in the case study. For example, teams A and C identified a contributing 
factor relating to staff not challenging or questioning the higher hierarchy 
regarding the misidentification of the patient. Also, team A identified 
contributing factor “tolerance of lack of systemic identity checks” as a safety 
culture issue relating to the hospital’s failure to conduct patient identity checks 
at different instances (at the physical level). However, this was noted as an 
assumption and not necessarily a fact. Finally, team B identified “Management 
complacency” as an organisational issue, and their reasoning behind this factor 
was highlighted by one of the participants (Team B): 
 
“Allowing the staff to take unilateral decisions when they shouldn’t as 
long as nothing goes wrong, then they are quite happy for that to let it 
go on.” 
 
Several other organisational contributing factors were identified by team C 
including “staff not challenging”, which was causally linked to another factor at 





factors including “lack of safety culture”, “lack of clinical governance” were 
identified by team C as inferences. They considered these factors to be reasons 
that contributed to the organisational culture of developing shortcuts and 
workarounds. 
 
3.5.2.5 Contributing Factor – External Issues 
No contributing factors based on evidence in the case study were identified by 
any of the teams for the external level, but inferences were made. These 
inferences made by each group can be summarised based on their AcciMap 
outcomes in table 3-3 below: 
 
Table 3-3: Contributing factors (Inferences) based on the case incident (Teams 
A, B, and C) 
Team A Team B Team C 
• Lack of consistency 
regarding E-health 
technologies 
• Improving hospital 
standards 
• Legal implications of 
informed consent 
• Issues relating to record-
keeping and code of 
practice 
• Waiting lists and targets from 
the government 
• Budgeting issues and cost 
cuttings 
• Set targets delivered to the 
organisation 
 
• Issues regarding boarding 
from another hospital 
• Demand demographics 
• Waiting times and targets 
 
 
Reasons behind each team’s decision to include these contributing factors were 
not openly discussed in their analyses. However, it indicates differences based 
on their perception and understanding of possible systemic factors that created 
the climate for the events. The one inference at this level that was similar 
between teams B and C was “waiting lists and targets”. 
 
It was observed during the exercise that some of the participants employed 
human factors thinking and traditional techniques such as the 5-Whys and barrier 
analysis based on their experiences in conducting an incident investigation. 
Comparing the AcciMap outcomes by placing immediate causes after the incident 
at the “Physical Actors and Processes” level, we noticed similar events from the 





constructed by each team appeared to show differences. These are discussed 
further in the following section of the comparative analysis of results. 
 
3.6 External Analysis  
The principal researcher and a clinical domain expert carried out an external 
(expert) analysis of the incident, as shown in figure 3-4. The result obtained 
from the incident analysis and used as part of the discussion regarding the face 
validity of findings obtained from the NHS participants. No contributing factors 
were identified at the external level due to a lack of evidence from the case 
incident. There were more contributing factors identified at the physical/actor 
level than from the results of participants. However, the reason for this is that 
the number of factors associated with the activities of the other medical staff 
involved led to the patient receiving a wrong procedure was identified. 
Additionally, other contributing factors (organisational level) include the 
perceived culture of not challenging senior staff members and policies regarding 
the verification of patients before undergoing any planned medical procedure. 
Other contributing factors identified include patients sharing a similar 
pseudonym (physical/actor level), and inadequate policy regarding clinical 









Figure 3-2: AcciMap Output of Case incident – External Review
58 
 
3.7 Comparison of AcciMap Results 
AcciMap results produced by each team were compared to assess the reliability 
of outcomes produced. Based on the qualitative evaluation approach adopted by 
Branford (2007), the following criteria used to evaluate the results include: 
1.) Identification of causal/contributing factors at each AcciMap level 
2.) Placement of causal/contributing factors at the appropriate AcciMap level 
3.) Causal links (relationships) within and between each AcciMap level 
4.) Safety recommendations 
 
While each team would not produce the same AcciMap model output, the 
purpose was to determine if similar factors were identified, the level they were 
placed in, and if similar causal links between them could be identified. Also, 
wordings used to describe events (contributing factors) were not expected to be 
identical as long as they portrayed similar meanings. 
 
3.7.1 Identification of Causes/Contributing Factors 
Causal/contributing factors identified by each team for each AcciMap level is 
divided into two parts. First, the process of comparing contributing factors 
between groups involves using qualitative content analysis to determine similar 
contributing factors identified from each team’s AcciMap results (Hignett and 
McDermottt, 2015). Each similar contributing factor is assigned an alphanumeric 
and colour coded as shown in figure 3-3. Second, the remaining contributing 
factors are uniquely identified from each team’s AcciMap result. 
 
3.7.1.1 Physical actor events Level 
At the physical/actor events level, team A identified three (3) factors, team B 
identified thirteen (13), and team C identified seven (7) factors. The only similar 
contributing factor identified by all groups was the factor relating to “patient 
identification” (C-2) from figure 3-3. Other similar contributing factors 
identified include “patient’s wishes being ignored by medical personnel” (C-4) 
by teams A and B and “inadequate handover procedures/processes” (C-6) by 
teams A and B (team B placed it at this level). Table 3-4 shows contributing 





Figure 3-3: Causal relationships (between similar contributing factors) identified 




Table 3-4: Contributing factors uniquely identified by each team (A, B, and C) 
(Physical/Actor Level) 
Team A Team B Team C 
Physical/Actor-Process Level 
• IV prescription is 
given over the 
phone 
• Operations making 
“assumptions” 
given the current 
information 
available 
• The patient was nauseated and not 
feeling well while giving consent 
• Patient not being recognised by the 
attending in the electrophysiology lab 
the night before 
• Electro lab did not identify the patient 
from the night before and did not 
question the patient’s reluctance 
• Assumptions by the neurosurgery team 
that his attending had ordered the 
study 
• The attending in electro lab did not 
recognise the patient from the night 
before 
• The fellow was aware of missing 
information but never followed up 
• All consents forms received except the 
wrong patient and then one additional 
consent form 
• The patient delayed for 
two days 
• End of shift (the team 
did not provide context 
for this factor) 
• Study arranged despite 
no written order 
• The doctor instructs 
prescription for nausea 
rather than having a 
discussion 
• No name used in the 
conversation 
Organisational Level 
• Design issues: 
incompatibility of 
IT systems 
• Lack of adherence 
regarding the pre-
surgery checklist 
• Tolerance of 
systematic identity 
checks 
• Lack of 
protocol/adherenc
e to the protocol 
on IV prescription 
over the phone 
• Accepting patients from outside the 
hospital with no robust 
communications systems 
• Management allowance for procedures 
to go without written order for IN 
chart 
• Lack of auditing 
• Pressure of time for getting the list 
done by clinical staff 
• Lack of strategic systems to track 
patient’s information 
• Lack of IT controls, strategy, and 
development 
• Poor training for staff regarding 
handover process 
• Accepted shortcuts and 
workarounds created 
• Lack of inadequate 
policy regarding patient 
consent 




• ** Lack of safety culture  
• ** Lack of clinical 
governance 
• ** Person-centred 
External Level 
No contributing factor was identified at this level (see prior table 3-3 for inferences at the 
external level) 
** Indicating inferences from the AcciMap analysis 
 
3.7.1.2 Organisational Level 
At this level, team A identified eight (8) causes/contributing factors, team B 
identified seven (7), and team C identified eight (8), although out of that 
number, four (4) indicated as “assumptions”. Similar contributing factors include 
“medical staff not challenging authority” (C-5) was identified by teams A and C. 
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Another similar contributing factor identified by groups B and C related to 
“communication between computer systems” (although this factor was placed at 
different AcciMap levels, as shown in subsection 3.5.2). The remaining 
contributing factor, “issues relating to patient’s informed consent” (C-1), was 
identified by teams A and B (although team A placed this at the organisational 
level).  
 
3.7.1.3 External Level 
No similar contributing factors were identified at this level by the teams. The 
incident did not contain explicit evidence of the factors that contributed to the 
decisions made at the organisational level (subsection 3.5.2.5). 
 
3.7.2 Placement of Causes/Contributing Factors 
Placement of causes/contributing factors at the appropriate level is considered 
essential in addressing system areas that need improvement through safety 
measures (Branford, 2007). According to Branford's guidelines, the placement of 
contributing factors is determined if these factors were placed at the 
appropriate AcciMap level. Contributing factors attributed to patient 
misidentification, miscommunication with the patient (C-2), and patient giving 
uninformed consent (C-1) were all placed at the appropriate level (physical 
actors level). Another contributing factor, “lack of communication between 
computer systems (C-3)”, particularly between the main hospital and the 
electrophysiology unit, was appropriately placed at the organisational level by 
teams A and C. However, Team B put that contributing factor at the 
physical/actor level instead of the organisational level as this was within the 
hospital organisation's control. Another contributing factor (C-6) was placed 
differently by teams A (organisational) and B (physical/actor).  
 
3.7.3 Causal relationships (links) within and between AcciMap levels 
This criterion is perhaps the most challenging when comparing causal 
relationships between similar contributing factors identified from all teams 
AcciMap results. Team B’s outcome had the most causal links (31), with team A 
having fifteen (15) and team C having twenty-one (21) connections. A similar 
process used in identifying and coding similar contributing factors was used to 
identify causal links (direct and indirect) between teams. Each similar link 
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between factors was also coloured and assigned a code (see figure 3-3). Based 
on all causal relationships identified, the only causal relationship (direct and 
indirect) that was similar was in respect to patient misidentification leading to 
the effect of the wrong patient being administered a procedure (Teams A, B, 
and C) (Link-1). Other causal relationships between physical/actor, 
organisational and outcome levels that were similarly identified by the teams 
include: 
a) The linkage (direct and indirect) between “Wishes of patient ignored” and 
“Patient (Jane Morrison) being given an EP procedure” – Teams B and C 
(Link-2) 
b) The linkage (direct and indirect) between “Computer systems not interacting 
(communication)with each other” and “patient receiving a wrong procedure” 
– Teams B and C (Link-3) 
c) The linkage (direct and indirect) between “lack of informed consent from 
the patient” and “patient receiving a wrong procedure” – Team A and B 
(Link-4) 
d) The linkage (direct and indirect) between “staff not challenging authority” 
and “patient receiving a wrong procedure” – Team A and C (Link-5)   
 
3.7.4 Safety Recommendations 
Based on safety recommendations produced by each team, there were 
similarities and differences based on their respective analyses (see table 3-5). 
Similarities from the safety recommendations were also identified by 
determining themes using content analysis. These were also labelled using an 
alphanumeric code (designated as Safety recommendation – SR-1), and the 
themes identified from the teams consist of the following: 
1.) Implementation of safety briefs (SR-1) - (Teams A and C),  
2.) Reviewing processes relating to consent policy (SR-2) - (Teams B and C) 
and, 
3.) Reviewing existing computer systems (SR-3) - (Team A and B).  
 
These recommendations relate to contributing factors including handover 




Table 3-5: Safety recommendations of Teams A, B, and C based on Wrong 
Patient case incident 
Team A Team B Team C 
1.) A full review of 
systems (SR-3). 




1.) The process for patient 
consent must be robust, and 
unless completed procedure 
must be halted. This process 
should be audited (SR-2). 
2.) Patient information systems 
must be able to share 
information. 
3.) The compatibility of systems 
needs to be reviewed (SR-3). 
1.) Implementation of safety 
briefs to support the 
development of safety 
culture (SR-1). 
2.) Implementation of 
consent policy (SR-2). 
 
Comparing each team’s safety recommendations with those produced from the 
external analysis (see table 3-6) shows similar outcomes relating to patient 
consent policies and reviewing computing systems in terms of synchronising with 
each other with updated patient information. However, other recommendations 
not indicated by respective teams include organisational safety culture regarding 
challenging hierarchy when reporting concerns and reviewing policies and 
training regarding patient identification. Another essential safety 
recommendation will be syncing information regarding the patient (i.e., 
identity) between computer systems within the organisation and setting up 
security checks to ensure patients' correct identification and procedure. 
 
Table 3-6: Safety recommendations (external analysis) on the Wrong Patient 
case incident 
Safety Recommendations 
1.) Patient Identification 
a.) Review of the organisational policy on positive patient identification to ensure it is 
adequate, i.e., it contains clear instructions on triangulating a patient’s 
identification – ask the patient their name, DoB (Date of Birth), and what they 
understand they are here for. 
b.) Develop appropriate training materials (online?) for this purpose 
c.) Implement a programme of mandatory training for all staff in patient-facing roles to 
ensure this is embedded in daily practice. 
 
2.) Patient Consent 
a.) Review of the organisational policy on positive patient consent to ensure it is 
adequate, i.e., it contains clear descriptions of informed and uninformed consent 
and includes “break glass” conditions for when it is not possible to obtain informed 
consent. 
b.) Develop appropriate training materials (online?) for this purpose 
c.) Implement a programme of mandatory training for all staff in patient-facing roles to 





3.) Clinical Communication 
a.) Review of the organisational policy on positive patient consent to ensure it is 
adequate, i.e., it contains clear guidance on the mandatory information which 
should be relayed at any hand-over of a patient from one healthcare professional to 
another.  This may benefit from the adoption of the SBAR approach – Situation, 
Background, Assessment, Recommendation. 
b.) Develop appropriate training materials (online?) for this purpose 
c.) Implement a programme of mandatory training for all staff in patient-facing roles to 
ensure this is embedded in daily practice. 
 
4.) Computing Systems 
a.) Computer systems must be in sync within the hospital to be able to receive updated 
information regarding patients.  
 
5.) Culture of clinical hierarchy 
a.) Review the organisational culture regarding any perceived clinical hierarchy and the 
abilities to challenge “upwards”, e.g., Nurse to Doctor, Jnr Doc to Consultant, etc. 
b.) Introduce a duty of candour into all clinical staff contracts so that individuals are 
duty-bound to report any concerns within a “just” culture, without fear of 
recrimination. 
c.) Training and support for this implementation would also be required and would need 




Based on the AcciMap results and responses from the survey data obtained from 
participants after the training workshop, the following subsections discuss their 
outcomes based on the survey, AcciMap analysis and challenges in applying the 
standardised AcciMap approach. 
 
3.8.1 Application of the Standardised AcciMap Approach 
Despite neutral responses to some of the questions in the survey, participants 
generally indicated an understanding and considered the AcciMap approach 
suitable for incident analysis. However, participants also discussed 
recommendations from their retrospective analysis to identify similarities. 
Regarding mapping the causal relationships between each level of the AcciMap, 
one participant noted some difficulty in understanding the role of ‘actors’ at the 
external level in contributing to the accident. The participant questioned the 
benefit of analysing systemic factors at the external level, especially regarding 
whether recommendations would improve system safety. However, this point 
wasn’t supported by another participant in team C who believed that by 
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analysing the external level, one could determine possible latent 
conditions/weaknesses that enabled such an event to occur.  
 
Organisational culture and inadequate systems were generally considered issues 
from the incident, particularly from team C. One participant noted that while 
this incident is only a “window”, it was believed that the next step an 
organisation needs to take is to determine if this is a systemic issue. Another 
participant (Team A) opined that it would have been preferable to implement 
the AcciMap approach in their organisation’s clinical incident scenarios. This 
point highlights the need for further investigation into the suitability of the 
AcciMap method, especially for live incident investigation in NHS boards. In their 
NHS practice, two participants were familiar with using a cause-and-effect 
template based on another systemic accident approach (Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau). Their experience in using this approach may have contributed to 
how they approached their analyses. Some participants utilised their 
experiences in using RCA techniques like barrier analysis and 5-why(s) in 
determining contributing factors. However, this is not considered a limitation in 
helping them determine contributing factors from the incident. 
 
3.8.2 Method Usage Characteristics 
Participants’ perception of the AcciMap approach is discussed based on the 
usage characteristics framework (Underwood and Waterson, 2013, 2014; 
Underwood, Waterson and Braithwaite, 2016). 
 
3.8.2.1 Graphical Representation of the Accident (Adverse outcome) 
During discussions, participants generally agreed that using the AcciMap 
approach as a graphical tool can help investigators depict and identify specific 
problem areas that compromise patient safety. From the survey result, a high 
percentage of participants either “agreed” or “slightly agreed” that the 
graphical representation of the accident can serve as a valuable means of 
communication (question 18). Only one participant slightly disagreed with this 
point. Another participant noted that the mapping of contributing factors 
provides a helpful way of promoting discussions with higher management. 
However, another participant indicated that AcciMap diagrams could become too 
complex unless contributing factors, i.e., communication, staff competence, 
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“are grouped under a higher hierarchy”. Regarding representing the timeline of 
events as specified in the case study, participants (6) generally disagreed 
regarding diagrammatically denoting timelines of the events. The remaining 
participants were neutral in their responses. 
 
3.8.2.2 Data Requirements 
One of the participants commented on the nature of the case study as an 
incident they experienced in their NHS board. The quality of the incident report 
also contributed to how each team interpreted the events that led to the patient 
receiving the wrong procedure. While they were guided using the table of 
contributing factors from Branford’s training manual, they generally had varying 
views regarding systemic factors (organisational and external levels) that 
contributed to the adverse event. However, making inferences from the incident 
was encouraged as part of the analysis since this was an exploratory study. From 
their outcomes, there was an indication of the challenge in determining systemic 
factors at those levels.  
 
3.8.2.3 Usability/Ease of Learning 
Regarding the AcciMap approach’s suitability for analysing accidents (question 
4), the participants had a general agreement, with only two neutral. Results 
from the survey data indicated that participants “slightly agreed (4)”, “agreed 
(2)”, and “strongly agreed (1)” regarding the method’s ease of use (question 
16). The remaining participants (6) provided neutral responses. There were also 
neutral responses regarding its applicability to analyse accidents in NHS 
practices (question 10) and how easy it was to understand the AcciMap approach 
(questions 11). Finally, participants collectively agreed that, like any analysis 
tool, understanding and using the method effectively depends on the skills, 
knowledge, and experiences gained from previous investigations. This perception 
indicated that more training will be needed to use the AcciMap method 
effectively and is considered a vital process regarding validity. This last point 
was particularly emphasised by one of the participants during the discussion.  
 
During the exercise, the participants generally did not indicate difficulty 
following guidelines regarding placing the contributing factors in the appropriate 
AcciMap levels. However, the challenging aspect of the activity was mapping 
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logical casual connections between each level (based on step 7 from Branford’s 
AcciMap training manual). Their responses and discussions also indicated a mixed 
review regarding question 21 (the AcciMap being time-consuming). Although 
their analyses were completed within the two hours assigned, further refinement 
would have required more time. 
 
3.8.2.4 Reliability of Analysis 
AcciMap results produced by each team were compared for similarities and 
variations. The three groups identified similar contributing factors, but only one 
contributing factor relating to patient misidentification (C-2) was found by all 
teams and placed at the physical/actor level. Other similar contributing factors 
relating to patient consent (C-1) were identified by groups A and B, and 
communication issues between computer systems (C-3) and medical staff 
ignoring the patient (C-4) were determined by teams B and C. However, for the 
contributing factor (C-3), it was placed in different AcciMap levels by teams B 
(physical/actor level) and C (organisational level). Team B and C’s reasoning 
behind their difference in positioning the factor (C-3) could be that computer 
systems not communicating with each other was a physical activity (team B). At 
the same time, this factor (C-3) could be considered an issue within the health 
organisation's control (team C). Similar to the contributing factor (C-1), team A’s 
reasoning for placing it at the organisational level could be related to 
inadequate procedures for obtaining informed consent from patients. This can 
also be applied to the contributing factor (C-6) on inadequate handover 
processes placed at different levels. 
 
3.8.2.5 Validity of analysis  
Each team’s respective AcciMap output was compared to the external AcciMap 
result of the incident. Comparing all similar contributing factors (C1 – C6) to the 
expert results, they were all identified as valid. However, it is possible that even 
if teams and experts identified a similar contributing factor, it might not be a 
valid contributing factor, mainly since the use of expert review serves as an 
alternative in the absence of a “gold standard” of measurement (Branford, 
2007). Participants “slightly agreed” that the AcciMap approach effectively 
analysed contributing factors relating to technical components, human factors, 
organisational and environmental issues from the survey. However, concerning 
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external factors (sub-question 6e), there seemed to be a contradiction between 
the survey result and their AcciMap results (external level). This observation can 
be attributed to the incident not having enough information regarding external 
systemic factors. Also, being first-time users, the participants will need to 
review their analysis as they gain more understanding of the issues relating to 
why this kind of adverse event occurred.  
 
3.8.3 Application Challenges 
One of the challenges in applying the AcciMap approach to this report was the 
insufficiency of information at the external and even organisational levels 
regarding systemic factors contributing to human error. While this incident took 
place in the USA, it was also interesting to note from several participants how 
they had never experienced this type of incident in their respective practices. 
This point could have contributed to how participants analysed the incident due 
to unfamiliarity and how things work in UK health settings compared to their US 
counterparts. AcciMap results produced from the teams also indicated that 
despite team collaboration, the outcomes were quite different. These 
differences could have occurred because of their understanding of the incident, 
contributing factors each team could agree on, causal relationships, and the 
AcciMap levels they were placed. Also, their respective analyses did not include 
parties to which the safety recommendations are assigned (parties responsible 
for implementing them).  
 
Regarding the potential for the AcciMap approach to be adopted for incident 
analysis in clinical practices, a crucial aspect noted in the workshop was its 
time-consuming nature. This factor may have influenced how they regarded the 
suitability of the AcciMap method for accident investigations compared to their 
experience using RCA techniques. The ability to use AcciMap for clinical studies 
(incident analysis) requires knowledge of the domain. Users are also required to 
correctly apply the guidelines in analysing major incidents and, where 
necessary, update the initial evaluation to produce a revised outcome. However, 
these processes can potentially take a considerable amount of time and effort, 




3.9 Limitations of the Study 
Conducting training and evaluation of the AcciMap approach with NHS 
participants had its challenges. The length of time was insufficient for analysing 
and for participants to review their results. Despite the participants receiving 
the incident report a week before the workshop, they still needed to refer to 
some of its aspects, which affected the time necessary to review their analyses. 
While this study did not specifically focus on the time taken for each team to 
complete their evaluations, it is worth noting that this could impact the 
reliability of their respective outcomes. This viewpoint was also reflected in the 
survey result regarding completing analysis within the designated time (question 
20) and if the approach is time-consuming (question 21). If more time had been 
allocated, it might have allowed each team to review their initial analyses, 
identify any missing information regarding contributing factors, and then refine 
their results. It was also impossible to conduct an immediate follow up to the 
workshop with participants to elaborate their reasoning behind their AcciMap 
results. This limitation was because of their unavailability due to their 
commitments in respective practices. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on gaining clinical safety practitioners’ perception by 
evaluating their first-time application of the AcciMap method for incident 
analysis. Based on survey data, comparison of AcciMap results, and discussions 
with participants, there was a general appreciation of the benefits of the 
AcciMap approach. Participants found the AcciMap method regarding usability 
aspects, including its ease of use, serving as a communication tool, and fostering 
team collaboration generally positive. This point was attributed to how intuitive 
they found the method from their first-time application on this case incident. 
However, there were neutral responses regarding other aspects, including its 
intuitiveness and the time-consuming nature of the AcciMap method. They also 
indicated a need for further training and experience to apply the AcciMap 
method effectively. 
 
Aspects relating to reliability and validity are also fundamental for any accident 
analytical approach to be valuable for accident analysis in healthcare. Based on 
one of the participants’ responses, grouping contributing factors into different 
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hierarchical categories supports the need for developing a more structured 
AcciMap approach in addressing the remaining research questions. This point 
also strengthens Waterson et al. (2017) study on the necessity for improving the 
reliability and validity of the AcciMap approach. In addressing the study's main 
limitation, a more in-depth study of the application of Branford’s AcciMap 
method will need to be implemented. Chapter Four will comprise a series of 
training and analysis workshops with a clinical safety expert in applying this 
approach to incidents. This study will extend this chapter in addressing the first 
research question on gaining further perspective on using this systemic approach 




















4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: Comparison of AcciMap Results and Safety 
Recommendations (Clinical Safety and AcciMap Experts) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents another exploratory research study on applying the 
standardised AcciMap approach as a tool for accident analysis in the National 
Health Service (NHS). In addressing study limitations from the previous chapter, 
a clinical safety expert from the National Services Scotland (NSS) was trained to 
apply Branford’s standardised AcciMap approach. In addition, participants 
(clinical safety and the AcciMap experts) were involved in analysing the CPOE 
medication error incident. Their AcciMap outcomes, including contributing 
factors, causal links, and safety recommendations, were also compared. The 
purpose of this study concerning the first research question was to gain further 
insight from the clinical practitioner’s first-time experience in applying the 
standardised AcciMap approach and determining its’ advantages and limitations 
as a tool for accident analysis in healthcare. 
 
4.2 Research Methodology 
The study will apply a qualitative approach (using a case study) in analysing a 
health IT-related case incident (Medication dosing error) using the standardised 
AcciMap method. Findings between two different safety experts. The following 
subsections detail the study methodology. 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
Two participants participated in this study and were designated as Analyst-A 
(clinical expert) and Analyst-B (AcciMap expert). Analyst-A is an experienced 
Clinical Safety Officer and e-Pharmacist with over twenty-five years of 
experience in health informatics in addition to five years of safety auditing with 
the National Services Scotland (NSS). Analyst-B is an experienced human factors 
specialist with extensive knowledge and experience in human factors 





4.2.2 Training Provided 
The clinical safety expert organised AcciMap training sessions at the National 
Services Scotland (NSS), where each session lasted between two to three hours 
maximum. The participant was introduced to the concept of systems thinking, 
Branford’s AcciMap approach, with its associated guidelines. The clinical safety 
expert was provided with example incidents, including the wrong patient 
(Chassin and Becher, 2002) used in the previous chapter. Another example 
incident, a clinical summary report relating to alert fatigue (International 
Normalised Ratio (INR) overshoot)(Agrawal, 2016), was also used in applying the 
AcciMap procedures and reviewed during training.  
 
4.2.3 Study Design 
After the training session, a case incident (CPOE medication dosage error) was 
then used for AcciMap analysis. Information on findings, including lessons 
learned and safety recommendations from the original documentation, was 
removed to help reduce any potential bias. Both participants were also told to 
focus only on the information available in the documentation and avoid making 
inferences (not supported by evidence from the incident report). Results 
obtained from analyst A were then compared with analyst B’s AcciMap outcomes 
for any similarities and differences as part of the validation (content validity). 
This approach was utilised in the absence of a “gold standard” for objectively 
measuring the validity of outcomes; the closest alternative will be to compare 
results with those obtained from “expert” opinions (Branford, 2007). Finally, 
AcciMap results were then swapped between both analysts through email 
correspondence and were reviewed independently. This measure allowed them 
to review and understand the reasoning behind their choices in identifying 
contributing factors. Analyst A was subsequently interviewed after the exercise 
on his perception of the AcciMap approach in the final meeting.  
 
4.3 Case Incident Two - Synopsis 
The case incident consists of two clinical providers (A and B) involved in the 
administration of KCl (Potassium Chloride) using a Computerised Provider Order 
Entry system (CPOE) to an initially hypokalemic patient. The events leading to 
the patient receiving a high dosage of KCl and becoming hyperkalemic are 
detailed in the work of Horsky et al. (2005) (Appendix C-1). The complete 
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timeline of events that took place over three days is detailed in Appendix C-1. 
This incident is an example of a “software” or “health IT” related incident. This 
incident also describes a situation where the combination of technological 
factors, including how operators utilise them, increases patient risk, resulting in 
harm. 
 
4.4 AcciMap Analysis 
Both participants were given the case incident and independently analysed it 
and formulated their safety recommendations. Before applying the standardised 
AcciMap method to this incident, the first participant (Analyst-A) applied it to 
two example incidents used as part of the training process. Previous AcciMap 
analyses on those example incidents were also reviewed in subsequent training 
sessions to discuss any challenges encountered during the investigation. Figure 4-
1 shows the final AcciMap outcome from the first participant. 
The second participant (Analyst-B) based in Australia received and analysed the 
incident. The expert developed an initial AcciMap model of the incident but was 
subsequently re-analysed to produce the final version along with safety 
recommendations. Figure 4-2 shows analyst-B’s final AcciMap model. Both 
participants completed their analyses within one week and submitted their 
results which were then compared as detailed in the proceeding section (4.5). 
Also, their AcciMap outcomes were exchanged for each to review any similarities 
and variations regarding their analysis. Finally, the analyst-B’s AcciMap result 













Figure 4-2: AcciMap Analysis of Analyst-B (AcciMap Expert)
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4.5 Comparison of AcciMap Outcomes 
The AcciMap results produced by both participants (Clinical and AcciMap 
experts) were compared and contrasted based on the same attributes used in 
the previous chapter when comparing each team’s results (see section 3.7) as 
reiterated below: 
1.) Identification of contributing factors at the AcciMap levels 
2.) Placement of contributing factors at the appropriate AcciMap level 
3.) Causal links between contributing factors 
4.) Safety recommendations 
Outcomes between both analysts are compared based on these AcciMap aspects 
described in Branford’s thesis. This process of determining similarities regarding 
contributing factors, placement of factors, causal links and safety 
recommendations involves using qualitative content analysis similar to what was 
done in Chapter Three (see section 3.7). Any similar contributing factors were 
colour-coded and assigned an alphanumeric code. The same process was applied 
in identifying and labelling similar causal relationships (links). Contributing 
factors identified at the appropriate AcciMap level are also determined through 
visual observation and following Branford’s AcciMap guidelines.  
 
4.5.1 Identification of Contributing Factors at the AcciMap Levels 
Causal/contributing factors identified were indicated as solid boxes, and other 
factors denoted as broken boxes are regarded as assumptions and were not used 
to compare each participant. Similar and varying factors were identified at each 
AcciMap level. For example, at the physical/actor activities/processes level, 
both analysts identified errors committed by Providers A and B regarding the KCI 
levels of the patient. When closely examining the participants’ AcciMap results, 
contributing factors identified were extracted to determine if they conveyed 
similar meanings, as shown in figure 4-3. Based on qualitative content analysis, 
contributing factor themes (C1, C2, and C3) relating to how clinical providers A 




Figure 4-3: Comparing the identification of contributing factors relating to 
Providers (A and B) and the CPOE system between Analyst A and B 
 
Table 4-1: Contributing factor themes identified by both analysts relating to 
Providers (A and B) interacting with the CPOE system 
Code Contributing Factor Themes 
C1 The currency of the results displayed by the CPOE system and the results not being 
clear to the providers 
C2 The CPOE system not being intuitive in terms of cancellation and addition of orders, 
interfaces for both IV and medicated drips looking similar, and dose calculations 
C3 Errors made by providers A and B regarding ordering and cancelling orders caused the 
initial KCI dosage to be administered 
 
Figure 4-4 shows the remaining contributing factor themes (C4, C5, and C6) 
identified by both participants but focused on the errors committed by clinical 
providers regarding the miscommunication when administering potassium 





Figure 4-4: Comparing contributing factors relating to errors committed by 
Providers (A and B) between Analysts A and B 
 
Table 4-2: Contributing factor themes identified by both analysts relating to 
errors committed by Providers A and B 
Code Contributing Factor Themes 
C4 Miscommunication between providers A and B regarding the administration of KCI 
C5 Provider B did not notice or check if the patient was already receiving KCI before 
administering an additional dose 
C6 Provider B ordered additional KCI after not realising that the results preceded the KCI 
depletion 
 
From both diagrams, there are instances where the clinical expert (analyst-A) 
may similarly identify a contributing factor determined by the AcciMap expert 
(analyst-B). For example, analyst A depicted two boxes denoting different design 
issues relating to the CPOE system. The clinical expert (analyst-A) made two 
distinct causal/contributing factors relating to specific CPOE issues (C2), which 
analyst-B identified in a singular box but conveying those factors. However, 
these contributing factor boxes represent a similar meaning to the contributing 
factor identified by analyst-B (C2) when combined into a single factor instead of 
one distinct factor. The reverse was also the case where the AcciMap expert 
identified a factor discovered by the clinical expert but is similarly expressed 
using multiple boxes. Contributing factor theme (C3) was identified as a distinct 
factor by the clinical expert (relating to both providers making errors regarding 
ordering and cancelling). It was recognised by the AcciMap expert as two 
separate contributing factor boxes but combined to convey a similar meaning. 
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This observation plays an important role when conducting a reliability 
assessment of factors between various users, especially when quantitatively 
measured. Table 4-3 consists of contributing factors that were uniquely 
identified by each participant based on their respective AcciMap model outputs. 
 
Table 4-3: Contributing factors uniquely identified by Analysts A and B 





• KCI dose for IV drip calculated 
incorrectly by both providers 
• Assumptions made by both 
providers over result currency 
• Excessive amounts of KCI 
ordered and administered 
• Nursing staff not noticing and 
reporting duplication of orders 
• Provider B did not realise KCI test 
results preceded potassium 
repletion, leading to a 
misdiagnosis of hypokalemia 
Organisational • Organisational guidance on KCI 
delivery over 4 hours 
• Insufficient or clinical safety 
testing of software product 
• Inadequate policy on clinical 
communications and/or 
ineffective training on policy 
• Inadequate human factors 
integration in design and testing 
• Inadequate training in the use of 
the CPOE system 
• Poor interface design leading to 
misidentification of order entries 
• Neither the CPOE application nor 
the pharmacy application was 
programmed to notify of excessive 
dosage orders or duplicate therapy 
• KCI IV drips are not displayed on 
the CPOE' medication list 
External • Poor software interface design • None 
• Inferences 
 
4.5.2 Placement of Contributing Factors at the AcciMap Levels  
The placement of causes/contributing factors was indicated as red boxes to 
distinguish variations between analyst-A and analyst-B, as shown in figure 4-5. 
For instance, differences were observed when comparing the placement of 
contributing factors relating to the CPOE system, C1 (currency of results 
displayed and not clear to the providers) and C2 (CPOE system not being 
intuitive). Analyst-A identified these factors at the physical/actor activities 
level while analyst-B associated them at the organisational level. However, the 
other contributing, C3 (errors committed by both providers in ordering and 
cancelling orders), was identified and placed by both participants at the 
physical/actor level. Relating to the differences in contributing factor 
placement, comparing the arrangement of C1 and C2 by analyst-A with analyst-
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B, these themes are considered the responsibility of the health organisation as 
noted by analyst-B rather than the providers' activities. 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Comparison of placement of contributing factors between Analysts 
(A and B) 
 
The other contributing factor themes, C4 (miscommunication between 
providers), C5 (provider B not checking before administering additional KCI), 
and C6 (faulty decisions regarding the ordering of additional KCI), were similarly 
placed at the same level (physical/actor activities) by both participants. 
Branford’s thesis noted the importance of positioning identified 
causal/contributing factors at the appropriate level to identify parties 




4.5.3 Causal Links within and between AcciMap Levels 
In identifying causal relationships from both participants’ AcciMap model 
outputs, the focus is on observing if similar links are discovered between similar 
contributing factors. Based on the previous figures depicting different 
contributing factor themes identified from their AcciMap models, similar causal 
links indicated as red lines were identified as shown in figures 4-6 (C2 and C3) 
and 4-7 (C4, C5 and C6). Table 4-4 provides the summary of similar causal links 
between both participants. 
 
Figure 4-6: Causal linkages depicting errors made by providers (A) due to a 




Figure 4-7: Causal linkages depicting the patient receiving a high dose of KCI 
due to lack of communication and omission between providers A and B 
Table 4-4: Similar causal links by identified by Analysts A and B 
Code Causal relationships 
Link-1 The causal link between contributing factor theme C2 and C3 
Link-2 The causal link between contributing factor theme C4 and C5 
Link-3 The causal link between contributing factor theme C5 and C6 
 
The common causal link (link-1) was between C2 (issues relating to the design of 
the CPOE system) and C3 (errors made in entering wrong orders into the system) 
(see figure 4-6). Because the three contributing factor boxes identified by 
analyst-A constitute a single box when similarly recognised by analyst-B (C2), the 
causal links are also combined to portray a singular causal link (link-1) which 
makes it like analyst-B’s causal relationship. The remaining causal links (link-2 
and link-3) were based on contributing factor themes (C4, C5, and C6). Other 
causal links not similarly identified from both results indicate how participants 
depicted relationships between contributing factors they interpreted from the 
incident report. 
 
4.5.4 Comparing Safety Recommendations 
Each participant developed their safety recommendations after completing their 
analysis of the incident. These measures were compared for similarities and 
variations. Table 4-5 below shows safety recommendations developed by 




Table 4-5: Safety recommendations from Analyst A and B based on the CPOE 
Medication Error case incident 
Analyst-A (Clinical Safety Expert) Analyst-B (AcciMap Expert) 
1.) External: 
a. Software suppliers (vendor) to 
review lessons learned from the 
incident and provide proposals for 
design improvement to reduce 
current clinical risks within the 
system. This should include: 
i. Developing clear signage within 
the interface to easily 
differentiate between IV/IM bolus 
and IV infusion (delivery over 
time). 
ii. Ensuring a total dose to be 
delivered onscreen for IV infusion 
calculation checks. 
iii. Improving the visibility of the age 
of the most recent lab result 
available for the patient. 
iv. Improve the functionality of 
medicine order management – 
ordering and cancellation 
processes. 
v. Improving visualisation of all 
current medications regardless of 
route of administration onto a 
single screen. 
vi. Providing additional alerts where 
a new medicine order duplicates 
a current active medicine order. 
b. Software suppliers to provide 
evidence of clinical safety testing 
and user acceptance testing, 
including test scripts for scenarios. 
c. Software suppliers to provide easy 
access to training materials with a 
particular focus on the management 
of medication orders, including 
cancellations. 
d. Software suppliers to develop 
feedback mechanisms from 





a. Review policy/guidance on KCl IV 
delivery with specific reference to 
CPOE system interface (current 
interface immediately and updated 
interface in time for an upgrade) 
 
1.) Comprehensive human factors review 
and interface design evaluation of the 
CPOE system to be undertaken and 
action taken to facilitate error 
reduction, detection, and recovery. 
2.) The CPOE interface design should be 
reviewed and revised to ensure that: 
a. The currency of test results is 
evident 
b. Medications provided by IV drips are 
included in medication lists 
c. Human-computer interaction design 
principles are followed to facilitate 
easy identification and interpretation 
of order entries, and, 
d. IV dosage input options are clear, 
unambiguous, meet requirements 
(expectations) and provide automatic 
dosage calculations to aid error 
prevention. 
3.) The CPOE application should be 
programmed to notify clinicians of 
excessive dosage orders and duplicate 
therapy. 
4.) The pharmacy application provider 
should be programmed to display alerts 
regarding excessive dosage orders and 
duplicate therapy. 
5.) Staff training concerning the utilisation 
of the CPOE system should be reviewed 
and revised where necessary to ensure 
staff have the required skills, 
knowledge, and competency to 
correctly enter dosage information and 





Analyst-A (Clinical Safety Expert) Analyst-B (AcciMap Expert) 
b. Review policy/guidance on clinical 
communication and instigate 
“mandatory for all clinical staff” 
training on this. 
c. Set up formal service management 
arrangements (ITIL standard) for 
system supplier engagement to 
ensure clinical safety and other 
functional issues can be fed back to 
the supplier. 
d. Instigate the role of clinical safety 
officer concerning Health IT systems 
as a single point of contact for 
clinical safety-related IT issues. 
 
 
Both participants (clinical and AcciMap experts) produced similar measures 
relating to the functionality and improving the interface of the CPOE system. For 
example, both indicated the necessity of incorporating safety alerts regarding 
excessive and duplicate doses administered. Also, improving the interface 
usability of the application, including visualisation and improved identification 
of order entries, was similarly recommended by both participants. However, the 
only additional recommendation not included in the original incident report was 
reviewing staff training on utilising the CPOE system and interpreting the data 
correctly. This safety proposal was formulated by the AcciMap expert (Analyst-
B).  
 
The differences between both participants’ recommendations were in 
identifying safety measures from the external level. For instance, analyst-A only 
identified a singular contributing factor relating to software vendors in 
incorporating safety measures based on lessons learned to reduce clinical risks at 
the external level. At the organisational level, analyst-A included the need for 
reviewing the KCI delivery concerning CPOE systems and, more interestingly, 
emphasised the role of a clinical safety officer. On the other hand, safety 
recommendations identified by analyst-B did not include any systemic 
countermeasures for the external level. The AcciMap expert reasoned that there 
were no causal relationships that extended to the external level. The reason for 
this was, for instance, the lack of contributing factors to explain why none of 
the other staff failed to identify dosage duplication and why the CPOE system 
installed was presumably done without appropriate user testing and human 
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factors input. An insightful observation about these safety measures shows how 
their interpretation of the incident and AcciMap analysis influences the 
recommendations developed and the parties responsible for them. In addition, 
their background experience also appears to influence their formulation of these 
recommendations. This observation is seen in the clinical expert’s background in 
pharmacy and health informatics, detailing aspects relating to the CPOE 
system’s design and functionality and reviewing policies on KCI IV delivery. 
 
4.6 Review of the AcciMap Analysis (Analyst-A) 
The AcciMap results were exchanged with each other after completing their 
analysis. This process was to allow analyst-B to review and comment on any 
variations regarding the AcciMap model. Another purpose was to enable the 
AcciMap expert (Analyst-B), having developed the AcciMap guidelines, to 
ascertain how the clinical expert applied it. Comments from analyst-B are 
indicated with direct quotes below: 
1) Comments on the application of the AcciMap approach on the case incident by 
analyst-B was summarised as follows: 
 
“Analyst-A has included assumed contributing factors (shown in the 
dotted boxes). This is appropriate and useful, and I endorse this 
approach, but it is not part of the published AcciMap guidelines that I 
believe we were asked to follow, which is why I didn't include any of 
these in my AcciMap. That is the source of one of the differences 
between our AcciMap results”. (Analyst-B) 
 
Analyst-B noted the addition of broken boxes representing inferred 
contributing factors but without concrete evidence to support its inclusion. 
This “key” is not originally part of Branford’s standardised AcciMap format but 
was used to gain insight into other potential factors that participants may 
infer from the case incident. The comment below is regarding this issue: 
 
“The key you’ve put at the bottom (with one box for Events, Actions, 
Decisions, and another for the Accident/Adverse Event and the dotted 
one for Causes) does not reflect my AcciMap format. In my opinion, 
anything in the Outcomes level is an Outcome, so there is no need to 
label it a second time. The other analyst listed one; I listed two. Also, all 
of the boxes in my AcciMap are contributing factors. They are events, 
decisions, or actions too, but the critical bit is that they're contributing 
factors, so if you label them as something else, it may confuse people. If 
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you want to stick with my original format, your key would just have 
"contributing factors" for the normal boxes. If you want to expand to 
include assumed factors, the dashed boxes could also be in the key, with 
"contributing factors (assumed)" as the label”. (Analyst-B) 
 
This comment relates to the keys that the principal researcher set for this 
study’s purposes. Branford’s original format denoted boxes as 
causal/contributing factors identified based on evidence from the incident 
report. However, broken boxes indicated for inferred factors will not be used in 
the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
 
2) Comments regarding the development of their respective AcciMap outcomes: 
❖ “The analyst A's AcciMap is well-formed and intuitive and provides a 
useful chart of the events, decisions, and actions leading to the event. 
However, in my opinion, there are four very minor deviations from the 
published AcciMap guidelines in this AcciMap”: 
 
o “There are four contributing factors at the Physical/Actor Events, 
Processes, and Conditions level that I feel would fit more 
appropriately at the Organisational level (because they relate to 
interface design issues). These are "Currency of laboratory results 
not clear", "Addition and cancellation of medicine orders neither 
clear nor intuitive", "Interface for IV bolus and IV drip very similar 
with nothing to obviously differentiate them", and "Total dose 
calculation for IV drip not calculated/shown on system interface". If 
these are shifted up to the Organisational level, it clarifies that this is 
something that the organisation can control/influence and enables 
corrective actions to be formed based on those factors (which I think 
would be appropriate).” 
 
o “Similarly, it can be argued that the contributing factor "Poor 
software interface design" is actually an Organisational factor (rather 
than External). The 'external' level is for factors that are beyond the 
control of the organisation(s) involved. Poor interface design is within 
the control of the organisation that produced this item, so I would 
place it at the Organisational level”. 
 
o “There is one causal link that appears incorrect. The AcciMap outcome 
suggests that "KCI dose for IV drip calculated incorrectly by both 
providers" contributed to "Total dose calculation for IV drip not 
calculated/shown on system interface". I think the arrow may be the 
wrong way around (i.e., the latter actually contributed to the 
former)”. 
 
o “There is one factor, “Organisational guidance on KCl - deliver over 
4 Hrs IV", which I don't think meets the criterion of using wording that 
makes it clear how things might have been different (noted in Step 5 
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of the AcciMap guidelines). I also don't think the meaning of that 
factor is clear”. (Analyst-B). 
 
3.) Comments on similarities and variations in AcciMap results produced: 
❖ “I believe the two analyses are quite similar. There were two factors in 
mine that were not in analyst A's AcciMap (namely "Neither CPOE 
application nor the pharmacy application were programmed to notify 
of excessive dosage orders or duplicate therapy" and "Inadequate 
training in CPOE usage"). I don't believe either factor was referred to at 
all in analyst A's AcciMap. It would be interesting to see if analyst A 
believes that these are valid factors on second thought. If so, this would 
reinforce the importance of using multiple analysts (so that more ideas 
are considered and discussed)”. 
 
❖ “I believe there was only one factor in analyst A's AcciMap that was not 
also in mine - regarding "clinical communications". I agree with the 
inclusion of this factor as an "assumed contributing factor". If I had been 
asked to include assumed factors, I would have included "Inadequate 
handover process and/or training", which I believe is essentially the 
same as this. I think the source of this difference relates to different 
instructions given to / interpreted by the analysts relating to whether to 
include assumed factors or not. I certainly agree this factor is 
appropriate”.  
 
❖ “I am unsure of the meaning of "Organisational guidance on KCl - 
deliver over 4Hrs IV", so I cannot determine whether that one refers to 
the same concepts as my factors relating to the lack of automatic dosage 
calculations or something different”. 
 
❖ “In all other cases, I believe the same essential concepts are included in 
both. There are variations in the wording, level of detail, and the number 
of factors used to convey the message (as would be expected, as this was 
what happened in my reliability study discussed in my thesis), but I 
believe that with the exception of the two mentioned above, the same 
essential factors are included in both analyses”. 
 
❖ “There are significant variations in which level the AcciMap factors have 
been placed in. This would result in very different safety 
recommendations if these were developed from the AcciMap (as 
recommendations typically do not address items at the Physical/Actor 
Events Processes and Conditions level, which would mean that none of 
Analyst A's factors relating to clarity of lab results and other interface 
issues would be addressed). As noted above, I believe these are errors in 
the application of the AcciMap guidelines, and I expect these variations 
just reflect analyst A's inexperience with AcciMap levels”.  
 
❖ “Novice users typically require some practice and experience to get a full 
understanding of the appropriate levels for contributing factors, and 
often, errors are picked up when safety recommendations are developed 
(which was not done in this case). My guess is that this difference reflects 




4.7 Interview Session with Clinical Domain Expert (Analyst-A) 
After completing the AcciMap analysis, a semi-structured interview was 
conducted, with questions focusing on the clinical expert’s experience applying 
the AcciMap method. The duration of the interview process was within two 
hours. Responses to the specific questions of interest are indicated with direct 
quotes shown below: 
1.) Question: Did you find the AcciMap intuitive in understanding how it is 
applied? 
Response: “Conceptually yes, I think it’s something in which people will 
have to be trained, essentially someone being able to have a quick read and 
then apply it.” 
 
The participant generally did not perceive the AcciMap approach as 
completely intuitive and felt adequate training was needed to apply the 
method effectively. For instance, the participant had to cross-reference with 
the manual regarding where to place contributing factors and how they were 
causally linked to determine the flow of causation (relating to what flows 
from one causal factor to another). 
 
2.) Question: What has been your experience based on case analysis using the 
AcciMap approach? 
Response: “It’s been reasonably painless, I would say, some of the examples 
and it’s partly due to my training because pharmacists tend to be quite 
detailed led and therefore particularly with the second case example, there 
were big gaps in data because there was nothing in the second case example 
that gave us clues and so we had to make some suppositions. For example, 
there was no evidence of organisational policies if the system actually made 
you why you would click through an alert, which will be very important, 
especially around the design of the product. If you get multiple alerts and 
you are able to bypass them with no record of why you did that, that is a 
really big missing gap in an auditory as to why someone did something!!”  
 
Based on a previous incident analysis (INR overshoot incident) used during 
training, the participant noted how potential missing information could 
create a situation where suppositions are made to ascertain why certain 
events or decisions at the organisational level were taken in the first place. 
Regarding the model’s ability to graphically depict causal factors and causal 
relationships compared to RCA techniques (i.e., fishbone diagrams), the 
participant noted the following: 
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“It’s still a reasonably straightforward technique. I tend to be quite 
visual, but for people who are not visually oriented, it may tend to be 
quite challenging. I’ve always used mind maps, in my head, I am actually 
going through a mind map and going through all the things that are in 
play and trying to strike them off and determine where to put them in 
the diagram and trying to cross-reference from what my mental mind 
map is suggesting to me that we need to cover”.  
 
The clinical expert also noted doing multiple passes (iterations) of analyses 
and ensuring that anything that needed to be added was included in the final 
AcciMap result. In addition, the following comment was made regarding the 
participant’s experiences applying the AcciMap method to incidents based on 
the information content: 
 
“The first one had a greater level of detail, and because we deal with 
adverse events, my mindset is always checking on which information is 
missing and needing to go back and ask further questions through emails 
and getting screenshots. This can include determining if the system 
behaves that way, what is the alert like, and getting a screenshot to have 
some sort of assessment, and how does the company rate the alert just 
to try and determine if this is a design flaw or an issue with the 
functionality that allows people to ignore any type of alert.”  
 
This response was also based on the previous analysis of the incident relating 
to alert fatigue (Agrawal, 2016) used as part of the AcciMap training.  
 
3.) Question: What was your experience using the AcciMap approach to identify 
unsafe decisions from the case study? 
Response: “Part of that is identified by how well documented the case study 
is. If it’s not documented in the case study, it’s difficult to guarantee if 
there were unsafe decisions. For example, the decision to multiply ignore an 
alert is an unsafe action, and it’s more of a decision followed by action. We 
do not know what has caused that to happen, which may be due to multiple 
contributing factors like environmental distractions or not recognising it as a 
problem to a lack of rating systems. An unsafe decision is not something on 
its own, but it’s part of a parlour of things that surround it. We may not 
know if the decisions were unsafe, but we can question the decisions made, 
and until we have more information, only then can we find out if they are 
unsafe.” 
 
This response was regarding identifying contributing factors, particularly at 
organisational and external levels. The participant also noted that it 
depended on how explanatory the report was and if it captured relevant 
information regarding decisions and conditions at both levels. The 
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participant’s response was also related to the analysis of the alert fatigue 
(INR overshoot incident) (Agrawal, 2016). 
 
4.) Question: Did you find the guidelines for applying the AcciMap approach 
helpful in your analysis? 
Response: “I would say to a point because there is always an issue about 
language, especially a type of language used in one environment could mean 
something else in another environment”.  
 
In terms of formulating safety recommendations, the participant also found 
the process (step 9 of Branford’s training manual) straightforward and, as a 
tool, considered the AcciMap approach to be practical. 
 
5.) Question: What are the advantages of using the standardised AcciMap 
approach? 
Response: “This is partly an assumption but what I get in using fishbone is 
that it allows for grouping of factors but does not give a link through, and 
that is what I like about AcciMap. What interests me is about multiple 
factors converging to create an environment or situation where the holes in 
the cheese appear. We do have to remember that it’s an incredibly complex 
environment in healthcare or what I would like to call a complex adaptive 
system. The AcciMap helps to tell a story from a bigger picture to a small 
picture, and out of that, very neatly flows recommendations. I think the 
ease of coming to a list of recommendations is a major benefit.” 
 
This comment indicated agreement with Svedung and Rasmussen (2000), 
Branford (2007), and Salmon et al. (2012) on the benefits of applying the 
AcciMap approach, especially when analysing complex adaptive socio-
technical systems. 
   
6.) Question: What are the limitations of the AcciMap approach? 
Response: “I think the limitation is user-dependent and helping to make it 
more intuitive with nice tight guidance about things to consider. Limitations 
may be software-based (basically using tools like Microsoft Visio). On its flip 
side, it provides an opportunity to develop a very easy to use freeware app 
that does AcciMap analysis”. 
 
Another comment that could be considered a limitation is the ability of the 
AcciMap approach to be used quickly (on the hoof) to analyse a severe 




“With the fishbone technique, it’s easy to be able to identify factors 
quickly even though it does not employ linkages. The ability of the 
AcciMap approach to be used for rapid deployment in a live situation will 
be a massive advantage and will be a key factor”.  
 
This point can be corroborated with the previous study (Chapter Three) 
regarding the time-consuming nature of the AcciMap approach, especially 
when considering the comprehensiveness of an incident report. There is also 
the aspect of evaluating the cost versus priorities regarding the level of risk 
from an incident and deciding if the AcciMap approach or an RCA technique is 
more suitable depending on the nature of the report and resources available 
(Health and Safety Executive, 2004).  
 
The clinical expert further noted that if applying the AcciMap approach 
depends on software utilised (e.g., Microsoft Visio), it will be challenging for 
users to implement it. The reason was that the cost of acquiring the necessary 
license for Microsoft applications might not be considered worth it in applying 
the AcciMap approach compared to the case of using existing RCA tools, which 
only requires minimal resources, e.g., papers. Although, it was acknowledged 
that papers and sticky notes could be used as alternatives for AcciMap 
analysis. However, this limitation also presents an opportunity of developing a 
freeware app specifically for creating AcciMap outcomes from incidents citing 
his own experience in using a free app (e.g., Gliffy) for his AcciMap analyses. 
However, the limitation of using such freeware apps is due to specific 
features not being available. Based on the interview summary, it was opined 
that while the AcciMap approach offers a different way of analysing 
contributing factors from an incident, its applicability will be further 
enhanced if developed as a software toolkit for NHS boards. 
 
4.8 Discussion 
In investigating the perception of applying the AcciMap method, the clinical 
safety expert had previously never used any systemic accident analysis approach 
in practice. Therefore, the clinical expert participated in training sessions to 
understand the concept of systems thinking and how the AcciMap method was 
applied. After the training sessions involving application on two cases, including 
the wrong patient incident (Chapter Three), the CPOE medication error incident 
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was used for comparative purposes. AcciMap results compared contributing 
factors, causal links, placement of factors and safety recommendations between 
clinical and the AcciMap experts. This exercise was also used to ascertain the 
clinical expert’s experiences applying the method, including the guidelines and 
the AcciMap expert’s review of the AcciMap analysis. 
 
Comparing both sets of results indicated that while there were similarities and 
differences regarding contributing factors. There was a situation where a 
contributing factor the clinical expert identified was presented vaguely or with 
little detail. The contributing factor (poor software interface design) will appear 
to be associated with the contributing factor theme (C3). However, the lack of 
detail regarding which interface design issue it referred to did not allow this 
factor to be regarded similarly. Also, there were significant variations regarding 
the placement of some contributing factors in different AcciMap levels. For 
instance, the reasoning behind the clinical expert’s decision for placing factors 
relating to the CPOE system at the physical/actor level could be because of the 
interactions between the providers and the CPOE system that facilitated errors. 
The AcciMap expert determined that they should have been set at the 
organisational level instead. Based on the AcciMap expert’s review, the reason 
was that health IT systems were within the control of the health organisation. 
Also, several contributing factors were identified by the AcciMap expert that was 
not specified in the clinical expert’s AcciMap diagram. This observation was a 
result of how both experts understood and interpreted the incident.  
 
Safety recommendations also showed some similarities between both 
participants, particularly in improving the interface and functionality of the 
CPOE system. The clinical expert provided greater detail of recommendations 
relating to health software providers/suppliers (external level) and review of 
policies regarding communication and training materials (organisational level). 
The contributing factor mentioned earlier (poor software interface design) 
identified at the external level was also recognised by the AcciMap expert as an 
organisational factor. This variation ultimately influenced the type of safety 
measure proposed by the clinical expert, which was explicitly directed to 
software providers (vendors) in improving the design of the CPOE system. Other 
safety recommendations identified by the AcciMap expert, including staff 
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training and reprogramming the pharmacy application to display alerts for 
excessive dosage orders, were not recognised by the clinical expert. The reason 
was due to contributing factors associated with the pharmacy application and 
inadequate training using the CPOE system. Regarding causal links, only one 
causal link was revealed to be incorrect, according to the AcciMap expert. The 
AcciMap analyst determined that the causal direction between “providers 
incorrectly calculating the KCI dose” and “the total dose calculation for the IV 
drip not calculated on the interface” was wrong and should have been in the 
reverse direction. No other causal links were indicated to be incorrect, 
according to analyst-B.  
 
Based on the interview with the clinical expert, details were drawn regarding 
the participant’s experience of applying the AcciMap method. From the usability 
aspect, the participant was able to use the AcciMap guidelines in analysing the 
incidents. However, drawbacks were also highlighted by the clinical expert. One 
notable disadvantage was the time-consuming nature of its application for 
incident analysis. This point relates to the participant’s experience using RCA 
techniques (i.e., fishbone diagrams) currently applied for incident analysis in 
healthcare. Closely following this demerit, another issue raised was the practical 
feasibility of using the AcciMap approach, especially during live accident 
investigations. The clinical safety expert also noted doing multiple iterations, 
requiring referral to the AcciMap guidelines to complete the analysis. The 
participant opined that for the AcciMap method to be widely adopted as a 
systemic toolkit, it needs to have the ability to quickly analyse incidents without 
requiring additional resources in a demanding and complex healthcare system. 
As earlier mentioned, this view was based on his experience using the fishbone 
diagram technique during incident investigations.  
 
This point can be regarded as one of the present challenges of why this systemic 
approach has not been readily applied for incident investigations in healthcare 
and the continued dependence on existing RCA techniques (Canham et al., 
2018). Also, these arguments substantiate findings from Chapter Three (survey 
and discussions) on the usefulness of the AcciMap method. However, the clinical 
safety expert noted how helpful the approach was in developing safety 
recommendations after analysis. This view was undoubtedly reflected in the 
94 
 
safety measures derived and the clinical safety expert’s background knowledge 
in health informatics and experience using IT systems (e.g., CPOE system). 
Overall, the participant found applying the AcciMap method to be 
understandable and to a degree pragmatic. However, as noted earlier in this 
discussion, considerable training and resources are needed to perform a 
thorough analysis and apply the guidelines correctly to produce valid AcciMap 
outcomes.  
 
4.9 Limitations of the Study 
Attempts were made to involve clinical safety practitioners from the previous 
AcciMap study (Chapter Three). Involving additional participants, especially 
those with clinical safety experience (e.g., NHS Digital) working with IT systems, 
would have allowed further insights to be made from the CPOE medication error 
incident. In addition, this step would have allowed for determining if multiple 
users would reach similar conclusions after applying the AcciMap approach. 
However, due to this limitation, findings from a single participant’s point of view 
had to be compared with expert analysis. This limitation further highlights 
Branford’s recommendation suggesting that a team-based approach to analysing 
adverse incidents may provide a more comprehensive view of the accident than 
from an individualistic viewpoint.  
 
Another limitation was that while the AcciMap expert’s opinion on the clinical 
expert’s analysis was considered, the study did not capture the processes each 
expert came to arrive at their respective AcciMap model outputs and safety 
recommendations. This limitation can be circumvented by using audio/video 
recordings to capture relevant data by observing how participants analyse and 
apply the AcciMap guidelines during incident analysis. This approach would have 
allowed participants to explain their outcomes, decisions behind them and any 
challenges they encountered. However, this process was not practically feasible 







This study in this chapter builds on the previous chapter on evaluating Branford’s 
standardised AcciMap approach concerning the first research question in 
ascertaining participants’ perception of the method for incident analysis in the 
NHS. This chapter presented a more focused study on its application and 
subsequent analysis of a health IT-related incident by two different safety 
experts. While there is a general appreciation regarding the methodology of the 
AcciMap approach incorporating systems thinking compared to RCA approaches, 
the clinical expert’s responses were mixed regarding aspects of the AcciMap 
method. Both experts’ analyses clearly showed that despite similarities 
identified, there were still variations from the outcomes, particularly regarding 
the placement of contributing factors. The clinical expert’s experiences using 
the AcciMap approach focused on its suitability, especially when analysing 
incidents without spending much time and resources. Outcomes from this study 
and Chapter Three indicate a need for more research and training involving 
multiple clinical safety practitioners, especially in practice. This process will 
include developing strict guidance regarding analysis based on supporting 
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5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: Development of a proposed Medi-Socio 
AcciMap Taxonomy Approach 
 
5.1 Introduction 
One notable recommendation from the pilot AcciMap training workshop (Chapter 
Three) that supports the objective of this thesis was the need for incorporating a 
taxonomy based on the AcciMap approach for identifying and classifying 
contributing factors. Taxonomies help provide structure and organise knowledge 
of a field, thus assisting researchers in studying relationships from concepts and 
hypothesising about these relationships (Glass and Vessey, 1995). They also help 
researchers and practitioners understand and analyse complex domains 
(Nickerson, Varshney and Muntermann, 2012). This chapter presents the 
development of a proposed new approach, the Medical-Sociotechnical (Medi-
Socio) AcciMap taxonomy approach, in addressing the second and third 
research questions on reliability and validity, respectively. This new AcciMap 
approach specific to the healthcare domain is based on the standardised AcciMap 
format and applied for incident analysis (health IT analysis). In addition, this 
chapter details the development process involved in building the initial 
taxonomy using existing socio-technical models and medical-related taxonomies 
identified. Subject matter experts (human factors, patient safety, and IT 
professionals) from the National Health Service (NHS) refined the initial 
structure to produce the final AcciMap taxonomy version.  
  
5.2 Research Methodology 
Taxonomy development broadly involves two processes. The first process is 
further divided into several sub-processes based on the methodology for 
developing taxonomies (Nickerson, Varshney and Muntermann, 2012; Mrosek, 
Dehling and Sunyaev, 2015; Usman et al., 2017). These sub-processes constitute 




Figure 5-1: Flowchart of the taxonomy development adapted for the proposed 
Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy (Nickerson, Varshney and Muntermann, 2012) 
 
These sub-processes, documented particularly by Nickerson et al. (2012), 
provide systematic guidance for the taxonomy development process include the 
following steps: 
1.) Identification of meta-characteristics which for this chapter refers to 
“system categories” (“sociotechnical aspects or dimensions”) corresponding 
with each AcciMap level (Physical/Actor activities, Organisational, and 
External). For each meta-characteristic, corresponding characteristics (sub-
categories or contributing factors) are identified, which must be mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive (Nickerson, Varshney and Muntermann, 2012; 
Mrosek, Dehling and Sunyaev, 2015).  
2.) Specifying ending conditions that can be objective or subjective for each 
meta-characteristic (system category) and associated characteristics 
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(contributing factors). The former ending type concentrates on the 
taxonomy’s dimensions having mutually exclusive and exhaustive attributes. 
The latter type focuses on questions on the taxonomy being concise, robust, 
comprehensible, explanatory and extensible (Nickerson, Varshney and 
Muntermann, 2012; Mrosek, Dehling and Sunyaev, 2015) (see table 5-1). 
3.) Determining which approach to use for each iterative pass until the ending 
conditions are achieved. The process could either be “empirical-to-
conceptual”, which involves obtaining dimensions and characteristics from 
empirical data or “conceptual-to-empirical”, which derives its taxonomy 
from conceptualisation based on knowledge and experience of existing 
foundations (Nickerson, Varshney and Muntermann, 2012; Mrosek, Dehling 
and Sunyaev, 2015). 
 
Table 5-1: Objective and Subjective ending conditions (adapted from Nickerson, 




• All objects or a representative sample of objects have been examined 
• No object was merged with a similar object or split into multiple 
objects in the last iteration 
• At least one object is classified under every characteristic of every 
dimension 
• No new dimensions or characteristics were added in the last iteration 
• No dimensions or characteristics were merged or split in the last 
iteration 
• Every dimension is unique and not repeated (i.e., no duplicate 
dimension) 
• Every characteristic is unique within its dimension (i.e., no duplicate 
characteristic within a dimension) 
• Each cell (combination of characteristics) is unique and is not repeated 




• Concise - Taxonomy being meaningful without being overwhelming 
• Robust – Dimensions and characteristics providing differentiation among 
objects 
• Comprehensive – Ability to classify all objects or a random sample of 
objects within the domain of interest 
• Extendible – Ability to accommodate a new dimension or new 
characteristic of an existing dimension easily 




Socio-technical models/approaches and relevant taxonomies were identified to 
initiate the first development process. Two significant studies that 
systematically classified taxonomies/classification schemes were identified from 
previous analyses. These studies mainly focused on human factors and medical 
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errors within healthcare (Taib et al., 2011; Mitchell et al., 2014). Taib et al. 
(2011) systematically compared twenty-six medical error taxonomies based on 
the human factors perspective. These taxonomies were also classified based on 
domain specificity being either “generic” or “domain-specific”, with the latter 
applying to different aspects of the healthcare system (e.g., International 
taxonomy of medical errors in Primary care). Mitchell et al. (2014) also 
conducted a systematic review of human factors classification frameworks that 
identified causal factors, including human factors. In addition, existing health 
IT-related frameworks and literature identified contributing factors from 
utilising health IT systems based on functionality, usability, and safety 
management (Schneider et al., 2014; Salahuddin and Ismail, 2015; Brindley and 
White, 2016a). 
 
The second process focuses on refining the initial AcciMap taxonomy (categories 
and sub-categories), which can also be considered part of the iteration process 
in the taxonomy development. This process will primarily involve discussing and 
obtaining feedback from various Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) experienced in 
clinical safety management, human factors and health IT from across NHS 
boards/trusts and NHS Digital. The final iteration process involved a patient 
safety team from NHS Nottinghamshire reviewing the initial taxonomy structure 
to determine changes/alterations. This safety team has practical experience 
applying the original AcciMap version (Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000) for 
analysing severe incidents in their trust. They have utilised the method 
combined with a popular taxonomic approach, the Human Factors and 
Classification Scheme (HFACS) (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003). The evaluation of 
the final version of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy will be elaborated in 
subsequent Chapters Six and Seven, respectively. 
 
5.3 Development of the Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy  
In the taxonomy development, system categories (socio-technical aspects) and 
causal/contributing factors (sub-categories) are derived based on existing socio-
technical models and frameworks. Based on the taxonomy development 
flowchart, the choice of which approach to use when iterating was based on the 
availability of the empirical data when deriving system categories and sub-
categories. These activities constitute the development of the first version of 
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the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy approach. Also, it is vital to establish the 
validity of the categories and sub-categories identified as part of the 
development procedure. This process includes assigning contributing factors to 
the appropriate category and system categories to the proper AcciMap level. The 
last point particularly relates to Branford’s thesis in analysing and determining 
which level (party) is responsible for any subsequent safety recommendation to 
mitigate or prevent reoccurrence. The following subsections detail the Medi-
Socio AcciMap development. 
 
5.3.1 First Iteration 
The empirical-to-conceptual approach was used to identify “sociotechnical 
aspects” (system categories) associated with each AcciMap level and 
contributing factors (sub-categories). This approach was applied to identify 
categories from existing socio-technical models and taxonomies used in 
healthcare. This approach was also utilised when identifying and determining 
contributing factors to be associated with each system category. The initial 
structure of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy consisted of four levels of 
granularity. These include the “AcciMap level” based on the standardised 
AcciMap format, “System-level” consisting of sociotechnical aspects or 
categories for each AcciMap level, and “Descriptor level” consisting of the 
specific sub-categories for each category. The final level, “Highly specific 
level”, consists of an additional level of subcategories associated with each sub-
category where applicable. However, this level was initially created to include 
specific sub-categories. 
  
5.3.1.1 Sociotechnical Aspects (System Categories) 
The first AcciMap level (Physical/actor activities and processes) consists of 
clinical teams' activities (actions, decisions, and non-concordance) relating to 
patients. System categories “Staff” and “Patient” were assigned to this AcciMap 
level to convey these contributing factors. The “Staff” category is divided into 
separate considerations; “Staff-individual” focusing on actions and decisions of 
individual persons, and the “Staff-team” category comprising of actions and 
decisions by a group of clinicians that may compromise patient safety. “Medical 
Environment” considers the state of the working climate, including the physical 
environment where patients and clinicians reside. System categories for the 
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organisational level (technical and local management levels) comprise aspects 
within the control of health organisations. Aspects relating to 
software/hardware and their functionality in enabling interactions with 
clinicians and Management entities (IT and hospital) were derived from relevant 
IT literature on health IT-related classification schemes/frameworks and 
(Institute for Medicine, 2012; Schneider et al., 2014; Salahuddin and Ismail, 
2015; White, 2018). Other categories added include “Equipment” relating to 
non-IT related factors and “Technical” relating to factors not solely focused on 
software or hardware aspects. These initial categories were obtained from 
similar dimensions found in existing sociotechnical models and contributing 
frameworks, as detailed in table 5-2. 
 
Table 5-2: Initial socio-technical aspects (System categories) associated with 
each AcciMap Level 
AcciMap Level Sociotechnical 
Aspect - Category 




Patient 1.) Adapted based on the “Person” category from the 
SEIPS model (Appendix D-1) and Eight-dimensional 
Sociotechnical model (Appendix D-2) (Sittig and 
Singh, 2010; Holden et al., 2013). 
2.) Adapted based on the “Patient factors” from the 
London Protocol Contributory Framework 
(Appendix D-3) (Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004; 
Vincent, Burnett and Carthey, 2014). 
Staff – Individual 1 1.) Adapted based on the “Individual factors” 
category from the London Protocol Contributory 
Framework (Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004; 
Vincent, Burnett and Carthey, 2014). 
2.) Adapted based on the category “Team factors” 
from the London Protocol Contributory Framework 
(same source as the first point). 
Staff – Teams 2 
Medical 
Environment 
1.) Adapted based on the category “Environment 
factors” from the London Protocol Contributory 
Framework and the Human Factors and 
Classification System (Appendix D-4)(Taylor-Adams 
and Vincent, 2004; Diller et al., 2014). 






Equipment (Non-IT) 1.) Adapted based on the category “Medical 
equipment” from the Human Factors Classification 
Framework (Appendix D-5) (Mitchell, Williamson 
and Molesworth, 2016). 
Technical 1.) Adapted based on the “Technical” category from 
the JCAHO Patient Event Taxonomy (Appendix D-
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AcciMap Level Sociotechnical 
Aspect - Category 
Sociotechnical Models/Taxonomy Categories 
(References) 
6)(Chang et al., 2005). 
Information 
Technology (IT) 
1.) Adapted based on the “Hardware and Software” 




1.) Adapted based on the classification of health IT 
safety use antecedents (Salahuddin and Ismail, 
2015). 
IT Management 1.) Adapted based on the notes from Clinical Risk 
Management Data Safety, NHS Digital Report, 
(Brindley and White, 2016a; White, 2018). 
   
Organisational 




1.) Adapted based on the “Management” category 
from the Human Factors Framework (Appendix D-
7) (healthcare) (Henriksen et al., 2008). 
Hospital (Senior) 
Management 
   
External Level Health IT Vendor 1.) Adapted from the Institute of Medicine (2012).  
Government 1, 2 1.) Adapted based on the “External environment” 
category from the Human Factors Framework.  
2.) Adapted based on the “Regulatory bodies” and 
“Government” categories from UPLOADS 
Classification Scheme (Appendix D-8) (Goode et 
al., 2015; Salmon et al., 2017). 
Regulatory Bodies 1 
Professional 
Bodies/Associations 
1.) Feedback from an experienced e-health specialist 
on the proposed model from the National Scottish 
Services (NSS). 
2.) Adapted based on the “Professional bodies” 
UPLOADS Classification Scheme (Goode et al., 
2015; Salmon et al., 2017). 
   
 
 
5.3.1.2 Contributing Factors (Sub-Categories) 
Figure 5-2 shows the first iteration of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy (version 
1.0) detailing each AcciMap level, the system categories, and associated 
contributing factors. The empirical-to-conceptual approach was applied to 
identify contributing factors for each system category since there was sufficient 
information. Some contributing factors identified for each category are 
commonly identified from different taxonomies and classification systems used 
in other safety-critical domains. For example, a common contributing factor like 
“inadequate communication and feedback” is a regular but crucial aspect 
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identified by different taxonomies. However, other factors particular to the 
health system will relate to system categories like the “patient-related”, 
consisting of the patient’s complexity and medication condition.  
 
The empirical-to-conceptual method was also applied in identifying categories 
and sub-categories at the organisational level. However, data was limited when 
deriving contributing factors associated with system categories at the external 
level. For example, contributing factors related to the system category, 
“Professional Bodies/Associations”, were derived using the “intuitive approach” 
(Nickerson, Varshney and Muntermann, 2012). This approach was applied based 
on discussions with the clinical safety officer (Chapter Four) and his 
understanding of external entities and factors affecting system safety. However, 
the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy approach can potentially include other 
systemic factors from new empirical data. In finalising the first iteration, the 
“Other” sub-category was assigned to comprise any factor identified from an 
incident not classified under any other sub-categories. The “Unclassifiable” 
category includes factors not classified under any pre-defined system categories 
at each AcciMap level. System categories and contributing factors were assigned 
specific codes (nano codes) for classification during incident analysis. In 
reviewing the initial taxonomy, specific system categories were marked in grey, 
indicating needed changes, and contributing factors (shown in red) were 







Figure 5-2: Initial version of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy model (version 1.0)
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5.3.2 Second Iteration 
After developing the initial Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy structure, it was 
imperative to determine the content validity of the categories and sub-
categories. This process involved discussions with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 
who have experience conducting accident investigations in their respective 
healthcare practices. First, SMEs were contacted through email correspondence, 
with the initial taxonomy structure for feedback and comments. Subsequently, 
and where possible, meetings were held to clarify aspects of the taxonomy.  
 
5.3.2.1 Review from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 
For the second iteration, five subject matter experts (SMEs) were involved 
comprising of human factors specialists (3), a clinical risk manager (1), and a 
clinical safety officer (1). Four of them work with the National Health Service 
(England and Scotland), with the remaining (who developed the standardised 
AcciMap) established in the Railway domain (Australia). Each of the SMEs 
(denoted with an SME-Number) then provided their feedback on the clarity of 
contributing factors and the placement of the socio-technical aspects initially 
placed in the taxonomy. Table 5-3 below details the changes based on their 
feedback. 
 
Table 5-3: Changes to the initial Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy from Subject 













factors at the 
external level. 
• Contributing factors 
associated with this 
category include current 
best practices, current 
professional guidance. 
• Addition of this 
category to consider 
external entities like 
Royal Colleges. 
    





• Staff-individual and  
• Staff-team-related 
factors 
• Social factors, design 








• Noted some of the 
contributing factors 
that fitted better at 
the organisational 
level instead of the 
Physical/actor level 
because they are not 
“direct precursors” to 
the incident 
Changes to categories  
• IT Management,  
• Equipment-related 
factors, and 
• Inclusion of selection of 
systems (hardware, 
software) as contributing 
factors. 
• “Selection of systems” 
is a contributing 
factor considered 













• Adjusting the 
category “Local Area 
Government” to be 
moved to the 
external level. 
• Including contributing 
factors like poor 
maintenance of 
equipment, defective or 
missing equipment, 
unsuitable equipment. 
• Inclusion of contributing 
factors internal auditing 
and inspections, 
enforcement of rules and 
procedures, staff 
selection, and training 
provision. 
• Changing the 
contributing factor 











• Adjusting the 
category “Health IT 
Vendor” factors to 
the Organisational 
level rather than the 
external level. 
• No comments. • Consideration was 
made regarding 
placing this category 
at the organisational 
level because the 
associated 
contributing factors 
are within the control 
of the health 
organisation. 
    








• Reviewing contributing 
factors;  




o Team structure – Staff-
Team related factor. 




• No comments. 
    
SME-4 • No comments • Inclusion of a 
contributing factor 
relating to “Procurement 
of IT systems and 
equipment”. 
• No comments. 
    
 
Based on the field meeting with a human factors specialist (SME-5), discussions 
took place regarding the AcciMap methodology and the structure of the proposed 
AcciMap version. The accident “outcome” of the AcciMap model was reviewed 
with suggestions of changes. This comment was based on the SEIPS model, where 
outcomes should not only focus on the immediate adverse result (relating to the 
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patient) but should consider other effects on the health organisation’s 
reputation and medical staff involved. Also, this viewpoint can be extended to 
include companies (Health IT vendors) responsible for developing any specific 
software product. However, this comment was not considered for the proposed 
AcciMap taxonomy because the underlying structure needed to be consistent 
with Branford’s system. Also, SME-5 emphasised the importance of ensuring that 
the identified contributing factors are “neurally-themed” to avoid making the 
taxonomy negative-centric. Based on observation of contributing factors at the 
physical/actor level, the semantics of contributing factors needed to be 
adjusted to convey them as neutrally themed factors. For instance, the 
contributing factor, “Inadequate communication & feedback”, was changed 
simply to “Communication & feedback”, as was the case of another factor “, 
lack of leadership”, was to be changed to either “Leadership” or “Inadequate 
leadership”. Another aspect noticed was the similarity of contributing factors 
like the “Inadequate risk management process” and “clinical risk management 
process”, which needed to be reformatted to avoid having overlapping factors.  
 
5.3.2.2 Review from Patient Safety Team (NHS, Nottinghamshire) 
The final review of the taxonomy involved a collaborative workshop meeting 
with a patient safety team based in NHS Nottinghamshire. The patient safety 
team is composed of the safety lead and two additional clinical support staff. All 
team members have also applied the AcciMap approach and other methods like 
the HFACS, which they sometimes use to analyse serious incidents. Before the 
scheduled meeting, the initial taxonomy and its guidance documentation were 
shared via email correspondence with the team's patient safety lead. Each 
category (particularly the greyed boxes) and associated contributing factors 
were reviewed for each AcciMap level. Discussions and consensus were reached 
with the patient safety lead where there were any disagreements regarding the 
clarity or relevance of contributing factors. In some cases, contributing factors 
or categories that were not part of the initial taxonomy were also identified 
during the review. Table 5-4 details the review and proposed recommendations 






Table 5-4: Review of the initial Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy Categories 
System Category Review/Comments Proposed Recommendation(s) 
Environmental-
related factors 
• This category could be considered at 
the physical level as long as a 
category at the organisational level 
links to this category. 
• There was an agreement regarding 
the contributing factor “physical 
Layout”, but the other factors were 
considered organisational factors that 
can potentially affect activities at the 
physical level. 
• This category is to be 
considered as part of the 
physical/Actor activities level 
in consideration of the 
working environment that 
may affect the physical 
activities of both patients 
and clinicians. 
• Contributing factors (working 
dynamics and staffing levels) 
to be removed and refitted 
with relevant categories at 
the organisational level. 
   
Staff-Individual 
related factors 
• Medication errors and documentation 
errors are regarded as examples 
falling under contributing factor 
“Communication”. 
• Contributing factor 
“Inadequate training” to be 
considered an organisational 
factor rather than a physical 
one. 
• Addition of a contributing 
factor “non-concordance” 
indicating unsafe acts of 
individual clinicians at the 
physical level. 
• Factor “Experience level” to 
be rephrased. 
   
Staff-Team 
related factors 
• Factors regarding “lack of leadership” 
and “Inadequate delegation” were 
not considered appropriate for this 
category. 
 
• Restructuring this category to 
include contributing factor 
“non-concordance” relating 
to unsafe acts that team 
members could commit at 
the physical level. 
   
Patient-related 
factors 
• No changes were needed on the 
contributing factors already 
associated with this category. 
• Addition of contributing 
factors regarding unsafe acts 
(non-concordance) of 
patients (e.g., where 
patients may not follow the 
prescription from medical 
personnel). 




• Comments were provided on 
contributing factors associated with 
this category. However, there was a 
consensual agreement that changes 
were needed, particularly with 
hardware and software sub-
categories. 
• Restructuring factors, 
particularly with changes 
under the factor 
“human/device interface”, 
sub-categories needed to be 
associated with the category 
“Human-Computer”, which 




System Category Review/Comments Proposed Recommendation(s) 




• There was a general agreement on 
contributing factors but noted that 
“safety culture and priorities” needed 
to be clarified for prospective users 
when evaluating the approach. 
• Contributing factors “Inadequate 
supervision” and “Lack of leadership” 
were considered synonymous because 
the former was deemed to be 
encompassed under the latter factor. 
• “Organisational structure” was not 
deemed to be necessary for this 
category. 
• Reconsideration and 
clarification of the 
contributing factor “safety 
culture”. 
• Removing the factor 
“Inadequate supervision” but 
leaving “lack of leadership”. 
• Removing the factor 
“Organisational structure”. 
• Rephrasing factor “Staffing 
levels” to “Staffing 
recruitment or human 
resources”. 
   
Equipment 
related factors 
• There was an agreement on 
contributing factors assigned to this 
category. 
• No recommendations.  
   
Technical-related 
factors 
• After discussion, it was agreed that 
this category was not relevant, and 
factors associated with this could be 
assigned to other system categories, 
particularly the Information 
Technology category. 
• Removing this system 
category and re-examining 
contributing factors to be 
assigned to relevant system 
categories. 
   
Human-Computer 
related factors 
• There was discussion on what the 
contributing factor “clinical workflow 
with systems” meant. After 
establishing its definition in terms of 
how software systems help facilitate 
the clinical process of patients, it was 
agreed that this factor is best suited 
for the “information technology” 
category. 
• It was agreed that contributing 
factors associated with this category 
would need to be reviewed, mainly 
focusing on aspects relating to health 
IT system usability. 
• Reviewing of contributing 
factors associated with this 
category focusing on the 
usability of health IT 
systems. 
   
IT Management 
factors 
• The only review for contributing 
factors for this category was 
rephrasing the “Maintenance of 
software and hardware” contributing 
factor. 
• Reviewing of contributing 
factors associated with this 
system category. 




• This system category was considered 
redundant, and that contributing 
factors could also be associated with 
the system category “Hospital 
(Senior) Management factors. 
• Removing the redundant 
system category and 
reviewing contributing 
factors to be associated with 




System Category Review/Comments Proposed Recommendation(s) 




• This system category was considered 
redundant, and that contributing 
factors could be linked to system 
categories at the external level 
especially relating to Regulatory and 
Government entities. 
• Creating an additional system 
category relating to local supervision 
of medical staff was considered and 
discussed regarding its placement at 
the Physical-Actor level (First AcciMap 
level). 
• Removing this system 
category because the 
category did not contribute 
to the overall concept of the 
proposed AcciMap approach. 
• Addition of a new system 
category “Staff – Local 
Management” at the 
Physical/Actor level. 
   
Health IT Vendor 
factors 
• There was an agreement on 
contributing factors associated with 
this category, but a consensus was 
needed regarding which AcciMap level 
was considered appropriate in 
depicting this aspect. 
• This system category was to 
be moved to the 
organisational level 
(specifically under the 
organisational – management 
level) due to links associated 
with software products from 
IT vendors and collaboration 
with hospital management 
and IT management 
categories. 
   
Regulatory 
related factors 
• No additional factors were considered 
for this category. However, there was 
general agreement with the 
associated factors. 
• No recommendations 
   
Government-
related factors 
• There was also agreement on 
contributing factors associated with 
this system category. 
• No recommendations 




• There was disagreement regarding the 
relevance of this system category. 
Questions raised included how this 
category potentially influences other 
aspects at both organisational and 
physical levels in contributing to any 
adverse event. 
• There was divided opinion regarding 
contributing factors assigned to the 
professional category, especially 
“professional guidance”.  
• Other contributing factors include 
“Evidence-based practices (e.g., 
where National Guidance may conflict 
with one another). 
• No recommendation was 
given, but a review with 
existing taxonomies was 
needed to justify the 
inclusion of this category. 




The final taxonomy development process involved applying the ending conditions 
for system categories at each AcciMap level and sub-categories for each 
category. After the second iteration, system categories for each AcciMap level 
were agreed to conceptually portray aspects of a healthcare system. No other 
system categories were added to the taxonomy after changes were made during 
the second iteration. As noted in previous subsections, the “unclassifiable” 
category was added to capture any new data regarding system categories not 
included in the updated Medi-Socio AcciMap version. When considering each 
category’s contributing factors, it was determined that the identified factors 
satisfied the subjective ending condition criteria, especially after the review 
from the patient safety team. Also, no additional system categories were 
required (added) after the second iteration when considering the objective 
ending conditions criteria. However, health IT-related system categories and 
associated contributing factors were not confirmed due to non-feedback from 
relevant clinical IT practitioners (NHS Digital).                                               
 
5.4 Changes to the initial Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy 
Based on the review of the initial taxonomy and feedback from the author of the 
standardised AcciMap approach (second iteration), fundamental changes were 
made, particularly regarding contributing factors at the physical/actor-activities 
level. The “highly specific” level regarding subcategories (see subsection 5.3.1) 
was not included in the final proposed AcciMap structure. Causal/Contributing 
factors relating to categories patient and staff (individual and teams) needed to 
have subcategories regarding “Unsafe Acts” and “Unsafe Acts – Violations” 
(adapted from the HFACS approach). This requirement agrees with the safety 
team's review, except that instead of the term “violations”, “non-concordance” 
is used. These comprise of actions/activities of medical practitioners relating to 
how they use clinical software systems and how this may unintentionally 
translate into actions that may put a patient at risk. Other changes include 
alterations to the “information technology” category where software and 
hardware-related factors were expanded based on factors adapted from health 
IT classification schemes. Contributing factors associated with the category 
“Human-Computer” were reviewed and changed to develop usability aspects 
relating to health IT systems (Salahuddin and Ismail, 2015). System categories 
“Local Area Government” and “Technical” were removed after changes to the 
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“Clinical Management” and “Information Technology” categories. Also, the 
“Health IT vendor” category was moved from the external to the organisational 
(Management) level. This category was regarded as an organisational aspect 
where relationships can be identified between management implementing 
health IT systems and IT vendors responsible for designing and ensuring 
achievable safety standards. 
 
Based on the review from the patient safety team, the only aspect of the 
taxonomy where more evaluation was needed was the system category 
“Professional Bodies/Associations”. However, from the previous review from one 
of the SMEs (SME-1), this category was considered relevant to the proposed 
AcciMap approach. Also, with the addition of the category “Staff-Local (clinical) 
Management”, the patient safety team recommended including contributing 
factor “non-concordance” associated with unsafe acts. The addition of this 
factor is due to instances where letting staff get away with bad practices may be 
allowed by managers (supervisors). They also reasoned that local clinical 
managers are also front liners and can make “operational” decisions, allow for 
safe practice and assess risks. After these changes, each system category and 
subcategories were re-assigned with unique nano codes. Figure 5-3 shows the 
updated Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy (version 2.0) where each AcciMap level 
details each system category and their subcategories as shown in figures 5-4 
(Physical/actor activities & processes), 5-5 (Organisational), and 5-6 (External), 
respectively. In addition, each sub-category is described in the guidance notes 


















Figure 5-6: Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy model approach – External Level 
 
Tables 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7 detail the updated Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy 
structure based on corresponding AcciMap levels with system categories, 
contributing factors (subcategories) and existing taxonomies/schemes they were 
derived. 
 
Table 5-5: Contributing factors associated with each system category – 








Patient • Communication (between 
patient and clinician) 1,2,3,7 
• Medical condition 
(Complexity and seriousness) 
1,7 
• Unsafe acts 4,5,6  
• Unsafe acts – Violations (non-
concordance) 4,5,6 
• Other 
1.) Vincent’s London Protocol 
framework for incident analysis 
(Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004). 
2.) Human Factors Classification 
scheme for patient safety 
(Mitchell, Williamson and 
Molesworth, 2016). 
3.) Adapted as a critical contributing 
factor (e.g., the case of 
insufficient communication due to 
lack of engagement between 
patients and doctors relating to E-
prescribing errors) (Manias et al., 
2015). 
4.) Human Factors and Classification 
System (HFACS) (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003; Diller et al., 
2014). 
5.) UPLOADS classification scheme 
(Goode et al., 2017; Salmon et 
al., 2017). 










proposed taxonomy with the 
patient safety team, National 
Health Service, Nottingham 
(2018). 
7.) Human error taxonomy system for 
evaluating patient safety event 
(Itoh, Omata and Andersen, 2009). 
   
Staff – Individual • Communication and feedback 
1, 5 
• Compliance with procedures 3 
• Unsafe acts 2, 4 
• Unsafe acts – Violations (non-
concordance) 2, 4 
• Physical and mental condition 
1 
• Judgement and decision 
making 3 
• Situation awareness 2, 3 
• Experience and competence 3 
• Other 
1.) Vincent’s London Protocol 
framework for incident analysis 
(Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004). 
2.) Human Factors and Classification 
System (HFACS) (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003; Diller et al., 
2014). 
3.) UPLOADS classification scheme 
(Goode et al., 2017; Salmon et 
al., 2017). 
4.) Fieldwork evaluation of the 
proposed model with the patient 
safety team, NHS Nottinghamshire 
(2018). 
5.) Human error taxonomy system for 
evaluating patient safety event 
(Itoh, Omata and Andersen, 2009). 
   
Staff – Team • Communication and feedback 
1,5,7 
• Compliance with procedures 2 
• Unsafe acts 3, 4, 6 
• Team structure 1,2 




1.) Vincent’s London Protocol 
framework for incident analysis 
(Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004). 
2.) UPLOADS classification scheme 
(Goode et al., 2017; Salmon et 
al., 2017). 
3.) Human Factors and Classification 
System (HFACS) (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003; Diller et al., 
2014). 
4.) Performance Influencing Factors 
(PIF) taxonomy (Kim and Jung, 
2003). 
5.) Severe medication errors (Chang, 
2007). 
6.) Fieldwork evaluation of the 
proposed model with a patient 
safety team, National Health 
Service, Nottingham (2018). 
7.) Severe and non-severe medication 
errors (Chang and Mark, 2009). 
   
Staff – Local 
(Clinical) 
Management 
• Communication and feedback 
1,6 
• Compliance with procedures 2 
• Unsafe acts 2, 4, 5 
1.) Vincent’s London Protocol 
framework for incident analysis 
(Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004). 










• Unsafe acts – Violations (non-
concordance) 2, 4, 5 
• Physical and mental condition 
1, 2, 4 
• Judgement and decision 
making 2 
• Situation awareness 2 
• Experience and competence 2 
• Supervision 2, 5 
• Other 
(Goode et al., 2017; Salmon et 
al., 2017). 
3.) Human Factors Classification 
Framework (HFCF) for patient 
safety (Mitchell, Williamson and 
Molesworth, 2016). 
4.) Human Factors and Classification 
Systems (HFACS) (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003). 
5.) Fieldwork evaluation of the 
proposed model with a human 
factors specialist and personnel 
experienced incident analysis, 
National Health Service, 
Nottingham (2018). 
6.) Human error taxonomy system for 
evaluating patient safety event 
(Itoh, Omata and Andersen, 2009). 
   
Environment • Physical Layout 1, 2 
• Staffing levels and skill mix 1, 
2,4 
• Workload and shift patterns 1 
• Administrative/managerial 
support 1 
• Time pressure 1,3,5 
• Clinical equipment and IT 
systems availability 3 
• Other 
1.) Vincent’s London Protocol 
framework for incident analysis 
(Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004). 
2.) Human Factors Classification 
Framework (HFCF) for patient 
safety (Mitchell, Williamson and 
Molesworth, 2016). 
3.) Adapted based on the 
classification of health IT safety 
use antecedents (Salahuddin and 
Ismail, 2015). 
4.) Medication error records from 
MEDMARX in post-anaesthesia care 
units (PACU) (Hicks et al., 2004). 
5.) Human error taxonomy system for 
evaluating patient safety event 
(Itoh, Omata and Andersen, 2009). 
 
Table 5-6: Contributing factors associated with each system category- 










• Software-functionality 1,2,3,4,6 
• Software-configuration 1,2,3,4,6 
• Hardware-functionality 1,2,5 
• Hardware-configuration 1,2,5 
• Network configuration and 
availability 1 
• IT workflow integration 4 
• Accessibility of IT systems 1 
1.) Adapted based on the Magrabi’s 
HIT framework (Magrabi et al., 
2010, 2016). 
2.) Sociotechnical model for health IT 
(Sittig and Singh, 2010, 2011). 
3.) Common Formats classification 
system (Schneider et al., 2014). 










• Interoperability of IT systems 
4 
Medicine, 2012). 
5.) Adapted based on the 
classification of health IT safety 
use antecedents (Salahuddin and 
Ismail, 2015). 
6.) Final Report on identifying and 
addressing unsafe conditions 
associated with Health IT, ECRI 
Institute (Wallace et al., 2013). 
   
Clinical IT 
Management 
• Communication and feedback 
1 
• Delivery of IT training and 
service 1,3 
• Selection of IT systems 5 
• Evaluation of IT systems 4 
• Safety and risk management 
practices 2 
• Maintenance of IT systems 1,4 
• IT implementation processes 
1,5 
• Procurement of IT systems 2,4,6 
• Other 
1.) Health IT and patient safety 
(Institute for Medicine, 2012). 
2.) Clinical Risk Management Data 
Safety, NHS Digital Report, 
(Brindley and White, 2016b, 
2016a; White, 2018). 
3.) Safety of health IT (training) 
(Agrawal, 2016). 
4.) Evaluating health IT systems 
(Heathfield, Pitty and Hanka, 
1998; Yusof et al., 2008; Lee, 
2016). 
5.) Selection, implementation and 
adoption of health IT (Lorenzi et 
al., 2009; Cresswell, Bates and 
Sheikh, 2013). 
6.) Feedback from a human factors 
specialist, NHS, Scotland. 
   
Human-Computer • Usability – Information 
display/interpretation 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
• Usability – Data entry and 
selection 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
• Usability – Design Consistency 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
• Usability – Interface design 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5 
• Other 
1.) Classification of health IT safety 
use antecedents (Salahuddin and 
Ismail, 2015). 
2.) Common Formats classification 
(Schneider et al., 2014). 
3.) Adapted from Magrabi’s Health 
Information Technology (IT) 
framework (Magrabi et al., 2010, 
2016). 
4.) Usability of Healthcare 
Information Technology (Kushniruk 
et al., 2005, 2010). 
5.) Electronic Health Records (Wilcox, 
Chen and Hripcsak, 2011). 
   
Equipment (non-IT) • Maintenance of clinical 
equipment 1, 2 
• Suitability of clinical 
equipment 1, 2 
• Functionality of clinical 
equipment 1, 2 
• Access/availability of clinical 
equipment 3 
• Design of clinical equipment 1, 
1.) Adapted from the JCAHO Patient 
Event taxonomy (under 
“Technical” sub-category – 
Facilities) (Chang et al., 2005). 
2.) Based on the evaluation and 
feedback of the proposed model 
from human factors specialists 













3.) Adapted from Magrabi’s Health 
Information Technology (IT) 
framework (Magrabi et al., 2010; 
Magrabi et al., 2016). 
   
Hospital (High-
level) Management 
• Communication and feedback 
1,2 
• Staff supervision 1,2 
• Judgement and decision 
making 2 
• Internal auditing and 
inspection 1,2 
• Enforcement of rules and 
procedures 1,4 
• Organisational processes 1,2 
• Financial constraints 1,2 
• Policies, protocols, and 
procedures 1,2 
• Safety culture and priorities 
3,4 
• Staff training and evaluation 4  
• Other 
1.) Vincent’s London Protocol 
framework for incident analysis 
(Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 2004). 
2.) UPLOADS classification scheme 
(Goode et al., 2017; Salmon et 
al., 2017). 
3.) Safety culture in this context: 
“Installation of an order entry 
system in a hospital with a poor 
safety culture or an inadequate IT 
network might lead to new 
errors” (Magrabi et al., 2016). 
4.) Human error taxonomy system for 
evaluating patient safety event 
(Itoh, Omata and Andersen, 2009). 




• Communication and feedback 
1,2 
• Knowledge of clinical 
processes 1,2  
• Software design processes 1,2, 
• IT system testing processes 
1,2,5 
• IT implementation processes 
1,3 
• Quality management 
processes 1,4 
• Legal responsibilities 1,6 
• Other 
1.) Health IT and patient safety 
(Institute for Medicine, 2012). 
2.) Safety of health IT (training) 
(Agrawal, 2016). 
3.) Selection, implementation, and 
adoption of health IT (Lorenzi et 
al., 2009; Cresswell, Bates and 
Sheikh, 2013). 
4.) Classification of health IT safety 
use antecedents (Salahuddin and 
Ismail, 2015). 
5.) Clinical Risk Management Data 
Safety, NHS Digital Report, 
(Brindley and White, 2016b, 
2016a). 
6.) Healthcare IT vendor “hold 




















Government • Communication and feedback 1, 
2 
• Policies and legislation 2,5 
• Funding and budgeting 2 
• Operational oversight (via 
certification) 4, 5 
• Standardisation (via guidelines) 
3, 4 
• Other 
1.) Vincent’s London Protocol 
framework for incident analysis 
(Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 
2004). 
2.) UPLOADS classification scheme 
(Goode et al., 2017; Salmon et 
al., 2017). 
3.) Report of the National Advisory 
Group on Health Information 
Technology in England (Wachter, 
2016). 
4.) Identifying patient safety 
problems associated with IT in 
general practice (Magrabi et al., 
2016). 
5.) Institute of Medicine (Institute 
for Medicine, 2012). 
   
Regulatory bodies • Communication and feedback 1, 
2 
• Auditing 2 
• Regulation on health IT systems 
4 
• Safety monitoring measures 4 
• Clinical risk Management 
processes 3, 4 
• Other 
1.) Vincent’s London Protocol 
framework for incident analysis 
(Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 
2004). 
2.) UPLOADS classification scheme 
(Goode et al., 2017; Salmon et 
al., 2017). 
3.) JCAHO classification framework 
for patient safety developed by 
the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) (Chang et al., 2005). 
4.) Clinical Risk Management Data 
Safety, NHS Digital Report, 
(Brindley and White, 2016b, 
2016a; White, 2018). 
   
Professional 
Bodies/Associations 
• Communication and feedback 
1,2 
• Current best practices 3 
• Current professional guidance 3 
• Collaboration 3 
• Other 
1.) Vincent’s London Protocol 
framework for incident analysis 
(Taylor-Adams and Vincent, 
2004). 
2.) UPLOADS classification scheme 
(Goode et al., 2017; Salmon et 
al., 2017). 
3.) Feedback from an experienced 
e-health specialist on the 
proposed model from the 






5.5 Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy – AcciMap and System Levels 
Based on the updated Medi-Socio AcciMap version, the following subsections 
briefly describe each AcciMap level and its respective system (socio-technical) 
categories: 
 
5.5.1 Physical/Actor Activities, Events and Conditions:  
Comprises entities (actors) at the front line and directly related to the events 
that led to an accident or a near miss. At this level, the focus is on the events 
that “directly” led to the accident. These include actions, errors and violations 
that directly caused the adverse outcome to occur. This level also describes 
potentially complex interactions between patients, clinicians, and software 
system utilisation and how they can potentially contribute to a hazardous 
situation. The system components at this level include “Patient” and “Staff”, 
which comprises different medical practitioners. Categories within this level 
include the following broad contributing factors: 
 
5.5.1.1 Patient-related Factors  
This category comprises contributing factors relating to patients, including 
medical conditions and actions/decisions (unsafe acts) taken that directly or 
indirectly resulted in an adverse outcome. In addition, factors associated with 
this category include communication between patients and medical staff. 
 
5.5.1.2 Staff-related Factors 
It consists of contributing factors relating to clinical staff that was directly 
involved with patients. This broad category is further classified into individually 
related, team-related, and local management related factors. Contributing 
factors include, for example, issues relating to effective communication with 
both patients and fellow staff, unsafe actions, decision making, and experience. 
 
5.5.1.3 Environmental Factors 
It consists of contributing factors relating to the condition of the environment 
where patients and clinical staff are operating. These include physical structure, 
staff level, workload and shift patterns, and how these can influence the 




5.5.2 Organisational Level 
This level comprises IT management, hospital management, health IT, and 
associated contributing factors relating to existing latent conditions that can 
potentially facilitate the occurrence and trajectory of the adverse outcome. This 
level also describes decisions taken within the health organisation, even 
including decisions previously taken that created an environment for errors to 
occur at the physical level. This level is divided into two other levels consisting 
of “technical & operational management” and “company management/local 
area planning” based on the original AcciMap format (Rasmussen and Svedung, 
2000; Svedung and Rasmussen, 2002). The system components and their 
associated contributing factors are included as follows: 
 
5.5.2.1 Hospital Management Factors 
Contributing factors relating to decisions made at the top-tier hospital 
management regarding the implementation of procedures, protocols regarding 
the safety of patients. Other essential factors include staff supervision, internal 
auditing, rules and procedures, policies and protocols, and safety culture. 
Financial constraint regarding budgeting is another contributing factor, primarily 
related to hiring staff, training them, and implementing new technologies that 
fit clinical processes. 
 
5.5.2.2 Information Technology (IT) Management Factors  
Contributing factors relating to the design and implementation of various health 
IT products and how they can affect the clinical staff’s utilisation of these 
technological products. This category broadly comprises factors relating to 
evaluating existing health IT systems, procurement, implementation, and 
maintenance. Other factors include communication between IT vendors and 
professionals regarding the development of software products and training for 
staff in using these products.  
 
5.5.2.3 Information Technology factors 
Contributing factors relating to the design of health IT products and how they 
are used by medical staff efficiently. This category focuses on aspects of health 
IT systems, including software functionality and configuration, hardware 
configuration, and facilitating clinical workflow integration. 
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5.5.2.4 Equipment-related Factors 
Contributing factors in this category relate to non-IT devices. This category 
essentially includes the design, suitability, functionality, and maintenance of 
medical equipment in clinical settings. Issues also included relates to the 
availability of medical equipment and if they support the workflow of medical 
units that utilises them. 
 
5.5.2.5 Human-Computer related Factors 
One of the contributing factors relating to human-computer interactions focuses 
on the usability of health IT products. Usability in this category includes 
interface design, data entry/selection, and information display.  
 
5.5.2.6 Health IT Vendor Factors 
This category comprises contributing factors including knowledge of clinical 
operations, quality management, health IT implementation, software design, 
and legal responsibilities. In addition, communication with the hospital’s 
management regarding the design and implementation of fit health IT products 
are among contributing factors in this category.  
 
5.5.3 External Level  
Contributing factors relating to decisions and actions taken outside health 
organisations by different entities regarding improving patient and system 
safety. The contributing factors identified at this level include the following: 
 
5.5.3.1 Professional Body Factors  
This system category includes factors associated with the effectiveness of 
existing best practices concerning safety and IT governance. Also included is how 
relevant health professional bodies communicate and collaborate with other 
external entities (government) and organisations (hospital). 
 
5.5.3.2 Regulatory Factors  
Contributing factors include communication between relevant regulatory bodies 
with other external entities (e.g., government) and organisations (healthcare). 
This system category also consists of the efficiency of safety monitoring 
measures, auditing, and regulation of existing health IT systems. 
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5.5.3.3 Government Factors  
Contributing factors relating to government influence include communication 
with hospital management and other external entities regarding patient safety. 
Other contributing factors include the effectiveness of operational oversight and 
standardisation regarding clinical operations and risk management. 
 
5.6 Analysis of Health IT-related Case Studies 
The case incident (CPOE medication error) used in the previous chapter served 
as a test trial for applying the initial structure of the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
taxonomy. The incident was analysed and validated by the same AcciMap expert 
involved in the previous study. The following steps involved in applying the 
AcciMap taxonomy include: 
1.) Analysis of the chronology of events that led to the adverse outcome or near 
miss. 
2.) Determining the “system categories” at the AcciMap level from the case 
incident. For example, in the analysis of the medication dosing error, at the 
physical/actor levels, the clinical providers (A and B) and the patient that 
was initially hypokalemic will be classified under the “staff-related” and 
“patient-related” factors, respectively. 
3.) Contributing factors are determined using the taxonomy and classified under 
appropriate sub-categories associated with each system or socio-technical 
category. 
4.) A similar process is repeated in the other AcciMap levels at the 
organisational and external levels. 
5.) Causal relationships are then depicted between the contributing factors 
within and between the system components. 
 
5.7 Maintenance of the Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy 
Maintenance of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy involves iteration to include 
newer themes not included in this version or combine existing contributing 
factors (sub-categories) that overlap (to be discussed further in the final 
chapter). In section 5.4, the subcategory “Other” and category “Unclassifiable” 
can be used to obtain themes to refine the proposed taxonomy to create new 
system categories and contributing factors. While the methodology adopted for 
its development mainly focused on using existing classification schemes, 
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maintaining, and improving the taxonomy will also involve continued application 
and feedback from target end-users in the healthcare domain. This feedback 
process will require specialists on human factors, patient safety and clinical risk, 
and IT management (e.g., NHS digital). 
 
5.8 Evaluation of the Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy 
Like any accident analytical approach, its taxonomy must achieve a 
recommended level of reliability (results between multiple users) and validity 
(results between users and experts). While reliability studies typically use the 
minimum benchmark of seventy per cent (70%), indicating high (acceptable) 
reliability, there isn’t any hard-set rule to determine its base value (Goode et 
al., 2017; Waterson et al., 2017). Past theses, including those of Branford (2007) 
and Shorrock (2003), particularly the latter, highlighted the need for 
classification schemes to achieve acceptable levels of validity and reliability. 
The pilot study (Chapter Three) highlighted these separate terms and elaborated 
in Chapters Six and Seven. These include its internal and external validity, 
briefly discussed in the proceeding subsections. 
 
5.8.1 Internal Validity 
Several criteria used to determine the internal validity of an accident analysis 
approach, or specifically, a taxonomy (Shorrock, 2003), are summarised as 
follows: 
1.) The first criterion focuses on how reliable an instrument is, in this case, a 
classification scheme or model (Shorrock, 2003). This criterion also includes 
its ability for the tool to be used reliably by multiple independent users 
(inter-reliability) and by the same user(s) over time (intra-reliability) (Ross, 
Wallace and Davies, 2004; Wallace and Ross, 2006).  
2.) The second criterion focuses on mutual exclusivity (as earlier pointed in 
this chapter) on a similar horizontal level where only one entity (e.g., 
causal/contributing factor) can be placed into one grouping or category. 
While this is considered an essential property of a classification system in 
an ideal abstract sense (Bowker and Star, 1999), Shorrock noted that some 
behavioural taxonomists disagree regarding the need for this attribute. 
3.) The third criterion focuses on the extent to which a 
taxonomy/classification scheme is considered comprehensive or 
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exhaustive. Comprehensiveness and reliability are often referred to as 
“content validity” (Shorrock, 2003).  
4.) The final criterion focuses on relationships between and within categories 
defined in a taxonomy system (Bowker and Star, 1999). Also, this criterion 
is regarded as more subjective (Shorrock, 2003).  
 
5.8.2 External Validity 
External validity focuses on the extent to which a taxonomy fulfils the objectives 
for which it was developed (Fleishman and Quaintance, 1984; Beaubien and 
Baker, 2002). Three critical indicators in considering the external validity 
include: 
1.) Generalizability of the scheme’s findings,  
2.) The extent to which the taxonomy is utilised to solve challenges, and, 
3.) Resources and training expended by users to use the taxonomy efficiently 
(Beaubien and Baker, 2002).  
When considering the external validity of any classification schemes or accident 
approach, the instrument should achieve the objectives for which it was 
developed (Shorrock, 2003; Branford, 2007). Aspects of external validity include 
face validity, where outcomes from its application should look valid based on 
results produced and end-users who utilise it for analysis (Shorrock, 2003). 
However, face validity is not the most robust type for validity assessment and 
will not be applied to evaluate the proposed AcciMap approach. 
 
Finally, in evaluating the proposed AcciMap version, the aspect of placement of 
contributing factors will not be used to compare findings. Chapters Three and 
Four had included this aspect when comparing results between participants after 
applying the standardised AcciMap version. However, the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
taxonomy incorporates system categories already assigned to appropriate 
AcciMap levels after initial development and feedback from SMEs. Therefore, the 
aspects of evaluation will primarily focus on causal/contributing factors, causal 




5.9 Limitation of the Study 
There were substantial challenges during the development phase of the 
proposed AcciMap taxonomy. One of such challenges included acquiring further 
feedback from additional SMEs on system categories and contributing factors. 
For example, despite contacting other safety specialists across NHS boards and 
trusts, there was limited or no feedback due to time constraints and 
unavailability. In addition, clinical IT practitioners (NHS Digital) feedback could 
not be obtained regarding aspects of the taxonomy relating to health IT 
(functionality and utilisation). Despite the initial contact with one of the NHS 
Digital representatives, a workshop was not possible due to their unavailability 
and work schedule. Another challenge was achieving an acceptable balance 
between ensuring that the taxonomy is not too complicated (i.e., number of 
sub-categories for each system category) and being as comprehensive as 
possible. There was also the issue of determining if subcategories defined for 
each system category had similar meanings to prevent overlapping factors. 
However, the evaluation of the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach will assess this 
limitation. 
 
Also, the methodology applied in the initial taxonomy development was 
considered an alternative to the development processes used in previous studies 
across different safety-critical domains. For example, part of the development 
process involves accessing data from incident reporting systems and extracting 
relevant themes. In this study, retrieving incident data from the relevant bodies 
in the NHS, especially related to health IT, was not possible to develop the 
proposed AcciMap taxonomy. However, access to this data can help to further 
refine the current Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy as part of the iteration process 
in a future study (Goode et al., 2018). Finally, while this thesis does not focus on 
the usability evaluation of the proposed approach, it was essential to develop a 








This chapter details the processes in developing the proposed Medi-Socio 
AcciMap taxonomy to address the second research question on reliability and the 
third question on validity assessments. These included reviewing existing 
taxonomies and selecting specific contributing factors and adapting them for the 
proposed AcciMap approach. System categories associated with each AcciMap 
level were extracted from existing socio-technical models that focused on the 
relevant aspects (as well as IT-related categories), including organisational and 
external elements of healthcare systems. Sub-categories related to each system 
category were also obtained from existing taxonomies/classification schemes 
and relevant literature. The initial Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy was reviewed 
by several human factors and patient safety practitioners, and changes were 
applied where necessary. Given the limitations in developing and revising the 
Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy, it is essential to test this proposed approach with 
professional participants and measure how reliable their outcomes are. This 
study will be covered in Chapter Six (reliability assessment) to address the 
second research question. Chapter Seven (validity assessment) will compare 




















6.0 CHAPTER SIX: Evaluation of the Reliability of the Medi-
Socio AcciMap Approach – NHS Patient Safety Practitioners 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the reliability assessment study relating to the second 
research question of the thesis on the evaluation of the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
taxonomy approach. The specific focus of this chapter is on the reliability 
assessment based on its application by a set of participants comprising of NHS 
patient safety and human factors specialists designated as “Professionals”. The 
professional group was also divided into two, where each subgroup applied the 
standardised and the Medi-Socio AcciMap approaches, respectively. Contributing 
factors, causal relationships, and safety recommendations were compared 
between professional participants from each subgroup. A quantitative 
measurement using the Index of Concordance was applied for qualitative analysis 
to assess both AcciMap approaches.  
 
6.2 Reliability 
6.2.1 Overview  
As the term was defined earlier in Chapter One, the definition has been argued 
to be flawed and used interchangeably with another word, “consistency”, 
particularly when taxonomic coding is involved (Kozlowski and Hattrup, 1992). 
The authors defined reliability instead as the ability of raters to agree on the 
code for each causal/contributing factor rather than just its application on 
average the same number of factors across the entire data set (Kozlowski and 
Hattrup, 1992). Furthermore, for any accident analysis approach to be 
considered reliable, “it must produce data that are independent of the 
measuring event, instrument or person” (Kassarjian, 1977). Reliability 
assessment of accident analytical approaches, according to Cornelissen et al. 
(2014), consists of different metrics, including the Index of Concordance (IoC), 
test-retest paradigm (Baysari, Caponecchia and McIntosh, 2011), and Pearson’s 
correlation  (Stanton and Young, 2003; Cornelissen et al., 2014). Also, other 
reliability measurements include the signal detection paradigm (Goode et al., 
2017). Each of these measurements has its respective strengths and limitations 
(Appendix E-1), but for the reliability studies in this chapter and the proceeding 
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chapter, the Index of Concordance (IoC) was applied to obtain per cent 
agreement scores (%) for quantitative analysis.  
 
6.2.2 Types of Reliability 
Reliability studies involve different assessment methods for determining the 
accident analytical approach’s reliability. There are generally two ways of 
evaluating the reliability of an accident analysis model; Intra-analyst agreement 
and the Inter-analyst agreement, described in the following subsections: 
 
6.2.2.1 Intra-analyst Reliability  
This type of assessment focuses on the ability of the accident analysis approach 
to produce consistent outcomes by the same analysts at different times or 
“comparison between judgements made by the same judge when presented with 
the same data on different occasions” (Ross, Wallace and Davies, 2004; 
Branford, 2007; McHugh, 2012; Goode et al., 2017). Also, the results produced 
from applying an accident approach on the same incident may vary from time to 
time (Goode et al., 2017).  
 
6.2.2.2 Inter-analyst Reliability 
This type of assessment focuses on the accident analysis approach's ability to 
produce similar or consistent results (outcomes) between multiple analysts 
simultaneously (Ross, Wallace and Davies, 2004; Branford, 2007; McHugh, 2012; 
Goode et al., 2017). This point also indicates that the classification scheme of 
the proposed model is logically organised, and causes/contributing factors can 
be classified in the appropriate categories by different users (Goode et al., 
2017). These reliability agreements have been used to evaluate and test 
classification schemes/taxonomies (Branford, 2007; Goode et al., 2017; Salmon 
et al., 2017). However, inter-rater reliability measurement is more commonly 
implemented as it saves time and resources for having multiple participants 
analyse multiple incident reports (Goode et al., 2017).  
 
6.2.3 Reliability Assessment 
The ability of accident analysis methods/models to produce consistent outcomes 
from multiple analysts and repeatable results over time are fundamental 
attributes (Branford, 2007; Goode et al., 2017, 2018). Based on Branford’s 
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research (2007), two approaches have been used to consider different aspects of 
the application of the AcciMap approach, and these are discussed below:   
 
6.2.3.1 Qualitative Assessment 
This type of assessment of the model’s reliability involves judging its application 
on a single or several case studies (Branford, 2007). Different approaches have 
been used when qualitatively assessing an approach’s reliability include the 
assessment of the Human Factors Investigation Tool (HFIT) (Gordon, Flin and 
Mearns, 2005) and REASON Root Cause Analysis (RCA) method (Branford, 2007). 
In applying the qualitative assessment, the focus will be to visually determine 
the reliability of outcomes from multiple users using both the standard and 
Medi-Socio approaches. This process is achieved by observing the causal maps 
produced, comparing, and contrasting themes regarding factors and safety 
recommendations (Markóczy and Goldberg, 1995). However, while qualitative 
assessments require making judgements regarding similarities and differences in 
results produced, it also introduces different forms of bias, including subjective 
and researcher bias (Branford, 2007). Therefore, this study requires the need for 
including quantitative assessment as was applied in Branford’s AcciMap 
evaluation. 
 
6.2.3.2 Quantitative Assessment 
Quantitative assessment is another option that allows for statistical analysis of 
contributing factors (nodes), causal links, and safety recommendations produced 
based on ratings from multiple analysts (Branford, 2007). The focus of 
quantitative reliability assessment is on calculating the percentage of agreement 
between different analysts in classifying discrete events in the appropriate 
categories (Hruschka et al., 2004; Branford, 2007; Goode et al., 2017, 2018). 
This type of assessment involves creating a coding template regarding 
contributing factors, causal relationships, and safety recommendations that will 
be reliable for multiple coders rather than having each coder utilise their 
method (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Hruschka et al., 2004). Thus, this 
quantitative assessment can provide a fuller picture of the reliability difference 




6.3 Research Methodology 
6.3.1 Methods 
Based on Branford’s thesis, content analysis was considered the appropriate 
method for qualitative assessment of both AcciMap approaches. Content analysis 
involves textual analysis for comparing, contrasting, and categorizing data 
(Hignett and McDermottt, 2015). This process also consists of quantitative 
(counting the number of instances that fall in a category for statistical analysis) 
and qualitative (understanding and describing these categories in contributing to 
the adverse event) approaches (Krippendorf, 2004; Bengtsson, 2016). However, 
with the development of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy, its reliability will 
also need to be categorised and analysed for statistical purposes (Branford, 
2007; Goode et al., 2017; Stanton et al., 2019).  
 
This study involved clinical safety practitioners with experience in 
incident/accident analysis from the National Health Service (NHS), United 
Kingdom. Each participant invited has experience conducting incident 
investigations using different accident analytical approaches. The participants 
were familiar with the AcciMap methodology but had never applied it in their 
practice for incident investigations.  
 
6.3.2 Participants 
A total number of six (n = 6) participants took part in this study after an initial 
invite and consent forms (Appendix E-2) were provided through email and skype 
correspondence. Five of these professionals were based in various NHS practices 
in the United Kingdom (Scotland and England). One was established in Greece 
but had collaborations with the NHS on Pharmacovigilance. The professional 
participants were divided into two subgroups, each comprising three 
professionals (n = 3). Table 6-1 provides a summary for each participant based on 








Table 6-1: Summary of professional participants and years of experience 






1 Pharmacovigilance (National Organisation for 
Medicines (EOF), Greece) 
4 3 
2 Patient Safety Manager (National Health Service 
(NHS)) 
11 11 
3 E-health Pharmacy Adviser/Clinical Safety Officer 
(National Health Service (NHS)) 
6 6 
4 Associate Director of Service Improvement 
(National Health Service (NHS)) 
2 1 
5 Clinical Research Registrar (National Health 
Service (NHS)) 
3 3 
6 Accident Investigator (Health and Safety 
Investigation Branch (HSIB)) 
N/A N/A 
N/A – Not available 
 
6.3.3 Training Provided 
Each participant was given the two case incident reports and AcciMap guidelines 
via email and Skype correspondence. Unfortunately, due to location and time 
constraints, training could not be organised with all participants simultaneously. 
Each session was organised with each participant through Skype, lasting between 
45 minutes to 1 hour. Training materials included Branford’s AcciMap guidelines 
and a worked example of applying the AcciMap and Medi-Socio approaches. The 
professional users were also provided with materials relating to the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach and its associated documentation of contributing factor codes. 
 
6.3.4 Training Procedures 
The concept of the standardised AcciMap approach was during the training 
session, including applying Branford’s guidelines for AcciMap analysis. An 
example case incident used was based on the AcciMap analysis of the CPOE case 
study (Horsky, Kuperman and Patel, 2005) previously used in Chapter Four. The 
Medi-Socio approach was then introduced to them using its application on the 
same case incident. Finally, each professional participant was provided with the 
documentation guideline describing each system category and sub-categories. 




6.3.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
After the training, each participant independently analysed the incident, 
produced their AcciMap outputs and safety recommendations, and sent them via 
email to the principal researcher. Any areas identified in their outcomes that 
were unclear regarding contributing factors (semantics) were communicated to 
participants to enable them to make any necessary changes. The results 
obtained from the analysis are qualitatively and quantitatively compared to 
determine the reliability of both AcciMap versions. Safety recommendations 
made are also compared and contrasted.  
 
6.4 Case Incident Three - Synopsis 
The reliability study involved using two case incidents. The first (case incident 
three) was a health IT-related incident involving a patient who was administered 
an overdose (381/2 times) of Septra at the University of California San Franciso 
(UCSF) teaching hospital (Wachter, 2015). Appendix E-3 provides the incident 
details, with additional information shown in Appendix E-4. This incident offers a 
context in which clinical IT systems/medical devices contributed to patients' 
adverse effects (overdose). For this incident, the EPIC system is a “UCSF based, 
Medical Record System (EMR) and electronic health record (EHR) system which 
puts increased emphasis on patient safety and medical error prevention by 
creating one electronic patient chart that’s accessible across the institution, 
increasing the continuity of care” (University of California, 2018). An additional 
incident (Incident 4) for the reliability study related to a patient receiving a 
fatal dose of Vincristine led to death at the Queens Medical Centre, Nottingham 
(Toft, 2001). The professional participants (groups A and B) were provided with 
the incident details as part of their AcciMap analysis in applying the standardised 
and the Medi-Socio AcciMap approaches. 
 
6.5 AcciMap Analysis 
After the training session, the first analysis round involved both subgroups 
(professionals A and B) applying the standard AcciMap approach on the two 
incidents. The process was then repeated in the second round of AcciMap 
analysis. Each subgroup then applied the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach but 
reversed the incidents used in the first round (see table 6-2). This process was 
applied to allow each participant to understand the AcciMap approach in the 
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first round, learn from their experience, and apply it when using the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach. Also, the standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap templates 
were designed and provided for them to implement their analysis. However, 
some participants used their software tool to develop their respective outcomes 
and submitted them as images (jpeg format). 
 
Table 6-2: AcciMap analysis rounds involving professional participants 
Analysis One 
  
Professionals Activity 1 
1st Subgroup (Professional A) Standardised AcciMap approach (Incident 3) 




Professionals Activity 2 
1st Subgroup (Professional A) Medi-Socio AcciMap approach (Incident 4) 
2nd Subgroup (Professional B) Medi-Socio AcciMap approach (Incident 3) 
 
After their analyses, participants developed their respective safety 
recommendations based on step 9 of Branford’s training manual. Next, AcciMap 
results submitted were re-created using the Microsoft Visio application to 
provide a more consistent design theme for the qualitative comparative study. 
Finally, the professional participants forwarded their safety recommendations 
separately for content analysis. 
 
6.6 Qualitative Assessment  
Results from applying the standardised AcciMap and Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approaches on the incidents were analysed using content analysis to extract 
common themes based on coding instructions (Appendix E-5). The content 
analysis involved identifying and extracting themes regarding contributing 
factors from the application of both AcciMap approaches by the professional 
participants based on contributing factor nodes (Branford’s AcciMap) and 
classified nodes (Medi-Socio AcciMap approach) identified (Branford, 2007). In 
addition, safety recommendation themes were also extracted from both sets of 
outcomes relating to the standardised AcciMap, and Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approaches. The criteria used to compare findings after the analysis rounds were 
137 
 
based on Branford’s assessment of the standard AcciMap approach, which 
includes: 
1.) Similar and different (unique) contributing factors identified by each 
participant. 
2.) Similar causal relationships between similar causal/contributing factors 
identified by each participant. 
3.) Similar safety recommendations developed by each participant. 
As previously mentioned in the methodology section, a qualitative content 
analysis was applied by both the principal researcher and human factors 
specialist to minimise biases and, where applicable, make a consensus regarding 
the similarity of outcomes.  
 
6.7 Qualitative Results - Application of the Standardised and Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approaches 
Professional participants produced standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap 
outcomes based on their respective AcciMap results (Appendices F-1 and F-2). 
The qualitative assessment of findings obtained from professionals is shown in 
figure 6-1 and table 6-3. The first subgroup (A) applying the standardised 
AcciMap approach identified twenty-five (n = 25) causal/contributing factors 
divided into eight common contributing factors (CCFs) (C1 – C8) and five 
individual contributing factors (ICFs) (C9 – C13) at the physical/actor level, five 
CCFs (C14 – C18), and five ICFs (C19 – C23) (see table 6-3). No common factors 
were identified at the external level, but two ICFs were identified (C24 – C25).  
 
Table 6-3: Contributing factors (Septra overdose) from applying the 
standardised AcciMap approach by professional participants (A) 
Code Contributing Factor(s) Themes 
 
Physical/Actor Events, Processes, and Conditions 
Common Contributing Factor (CCF) 
C1 Trust between Lucca and Chan from prior relationship leading to complacency 
C2 Pharmacist (Chan) is overloaded (busy) and overwhelmed 
C3 Staff (pharmacist and paediatrician) ignoring software warning messages 
C4 The Pharmacy office is very busy and noisy 
C5 The patient was on different and complicated medications 
C6 The Pharmacist ignored the error alert (clicked out of the alert screen) 
C7 Alert fatigue due to previous alerts clicked out (dismissed) without consequence 
C8 Paediatrician incorrectly inputs a high Septra dose value under mg/kg instead of mg 
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Code Contributing Factor(s) Themes 
 
Individual Contributing Factor (ICF) 
C9 The added complexity of weight-based dose calculations Professional – 1A 
C10 The patient has a rare medical condition 
C11 Pharmacist authorised incorrect dose 
C12 The nurse administered 38.5 tablets Professional – 2A 
C13 The patient accepted and took 38.5 tablets 
 
Organisational 
Common Contributing Factor (CCF) 
C14 All overdose warnings (alerts) on the EPIC software system looked similar and unclear 
C15 The EPIC software system was not built with maximum dosage limits regarding 
dosage orders  
C16 The decision to impose weight-based dosing for children (<40kg) causing 
complications 
C17 The design of the alert screen was inefficient (poor design of error alert) 
C18 Translation of weight-based doses into pills (tablets) requiring confirmation 
 
Individual Contributing Factor (ICF) 
C19 The system allows ordering in mg and mg/kg Professional – 1A 
C20 Poor design of satellite pharmacy office – inadequate space, 
noisy, cluttered environment 
C21 There are many drug alerts 
C22 Tablets need to be ordered in mg (Not mg/kg) Professional – 2A 
C23 Screen for mg/kg not distinguished from the screen in mg only 
 
External 
Individual Contributing Factor (ICF) 
C24 EPIC and First Databank designed system and created rules 
that govern UCSF’s alerts (no alert for mode – mg or mg/kg) 
Professional – 1A 
C25 Problems with previous software provider Professional – 2A 
 
The second group B of professionals, based on their application of the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap taxonomy, identified twenty-seven (n = 27) causal/contributing factors 
with seven CCFs (C1 – C7) and five ICFs (C8 – C12) at the physical/actor level. 
Three CCFs (C3, C6, and C7) identified from applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach were also found using the standardised AcciMap version. At the 
organisational level, they identified two CCFs (C13 – C14) and twelve ICFs (C15 – 
C26) (technical/operational and management levels) (see table 6-4). Only one 







Table 6-4: Contributing factors (Septra overdose) identified from applying the 
Medi-Socio AcciMap approach by professional participants (B) 
Code Contributing Factor(s) Themes 
Physical/Actor Events, Processes, and Conditions 
Commonly Contributing factor (CCF) 
C1 The nurse (Levitt) administers a wrong (high dose) order 
C2 Pharmacist (Chan) accepting an incorrect order 
C3 Trust between Lucca and Chan from prior relationship leading to complacency in 
administering the dose – (C1) 
C4 The dose order was returned as the variance was above 5% 
C5 The physician (Lucca) incorrectly amends the dosage order wrongly 
C6 The Pharmacy office is very busy and noisy – (C4) 
C7 Pharmacist (Chan) is overloaded (busy) and overwhelmed – (C2) 
 
Individually Contributing factor (ICF) 
C8 The patient received 15 different medications Professional – 1B 
C9 Admission process without Pharmacy 
C10 Doctor unfamiliar with paper prescribing 
C11 Existing relationship of trust between Physician and Pharmacist Professional – 2B 
C12 The physician made a first incorrect order Professional – 3B 
 
Organisational Level – Technical & Operational Management 
Common Contributing Factor (CCF) 
C13 Dosage calculation based on the weight of patients 
C14 Mode error relating to lack of feedback from the EPIC System on default settings 
 
Individual Contributing Factor (ICF) 
C15 Paper-based prescription in community Professional – 1B 
C16 Order entry module - Intelligence 
C17 Insufficient process for correcting incorrect drug dose entries Professional – 2B 
C18 The pharmacist receives multiple alerts from the EPIC system 
producing cognitive overload 
C19 Drug ordering screen calculated dose above available tablet 
strength 
C20 EPIC system – design of information screens poor. No visual 
clues to aid medical staff 
C21 Alert sign of the program was not the appropriate one Professional – 3B 
 
Organisational Level - Health Management 
Individual Contributing Factor (ICF) 
C22 The interface between care providers Professional – 1B 
C23 A poor decision relating to setting dosage limits in the system Professional – 2B 
C24 Implementation committee decision for weight-based dosing for 
children < 40kg 
C25 EPIC – design and test policies and procedures 
C26 UCSF Management decided not to switch units on the dose of the 
program 
Professional – 3B 
 
External 
Individual Contributing Factor (ICF) 
C27 EPIC dose limits Professional – 1B 
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6.7.1 Causal/Contributing Factors – Similarities and Variations  
Based on the content analysis of factors identified after applying both AcciMap 
approaches, the summary of causal/contributing factors is designated as 
Common Contributing Factors (CCF) for each AcciMap level. Thus, tables 6-5 and 
6-6 are based on the standardised AcciMap approach, and tables 6-7 and 6-8 are 
based on the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy version. 
 
Table 6-5: Matrix of CCFs identified by professional participants (A) from 
applying the standardised AcciMap approach – Physical/Actor-Process level 
Code Professional-1A Professional-2A Professional-3A 
Common Contributing Factors (CCFs) 
Physical/Actor Events, Processes, and Conditions 
 
C1 X   
C2 X   
C3    
C4    
C5  X  
C6    
C7   X 




KEY – Common Contributing Factor Theme 
C1 Trust between Lucca and Chan from prior relationship leading to complacency in 
administering the dose 
C2 Pharmacist (Chan) is overloaded (busy) and overwhelmed 
C3 Staff (Chan and Lucca) ignoring software warning messages 
C4 The Pharmacy office is very busy and noisy 
C5 The patient was on different and complicated medications 
C6 The pharmacist ignored the error alert (clicked out of the alert screen) 
C7 Alert fatigue due to previous alerts clicked out without consequence 











Table 6-6: Matrix of CCFs identified by professional participants (A) from 
applying the standardised AcciMap approach – Organisational and External levels 
Code Professional-1A Professional-2A Professional-3A 
Common Contributing Factors (CCFs) 
Organisational 
 
C14    
C15    
C16   X 
C17   X 
C18 X   
 
External 
No Contributing factors identified 
 
 
KEY – Common Contributing Factor Theme 
C14 All overdose warnings (alerts) on the EPIC software system look similar and unclear 
C15 The EPIC software system was not built with maximum dosage limits for dosage 
orders 
C16 The design of the alert screen was inefficient (poor design of error alert)  
C17 The decision to impose weight-based dosing for children (<40kg) causing 
complications 
C18 Translation of weight-based doses into pills (tablets) requiring confirmation 
 
Table 6-7: Matrix of CCFs identified by professional participants (B) from 
applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach – Physical/Actor-Process level 
Code Professional-1B Professional-2B Professional-3B 
 
Common Contributing Factors (CCF) 
Physical Actor Events, Processes, and Conditions 
C1 X P-SI3 P-SI7 
C2 P-SI3 P-SI3 P-SI3 
C3 X P-SI6 P-SI6 
C4 X P-ST2 P-SI3 
C5 X P-SI3 P-SI6 
C6 X P-EN1 P-EN0 
C7 P-EN5 P-EN5 P-EN3 
 
KEY – Common Contributing Factor Theme  
C1 The nurse (Levitt) administers a wrong (high dose) order 
C2 Pharmacist (Chan) accepting an incorrect order 
C3 Trust between Lucca and Chan from prior relationship leading to complacency in 
administering the dose 
C4 The dose order was returned as the variance was above 5% 
C5 The physician (Lucca) incorrectly amends the dosage order wrongly 
C6 The Pharmacy office is very busy and noisy 
C7 Pharmacist (Chan) is overloaded (busy) and overwhelmed 
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Table 6-8: Matrix of CCFs identified by professional participants (B) from 
applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach – Organisational level 
Code Professional-1B Professional-2B Professional-3B 
 
Common Contributing Factors (CCF) 
Organisational (Technical/Operational Management and Health Management) 
C13 O-IT2 O-IT2 X 
C14 O-IT1 O-HC1 X 
 
External 
No common contributing factors identified 
 
KEY – Common Contributing Factor Theme  
C13 Dosage calculation based on the weight of patients 
C14 Mode error relating to lack of feedback from the EPIC System on default settings 
 
The following subsections will elaborate further on the identification of CCFs and 
indicate each professional participant's individual contributing factors (ICFs). 
 
6.7.1.1 Physical Actors, Events, Processes, and Conditions Level 
Based on the application of Branford’s AcciMap approach, out of the eight 
common contributing factors (CCFs) identified, all professional participants 
identified only three factors. These include C3 (“staff ignoring software 
messages”), C4 (“the pharmacy office being very busy and noisy”) and C6 (“the 
pharmacist ignoring an error alert”). Two out of the three professionals 





Figure 6-1: Comparison of contributing factors at the Physical/Actor and Process 
level using the Standardised AcciMap approach - Professional participants (A) 
 
On the application of the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach, all professionals 
identified common factors relating to “the pharmacist accepting an incorrect 
dosage order” (C2) and “the pharmacist being very busy” (C7). From these 
factors, C2 was classified under the same sub-category (P-SI3: unsafe acts) and 
two out of three professionals classified C7 in the same sub-category (P-EN5: 
time pressure). Two out of three professionals identified the remaining 5 CCFs 
(C1, C3, C4, C5, and C6). However, each factor was classified under different 




Figure 6-2: Comparison of contributing factors at the Physical/Actor and Process 
level using the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach - Professional participants (B) 
 
6.7.1.2 Organisational Level 
At this level, based on the summary of CCFs and ICFs from table 6-3 and the 
contributing factor matrix (table 6-6), CCFs identified by all three professionals 
were factors C14 (“similarity of overdose alerts”) and C15 (“the EPIC software 
not incorporating a maximum dose limit”). The latter CCF identified by 
professional three was placed at the external level instead of the organisational 
level (indicated as a red bolded box). The other CCFs, C16 (“weight-dosage 
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policy for children causing complications”), C17 (“the design of the error 
alert”), and C18 (“translation of weight-based doses to pills creating a risk”) 
was identified by two out of three professionals (see figure 6-3).   
 
 
Figure 6-3: Comparison of contributing factors at the Organisational level using 
the Standardised AcciMap approach - Professional participants (A) 
 
From applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach, two CCFs were identified with 
the only factor relating to C13 (“dosage calculation based on patient’s weight”) 
classified under the same sub-category (O-IT2: “software-configuration”) by 
professionals 1B and 2B (see table 6-8). The remaining CCF C14 (“lack of 
feedback from the EPIC system regarding its default settings”) were identified 
by professionals 1B and 2B. However, this factor (C14) was classified under 
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different sub-categories relating to O-HC1 (“usability-information 
display/interpretation”) and O-IT1 (“software-functionality”) (see figure 6-4). 
 
Figure 6-4: Comparison of contributing factors at the Organisational level using 
the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach - Professional participants (B) 
 
6.7.1.3 External Level 
There were no similarities to be determined after applying the standard and 
proposed AcciMap approaches at this level (see figure 6.5). Professional 
participants identified different factors using the standardised AcciMap. The only 
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factor identified by professional 3A at the external level was designated as a CCF 
(C15) regarding mode error of the EPIC software system. The second subgroup 




Figure 6-5: Comparison of contributing factors at the External level using the 
standardised AcciMap approach - Professional participants (A) 
 
6.7.2 Causal Relationships (Links) – Similarities 
Causal relationships between factors (CCFs) (marked as red bolded arrows 
indicating direct links and blue bolded arrows meaning indirect links from 
previous figures) within and between different AcciMap levels were identified 
and summarised based on the application of the standardised and Medi-Socio 
AcciMap taxonomy approaches (table 6-9). Based on the application of the 
standardised AcciMap, five causal links (greyed links indicate indirect causal 
relationships) within the physical/actor level. The relationship (Link-1) was the 
only link identified by all professional (A) users, which relates to the pharmacist 
clicking or “ignoring error alerts (C4) due to the busyness, multiple activities, 
and distractions in his working environment (C6)”. Two professional participants 
identified the other two links (Link-6 (1, 2) and Link-7 (2, 3)) between the 
physical and organisational AcciMap levels. These links focused on the “poor 
design of the alert screen (C19) leading to the pharmacist ignoring the error 
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alert (C6)” and “the lack of severity levels from the alerts (C18) leading to the 
paediatrician also ignoring warning alerts (C3)”. No other links were similarly 
identified within and between both organisational and external levels. 
 
Table 6-9: Causal relationships (links) identified from the Septra overdose 
incident from applying both AcciMap approaches 
Branford’s AcciMap Approach 
Link Code Causal Relationships similarly Identified Professional 
(A) 
Physical/Actor Events, Process, and Conditions 
Link-1 A causal relationship between contributing factors C4 and C6 
(contained intermediate factors between C4 and C6) 
1,2,3 
Link-2 A causal relationship between contributing factors C5 and C8 
(contained intermediate factors between C5 and C8) 
1,3 
Link-3 A causal relationship between contributing factors C1 and C6 2,3 
Link-4 A causal relationship between contributing factors C3 and C1 
(contained intermediate factors between C3 and C1) 
2,3 
Link-5 A causal relationship between contributing factors C7 and C3 1,3 
 
Organisational 
Link-6 A causal relationship between contributing factors C16 and C6 1,2 
Link-7 A causal relationship between contributing factors C14 and C3 2,3 
 
Medi-Socio AcciMap Approach 
Link Code Causal Relationships similarly Identified Professional 
(B) 
Physical/Actor Events, Process, and Conditions 
Link-1 A causal relationship between contributing factor C1 and 
outcome(s) 
2,3 
Link-2 A causal relationship between contributing factors C2 and C1 2,3 
Link-3 A causal relationship between contributing factors C3 and C2 2,3 
Link-4 A causal relationship between contributing factors C6 and C2 2,3 
Link-5 A causal relationship between contributing factors C5 and C2 2,3 
Link-6 A causal relationship between contributing factors C4 and C5  2,3 
Link-7 A causal relationship between contributing factors C7 and C2 
(contained an intermediate factor between C7 and C2) 
1,2,3 
 
Organisational (Technical & Operational and Health Management) 
 No similar causal relationships identified  
 
The second subgroup identified seven causal relationships within the 
physical/actor level after applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap version. Professionals 
2 and 3 indicated similarities regarding all the relationships except for Link-7, 
which was similarly recognised by all the professionals (B). From the observation 
of the AcciMap results after qualitative content analysis, causal relationships 
between CCFs were virtually identical between professionals 2 and 3 at the 
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physical actor/process level. Other links that were not common were very few 
and were linked from the preceding AcciMap level (between levels rather than 
within each level). There were no other relationships identified at both the 
organisational and external levels that were similar.  
 
6.7.3 Comparison of Safety Recommendations 
Each subgroup also produced safety recommendations based on their application 
of both AcciMap approaches (Appendix F-3). Their safety measures were also 
qualitatively compared to determine themes using content analysis, with each 
recommendation theme designated as “Pr-R” (Professional – Recommendation) 
(see table 6-10). From the observation of safety measures from the first 
professional subgroup, there was higher reliability in safety recommendations 
after applying the standardised AcciMap than using the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach (see table 6-11). The only safety recommendation identified based on 
both AcciMap versions was Pr-R1 regarding reviewing the EPIC system’s interface 
for data entry and introducing severity levels as applied to alerts. 
 
Table 6-10: Safety recommendation themes based on the Septra overdose 
analysis after applying both AcciMap approaches by professional participants 
Code Safety Recommendation Themes Parties 
Responsible 
 
Standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap approaches 
Pr-R1 Reviewing the EPIC software system to improve the design of alerts 
based on severity levels, system interfaces for data entry. 
Hospital 
Management 
Pr-R2 Reviewing of the EPIC software system to incorporate a maximum 
dose limit when administering drug medication 
UCSF, Hospital 
Management 
Pr-R3 Reviewing of the EPIC software system to incorporate clearly 
defined default settings regarding dosage units (e.g., mg/kg) 
UCSF, Hospital 
Management 
Pr-R4 Improving the working environment by the reduction of staff 
workload (tasks and responsibilities) and augmenting staff personnel 
(Pharmacy department) to prevent human error 
Hospital 
Management 











Table 6-11: Summary of safety recommendations from applying of both AcciMap 
approaches by professional participants 




Standardised & Medi-Socio AcciMap Approaches  
Pr-R1 Reviewing of the EPIC software system in improving 
the design of alerts based on severity levels, system 
interfaces for data entry 
1,2 1,2,3 
Pr-R2 Reviewing of the EPIC software system to 
incorporate a maximum dose limit when 
administering drug medication 
1,2,3 None 
Pr-R3 Reviewing of the EPIC software system to 
incorporate clearly defined default settings 
regarding dosage units (e.g., mg/kg) 
1,2 None 
Pr-R4 Improving the working environment by the 
reduction of staff workload (tasks and 
responsibilities) and augmenting staff personnel 
(Pharmacy department) to prevent human error 
1,2,3 None 
Pr-R5 Implementation of policies encouraging medical 
staff to challenge medication doses 
None 2,3 
• Identified using the Standardised AcciMap approach only 
• Identified using the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach only 
 
Safety recommendation themes Pr-R2, Pr-R3, and Pr-R4 were formulated based 
on the use of the standardised AcciMap approach, while Pr-R1 and Pr-R5 were 
developed after applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. However, regarding 
the safety recommendation theme (Pr-R1), only two out of the three 
professionals (A) indicated it while all three professionals (B) indicated this 
recommendation. Based on the qualitative assessment of both AcciMap 
approaches, the standardised AcciMap version was also visually more reliable 
than the Medi-Socio AcciMap version. The following subsection will quantify 
these results to obtain numeric values for each aspect of analyses in comparing 
both AcciMap approaches. 
 
6.8 Quantitative Assessment 
Quantitative measurements for analysing the reliability of outcomes produced 
after applying both AcciMap approaches after the qualitative assessment will 
provide a complete picture of the reliability regarding the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach. The coding rules (see Appendix E-6) used to code responses from 
professional participants as part of content analysis were mainly adapted from 
Branford (2007) and Goode et al. (2017) studies. These rules for both the 
standard and Medi-Socio AcciMap approaches were used to rate outcomes 
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produced relating to causal/contributing factors, causal relationships (links), and 
safety recommendations. The summary of the coding rules are:  
1.) For any causal/contributing factor similarly identified between pairs (Y:1), 
partially identified between pairs (1/2:0.5), and not identified between 
pairs (N:0) (Standardised AcciMap version)  
2.) For causal links and safety recommendations similarly identified between 
pairs of participants (Y:1) and not identified between pairs (N:0). 
(Standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap versions)  
3.) For any contributing factor classified in the same sub-category similarly 
identified between two pairs (Y:1), partially identified in the case of 
contributing factor identified similarly but classified under a different sub-
category (1/2:0.5) and not identified between pairs (N:0). (Medi-Socio 
AcciMap version)  
 
To achieve this process, two coders (principal researcher and a human factors 
specialist with Health Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB)) independently analysed 
the results to determine “agreements” and “disagreements” regarding causal 
factors, safety recommendations, and causal links. The purpose of using two 
coders (raters) was to reduce cognitive bias (e.g., subjective bias) and produce 
an agreed set of outcomes for further pair comparative analysis (Branford, 
2007). The AcciMap results from professionals are compared in pairs of two. 
Since the participants were divided into two subgroups (three professionals per 
subgroup), the pairings for professionals constitute three pairs (AB, AC, and BC). 
Any items with disagreements regarding the three aspects of measurement were 
discussed, and a mutual consensus was reached regarding actual values. 
 
Earlier in this chapter, different reliability metrics were introduced (Appendix E-
1), where each approach has its respective strengths and weaknesses. The 
measurement chosen for the quantitative analysis is the Index of Concordance 
(IoC), which is one of the most commonly used statistical measurements for 
determining the per cent agreement rates regarding a tool of analysis (Olsen, 
2011; Goode et al., 2017). However, the limitation of this technique is that it 
does not account for “chance agreement” between multiple analysts (Landis and 
Koch, 1977; Branford, 2007). Another limitation of the IoC measurement is its 
overestimation of levels of agreement. A more stringent measurement option for 
152 
 
analysing classified data is Kappa’s statistics, which considers “chance 
agreement” (Landis and Koch, 1977). This statistical technique can be applied to 
coding results between two raters (Cohen’s Kappa) (Cohen, 1968) or multiple 
raters (Fleiss’ Kappa) (Fleiss, 1971). Other options include Krippendorff’s alpha 
which also takes chance agreement into account. The chance agreement 
essentially constitutes a situation where two or more independent coders select 
or classify an item based on a finite set of options and may agree by chance. In 
this instance, when applying the IoC measurement, the focus was on determining 
similarly identified factors between participants rather than if that factor was 
similarly “classified” (same sub-category) between users. These reliability 
measurements have a range of values indicating a tool's reliability, as shown in 
table 6-12. Table 6-13 shows the breakdown of the degree of agreement 
(kappa’s statistics). 
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Table 6-13: Levels of Agreement using Cohen’s Kappa Coefficients (Landis and 
Koch, 1977) 
Cohen’s Kappa Degree of Agreement 
< 0.20 Poor 
0.21 – 0.40 Fair 
0.41 – 0.60 Moderate 
0.61 – 0.80 Good 
0.81 – 1.00 Very good 
 
However, to compare reliability scores between both AcciMap approaches, the 
index of concordance metric was applied to both AcciMap approaches. The 
reason is that using an alternative measurement like kappa’s statistics is only 
applicable to the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach, especially when analysing the 
reliability of contributing factors relating to classifying factors in the sub-
153 
 
categories. The only instance where Kappa’s statistics could be applied will be 
when considering the placement of contributing factors at AcciMap levels rather 
than their identification. While IoC offers a more simplistic approach in 
determining agreement and not taking “chance” into account, Ross et al. (2004) 
and Martin and Bateson (1993) argued that the use of this metric is considered 
an appropriate approach for calculating intercoder consensus. They cited 
benefits, including avoiding criticisms relating to Kappa’s statistical 
measurement and agreement for each code being individualistic rather than 
agreeing on the code set (taxonomy) (Martin and Bateson, 1993; Ross, Wallace 
and Davies, 2004).  
 
Finally, based on the “agreed ratings”, the IoC metric was applied to calculate 
the reliability scores. The formula constitutes the total number of “agreements” 
divided by the number of “agreements” and “disagreements” (Appendix E-1). 
However, in using this formula, “partial agreements” (e.g., where the second 
participant partially identifies a factor identified by one participant) was 
considered to produce the actual reliability scores. Therefore, in calculating the 
scores, values were assigned for “agreement” (1), “partial agreement” (0.5) and 
“disagreement” (0). 
 
6.9 Quantitative Results 
The summary of reliability scores based on the application of both AcciMap 
approaches by the professional participants after applying the reliability coding 
procedures (Appendix E-6) are summarised in the following subsections. 
 
6.9.1 Contributing Factors Results 
Reliability scores using the IoC metric for contributing factors identified by 
professional participants are shown in tables 6-14 (standardised AcciMap version) 
and 6-15 (Medi-Socio AcciMap version), respectively. The mean reliability score 
based on the application of the standardised AcciMap resulted in 39%. In 
contrast, for the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy, the result was 26% (34% 





Table 6-14: Reliability scores of causal/contributing factors between 
professional participants (A) (n = 3) - Standardised AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Reliability Score (IoC) % 
A and B 38% 
A and C 41% 
Mean Reliability 40% 
  
B and C 38% 
 
Grand Mean Reliability 39% 
 
Table 6-15: Reliability scores of causal/contributing factors between 
professional participants (B) (n = 3) - Medi-Socio AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Reliability Score (IoC) % 
(Associated codes) 
Reliability Score (IoC) % (No 
associated codes) 
A and B 33% 38% 
A and C 13% 17% 
Mean Reliability  23% 27% 
   
B and C 29% 41% 
   
Grand Mean Reliability 26% 34% 
 
6.9.2 Causal Relationship Results 
Causal links identified between pairs of professional participants using the 
standardised AcciMap and Medi-Socio AcciMap versions are summarised in tables 
6-16 and 6-17. The mean reliability scores resulted in the grand mean reliability 
score of 16% against the 26% score from applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach. 
 
Table 6-16: Reliability scores of causal relationships (links) between professional 
participants (A) (n = 3) - Standardised AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Reliability Score (IoC) % 
A and B 12% 
A and C 28% 
Mean Reliability  20% 
  
A and E 12% 
  





Table 6-17: Reliability scores of causal relationships (links) between professional 
participants (B) (n = 3) - Medi-Socio AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Reliability Score (IoC) % - Taxonomy 
A and B 33% 
A and C 13% 
Mean Reliability 23% 
  
B and C 29% 
  
Grand Mean Reliability 26% 
 
6.9.3 Safety Recommendation Results 
Tables 6-18 and 6-19 summarise reliability scores regarding the safety 
recommendations produced using both AcciMap approaches. The grand mean 
reliability score of the standardised AcciMap resulted in 73%, with the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach having 45%. 
 
Table 6-18: Reliability scores of safety recommendations between professional 
participants (A) (n = 3) - Standardised AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Reliability Score (IoC) % 
A and B 100% 
A and C 50% 
Mean Reliability 75% 
  
B and C 71% 
Grand Mean Reliability 73% 
  
Table 6-19: Reliability scores of safety recommendations between professional 
participants (B) (n = 3) - Medi-Socio AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Reliability Score (IoC) % - Taxonomy 
A and B  100% 
A and C 0% 
Mean Reliability 50% 
  
B and C 40% 







6.10.1 Comparison of Outcomes 
Both qualitative and quantitative results from this reliability study involving 
professional participants indicated that despite the inclusion of the taxonomy, 
the reliability scores from applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach was less 
than the standardised AcciMap counterpart. A comparison between subgroups of 
professionals was also carried out to examine similarities and variations. The 
following subsections discuss the results from the reliability study. 
 
6.10.1.1 Reliability – Causal/Contributing Factors 
Associated codes with contributing factors identified using the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach indicated that the outcomes were less reliable than Branford’s 
AcciMap version. At the physical/actor level, two out of three professionals (A) 
identified eight CCFs, where three (C3, C4, and C6) out of the CCFs were 
recognised by all professionals A. This observation indicated a higher reliability 
outcome compared to the results of the Medi-Socio AcciMap (professional 
subgroup B). However, visual observation of CCFs (C1 – C8) based on professional 
subgroup B’s results at the physical/actor-level indicated that professionals 2B 
and 3B particularly have almost identical outputs in the CCFs identified. 
However, these factors were classified under different sub-categories. From 
these factors, only one out of the remaining six CCFs (excluding the CCF 
identified by all three professionals B) was categorised under the same sub-
category (P-SI6 – Judgement and Decision making).  
 
At the organisational level, the outcomes from subgroup A (standardised 
AcciMap) indicated that all three professionals identified two out of five CCFs 
except for CCFs (C16, C17, and C18) by two out of three professionals. For the 
second group B (Medi-Socio AcciMap), only two identified CCFs (C13 and C14) 
were identified by only two professionals, but only one was classified under the 
same category (O-IT2 – Software configuration). At the external level, no CCFs 
were identified from applying both AcciMap approaches by both professional 
subgroups. However, a CCF that was an organisational related factor (C15 – “The 
EPIC software system was not built with maximum dosage limits regarding 
dosage orders”) was identified by professional 3A at that level based on the 
standardised AcciMap approach. From the quantitative results, the reliability 
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scores (IoC) from the use of the standardised AcciMap version was higher (39%) 
than the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach (26% with associated codes and 34% 
without the associated codes). The reliability result (Medi-Socio AcciMap) can be 
attributed partly to the outcome produced by professional 1B using the proposed 
approach. Aside from the two CCFs identified with the other professionals, the 
remaining ICFs (Individual Contributing factors) did not provide enough context, 
making coding the data (text) challenging.  
 
6.10.1.2 Reliability – Causal Relationships/Links 
From the quantitative results, the reliability score was higher based on the 
application of Medi-Socio AcciMap (26%) than the standardised version (16%). 
What was very interesting from the visual observation of relationships with the 
second subgroup of professionals (professionals 2B and 3B) that applied the Medi-
Socio AcciMap was that there were very similar, especially at the physical/actor 
level. This observation also included CCFs identified and how they are causally 
linked to one another, although several links were seen as indirect (indicated as 
blue colour). However, no similar causal links were identified at both 
organisational and external levels after applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach. Two links identified by two out of three professionals were placed at 
the organisational level after using the standardised AcciMap method.  
  
6.10.1.3 Reliability – Safety Recommendations 
For the safety recommendations identified by professionals, the mean reliability 
scores using the standardised AcciMap were higher (73%) than for the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach (45%). From tables 6-10 and 6-11, the recommendation theme 
that was common from both AcciMap (Pr-R1) but the other recommendation 
theme (Pr-R5) relating to the “implementation of policies to encourage medical 
staff to challenge decisions on high doses” was formulated by two out of three 
professionals who used the proposed AcciMap. The remaining safety 
recommendations (Pr-R2 – Pr-R4) related to specific aspects of the EPIC software 
in setting the maximum dose allowed and improving the working environment 




6.10.2 Interpretation of the Case Incident 
The Septra case incident presented a combination of factors at the physical and 
organisational level regarding using the EPIC software system and existing 
policies surrounding how medication doses were calculated, prescribed, and 
administered for paediatrics. However, the incident did not provide many 
systemic factors as to why there were safety concerns and how the patient 
eventually received such a high dose of Septra. Ideally, case reports giving 
further details, especially on any external or other organisational 
factors/decisions, would have allowed for in-depth clarity regarding decisions 
taken by different actors at both the physical and organisational levels. While 
participants were instructed to limit their findings and base them (contributing 
factors and safety recommendations) on what was available from the case 
report, it presents a study challenge. The purpose of accident analysis does not 
stop at just identifying or classifying causal/contributing factors or causal 
relationships between them.  
 
Safety recommendations formulated will be considered adequate if they 
effectively address gaps relating to the safety of patients and the safe use of 
medical software products. One of the issues noted by one of the professional 
participants and one of the safety experts was the perceived lack of safety 
management systems or if such systems existed in the first place. These details 
were not available in the incident report. Also, while they were all based in 
different NHS establishments, their experiences in how they perceived a patient 
receiving such an overdose could have played a role in identifying 
causal/contributing factors. While it is acknowledged that healthcare systems 
from various countries operate differently, the purpose of analysing this incident 
was to gain new insights and provide safety recommendations not previously 
developed from the original analysis. However, no comparison could be made 
with any previous investigations due to lack of access to the information. 
 
6.10.3 Application of AcciMap Guidelines and Taxonomy 
Another reason for the reliability scores being low from both AcciMap approaches 
could be attributed to how the guidelines were applied. Particularly with the 
Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy, the additional taxonomy guideline given to 
participants regarding sub-category codes and examples was supposed to provide 
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further context on code definitions. However, there were situations as noted 
from the survey data on “overlapping categories” (discussed in the final 
chapter). Professional users and health safety practitioners who attended an 
AcciMap training workshop at the NHS, Durham (World Patient Safety Day) 
identified this issue. There were instances where some participants were 
confused regarding which sub-category best fitted the causal factor identified 
based on evidence from the report. Also, the number of codes, particularly sub-
category codes associated with each category, may have contributed to some of 
the participants being confused about which subcategory to classify the 
causal/contributing factor.  
 
From the AcciMap results, there were instances where a factor relating to either 
a “software configuration or functionality” issue (IT-related factors) was 
classified as a “human-computer” related factor. This scenario could be due to 
how participants interpreted the incident regarding contributing factors and, 
eventually, classified. Furthermore, regarding using both AcciMap approaches, 
some participants did not associate actions or events to specific “actors” 
involved in the system setting (i.e., nurse, pharmacist, and Paediatrician). For 
example, there were situations where a causal/contributing factor that the 
paediatrician committed was instead assigned either using a common term (e.g., 
clinician or medical staff) or to a wrong actor. This situation was one of the 
challenges experienced when comparing factors between pairs of participants 
which required making a judgement during discussions between coders.  
 
6.11 Limitations of the Study 
The reliability study presented limitations also reiterated in the final chapter 
regarding recommendations for future studies. While multiple clinical/human 
factors practitioners were invited to apply both AcciMap approaches, many were 
not available for the study due to their work schedules at their respective NHS 
practices. Even with the number of participants involved in the reliability study, 
the number of incidents for analysis was reduced to focus on the Septra overdose 
incident. The reliability study was initially supposed to apply the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach to a non-IT related case incident (Queen’s Medical Centre 
adverse incident) (Toft, 2001) by professionals who had already used the 
standardised AcciMap version on the Septra incident. However, this chapter did 
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not include the outcomes from the incident because one of the participants 
could not complete the analysis, thus not having a complete set for subsequent 
reliability assessment.  
 
An additional case analysis would have allowed for further evaluation of the 
Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. In addition, the number of participants for this 
study was considered very low. Goode et al. (2017)’s study generally 
recommended that the sample size of participants performing individual 
accident analysis be a minimum of eight participants. A larger sample size of 
professional participants would have allowed for further insights into similarities 
and variations. In addition, a larger sample size would also have allowed for a 
team-based AcciMap analysis rather than each participant conducting an 
individual evaluation. However, this approach would require each team member 
to correspond with their investigations before producing final results. This 
process further requires team discussions (similar to the study in Chapter Three) 
and could require more time and resources.   
 
Another challenge was interpreting one of the professional participant’s AcciMap 
results, mainly contributing factors when applying content analysis. For instance, 
professional 1B’s AcciMap result after applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach 
indicated factors that were initially challenging to determine the context behind 
the factors identified, particularly at the organisational level. These included 
factors like “Order entry module – intelligence” classified under O-IT2 (software-
configuration) and “paper-based prescription in the community” categorised 
under O-IT7 (accessibility of health IT systems). The participant was contacted 
to provide further context behind these factors selected. Another instance was 
in the causal factor at the physical level, “incorrect dose entered” causally 
linked (link 6) from “High workload”, which was classified under P-EN5 (time 
pressure). This causal relationship between these grouped factors will relate to 
the paediatrician (rather than the pharmacist) based on the narration from the 
incident report. These issues brought up challenges during inter-rater coding and 
making judgement calls on what value to assign, which was one of the reasons 
why discussions with another independent rater were needed to reach a mutual 
consensus. The incident report used for the reliability study, while generally 
comprehensive, did not provide sufficient details regarding information, 
161 
 
particularly at the external, which led to most professional participants not 
being able to determine and classify any factors. 
 
6.12 Conclusion 
This chapter conducted a reliability assessment based on the AcciMap data 
produced by professional participants after applying both AcciMap approaches in 
determining and comparing the reliability of the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. 
Based on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of the outcomes from the case 
incident, the reliability score (%) was lower with the proposed AcciMap version 
than the standardised AcciMap approach. However, this was explicitly about 
contributing factors and safety recommendations and for causal relationships 
(links), the reliability score was higher with the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. In 
conclusion, and regardless of the analysis of a single incident, the reliability of 
the AcciMap method was not improved using a health-specific taxonomy. The 
reasons for this outcome will be discussed in the concluding chapter of the thesis 
(Chapter Eight) and potential recommendations for improving the taxonomy and 
methods for further evaluation. Regardless of the outcomes from this reliability 
assessment study between both AcciMap approaches, the validity assessment will 
be implemented and determined based on comparison with expert analysis of 
the same incident. This assessment will be covered in Chapter Seven to answer 

















7.0 CHAPTER SEVEN: Validity Assessment of the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap Taxonomy Approach – Clinical Safety Experts 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the validity assessment of the proposed Medi-Socio 
AcciMap taxonomy to answer the thesis's final research question. This study 
involves conducting a validity assessment by comparing the standardised 
AcciMap approach with the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy based on its 
application on the Septra overdose incident. Regardless of the outcomes from 
the reliability study, it is important to also measure and determine the validity 
of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy approach compared with the standardised 
AcciMap method. In attempting to answer the third research question, a validity 
assessment was conducted by comparing both results from participants 
(professionals) with safety experts. Results including contributing factors, causal 
relationships, and safety recommendations from applying both AcciMap versions 
are compared quantitively. Findings and limitations from this study will also be 
discussed concerning the final research question. 
 
7.2 Validity Overview 
As briefly highlighted in Chapter One, Validity is another essential characteristic 
for determining the suitability of accident analysis approaches (Underwood and 
Waterson, 2013, 2014; Underwood, Waterson and Braithwaite, 2016). The 
standardised AcciMap approach’s validity is considered from two perspectives, 
according to Branford (2007). The first relates to the validity of the accident 
analytical approach itself based on whether the method is developed in a way 
that carries out its intended purpose (Branford, 2007; Goncalves Filho, Jun and 
Waterson, 2019). The second aspect relates to the outcomes produced from 
applying the approach rather than the approach itself (Branford, 2007; 
Goncalves Filho, Jun and Waterson, 2019). In this case, the focus is not on 
whether the approach (standardised or Medi-Socio AcciMap version) and the 
process involved for producing results is considered appropriate, but on if the 
results produced are what they are intended to be. This latter process is called 
the “empirical validity”, which is “the degree to which an approach works with 
real cases in a real sample” (Branford, 2007).  
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Four approaches to evaluating the validity of accident analysis approaches 
proposed by Branford (2007) are summarised below: 
1.) Evaluation of outcomes against objective external criteria focuses on using 
a “gold standard” based on the results of a previously validated approach. 
The validity of results is determined by their agreement and disagreement 
with the standard available. 
2.) Evaluation of outcomes relating to their internal logic which focuses on 
whether the results obtained have internal logic in ensuring that they are 
the correct answers. 
3.) Evaluation of outcomes against those obtained by an expert analysis 
focusing on comparing results obtained from multiple users with those 
obtained by experts who applied the accident analytical approach (Gordon, 
Flin and Mearns, 2005). 
4.) Evaluation of the degree of how similar the outcomes obtained are from 
different accident analysis approaches. 
The third approach was considered most appropriate in assessing and comparing 
participants and experts results. The reason is that it’s scarce to obtain such a 
gold standard of measurement based on the first approach because of its 
unavailability. The limitation with the second approach is that even the use of 
internal logic when evaluating results does not necessarily ensure that correct 
conclusions are reached (Goncalves Filho, Jun and Waterson, 2019). While 
Branford’s study focused on comparing results obtained from her set of 
participants with those obtained through expert review, this study adopts a 
similar approach but with the inclusion of results also obtained from both groups 
applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach on the same incident (Branford, 
2007). Results from standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap versions implemented 
between the users and the experts are compared to determine any improvement 
in the validity of the outcomes using the proposed AcciMap version. However, in 
considering the validity of the Medi-Socio AcciMap, the sub-categories used to 
determine contributing factors and their classification will also need to be 





7.3 Validity Measurement Approaches 
According to studies implemented in Branford’s thesis, Salmon et al. (2017), and 
Goode et al. (2017), there are different aspects or types when applying validity 
assessments. Referring to Chapter Six summarising reliability assessment 
measures (see Appendix E-1), they can be used for assessing the validity of both 
AcciMap approaches (quantitatively). The signal detection paradigm “measures 
outcomes based on the number of hits, misses and false alarms and correct 
rejections” (Stanton and Salmon, 2009; Cornelissen et al., 2014). Hits refer to 
items (factors, recommendations) identified by both users and experts. Misses 
indicate items specified by experts but not by users, and false alarms represent 
items not identified by experts but selected by users. Correct rejections mean 
items that were not selected or indicated by both users and experts (Cornelissen 
et al., 2014).  
 
This approach has also been argued for its suitability regarding its application on 
taxonomy-based systems and theoretical maximum (Stanton and Stevenage, 
1998; Baber and Stanton, 2002). However, Goode et al. (2018) indicated that the 
signal detection paradigm’s advantages were preferable only for classification 
schemes with few categories. For this reason, the index of concordance (IoC) 
used in the previous chapter is a suitable measurement for systems with a large 
number of codes. This measurement applies to the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy 
approach. While the Index of Concordance (IoC) and Signal detection paradigm 
are considered suitable based on a previous recent study (Goode et al., 2017), 
the IoC metric is utilised for the validity assessment in determining per cent 
agreement based on reasons summarised in Appendix E-1.  
 
7.4 Research Methodology 
Experts' analysis will be used as an alternative in the absence of a “gold 
standard” to compare findings from the professional group based on 
causal/contributing factors, causal relationships, and safety recommendations. 
The following sections describe the methods applied in this study. 
 
7.4.1 Recruitment of Experts 
Different experts were contacted (via email correspondence) and provided with 
the details of the study. The number of participants that agreed to take part in 
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the study consisted of four (n = 4) safety experts; one based at the National 
Health Service (Nottinghamshire), two based in the Health and Safety 
Investigation Branch (HSIB), and one from the University of Glasgow (see table 7-
1). The HSIB is an independent specialist branch under the NHS responsible for 
incident/accident investigation of major health cases. They also work in 
different trusts and specialist groups of the National Health Service, England. 
Each expert possessed extensive knowledge and experience not only in the 
application of the AcciMap approach but with other systemic (SAA) approaches, 
including STAMP and FRAM approaches both in clinical incident investigations 
and academics.  
 
Table 7-1: Summary of Safety experts involved in the analysis of the Septra 
overdose incident 
Expert Role/Responsibility Years of Experience 
(AcciMap Approach) 
1 Patient Safety Lead (National Health Service, 
Nottinghamshire) 
2 
2 National Investigator (Health and Safety Investigation 
Branch) 
3 
3 National Investigator (Health and Safety Investigation 
Branch) 
6 
4 Professor (Department of Computing Science, University of 
Glasgow) 
N/A 
N/A – Not available 
 
7.4.2 Training Materials 
Materials including the Septra overdose incident (used in the previous chapter), 
AcciMap guidelines, and Medi-Socio taxonomy notes was provided to the safety 
experts through email correspondence. Also, the guidelines on the standardised 
AcciMap approach adopted from Branford’s work and the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
taxonomy were provided.  
 
7.4.3 Study Design 
An initial online correspondence was made with the experts before a formal 
field meeting was established, and this occurred at different times based on 
their location in the United Kingdom. During these field workshops, the Medi-
Socio AcciMap taxonomy was presented alongside its taxonomy of contributing 
factors and how they were developed. In total, four expert participants 
excluding the principal researcher, where each set of two experts independently 
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analysed the Septra overdose incident. The first set applied the standardised 
AcciMap approach, while the second set applied the proposed approach to the 
incident. Any disagreements with safety experts regarding contributing factors, 
causal links, and safety recommendations were reviewed to reach a consensus. A 
discussion session also took place during the field meetings on the structure of 
the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy and its application. A survey questionnaire 
link also was provided for them to give more feedback on their experiences after 
their analyses. 
 
7.4.4 Analysis of Findings 
Two independent raters will compare and code results obtained from 
professionals and safety experts to calculate the percentage agreement (using 
the index of concordance) to produce the validity results for each AcciMap 
version. For the proposed AcciMap version, a quantitative (criterion validity) 
assessment is applied to contributing factors classified into sub-categories by 
professional participants and determine if they matched with the experts. Then, 
each contributing factor, causal link, and safety recommendation identified by 
experts are compared with those identified by each professional to produce 
respective validity scores and determine the grand mean validity score. 
 
7.5 Expert AcciMap Analysis 
Standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap results from their respective application 
and analysis of the Septra overdose incident were completed by both sets of 
safety experts as shown in Appendix G-1 and Appendix G-2, respectively. 
Disagreements or lack of clarity regarding wordings and classification of 
contributing factors themselves were discussed with safety experts and resolved 
where necessary. This process was achieved in a scenario where the second 
expert verified the first safety expert’s initial analysis because both experts 
were not physically together. This process was similarly applied when producing 
the outcome for applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap (proposed), especially when 
using sub-categories from the taxonomy. There were few instances where a 
factor was classified under multiple sub-categories to describe it while 
classifying identified contributing factors. In such cases, a discussion took place 
with another safety expert on which sub-category is the most suitable for the 
identified contributing factor. Wordings (semantics) used to describe identified 
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factors were adjusted where necessary to improve clarity and understanding 
within the context of the incident scenario. This process was required to 
compare with the professionals' results on whether they conveyed similar 
meanings or not. This process was also applied when considering safety 
recommendations produced by expert analysts. In comparing standardised and 
proposed AcciMap results (models), there were similarities and several 
differences discussed in the following subsections.  
 
7.5.1 Causal/Contributing Factors 
Similar contributing factors were identified at each corresponding AcciMap level 
after applying both standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap versions. For example, 
at the physical/actor level, factors including the “physical environment where 
the Pharmacist was working”, “multiple tasks and busyness of the pharmacy 
office”, “high workload experienced by the Paediatrician” were identified using 
both approaches. Other factors included “trust between Pharmacist and 
Paediatrician based on their past relationship”, “Paediatrician ignoring multiple 
alerts from the EPIC system” and “issues relating to how they both perceived 
the value “160” without cross-checking before the dose of approved”.  
 
One notable factor identified using the proposed AcciMap version was the 
“patient having multiple medications (15) and not questioning the dose given”. 
At the organisational level(s) (technical/operational and health management), 
contributing factors were identified using both AcciMap approaches. These 
include the EPIC system producing multiple alerts which did not make sense to 
the clinicians, the system not providing any guidance regarding which dosage 
mode it was operating, and the system’s lack of clarity between small and large 
overdoses. Other factors included existing policies relating to calculated weights 
regarding children less than 40kg creating a complex situation and the EPIC 
system not setting a maximum or upper dose limit based on decisions made by 
the UCSF. Contributing factors uniquely identified using the standard approach 
included issues relating to EPIC system procurement and the transition from 
paper-based to a digital system. The application of the Medi-Socio AcciMap had 
an external contributing factor not identified using the standardised version, 
included “a lack of evaluation of the EPIC system” and “tacit acceptance of the 
effectiveness of the digital system”. No external contributing factors were 
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identified using the standardised version. Still, factors relating to lack of safety 
management systems and lack of oversight on risks associated with the 
configuration of IT systems were identified using the proposed AcciMap version. 
 
7.5.2 Causal Relationships (Links) 
There were similarities between both model outcomes in observing causal 
relationships between contributing factors within and between corresponding 
AcciMap levels. Similar causal connections extracted from both AcciMap results 
include when the paediatrician administered the Septra overdose by typing 
“160” due to multiple contributing factors rather than a singular factor. This 
causal relationship had factors associated with the EPIC system’s presentation of 
alerts indicating no difference in severity level, number of alerts, maximum dose 
limits and complexity regarding an existing policy of children's weights. Another 
similar causal relationship between the two outcomes includes factors leading to 
the paediatrician's prescribing error in typing “160”. Both showed causal linkages 
stemming from factors relating to the paediatrician experiencing high workload, 
alert fatigue (receiving multiple alerts), and default unit settings of the EPIC 
system.  
 
The other similar linkage was the direct relationship between the nurse 
administering a high Septra dose and the resulting massive overdose leading to 
seizure. The proposed AcciMap outcome indicated an additional factor as 
“patient already being on fifteen different medications”. Notable differences 
between both results included causal relationships between the nurse 
administering an overdose (dispensing error) and a factor relating to trust 
between the pharmacist and paediatrician based on a past relationship. In the 
case of the standardised AcciMap application, the intermediate factor between 
these two factors was that “Chan was very busy”, which, compared to the Medi-
Socio AcciMap application, indicates “Chan not noticing the mg/kg after seeing 
160”. While the first factor appears straightforward, its meaning regarding 
context could be anything. However, other factors regarding why Chan was busy 
were similarly identified from the outcomes (e.g., Chan was busy due to 




7.5.3 Safety Recommendations 
Safety recommendations formulated by both groups of experts; four 
(standardised AcciMap) and seven (proposed AcciMap) recommendations are 
highlighted in tables 7-2 and 7-3, respectively. For each set of safety 
recommendations, the designed code for each safety proposal, for example, “S-
R1” means Standardised-Recommendation 1, and the same applies for “P-R1”, 
denoting “Proposed-Recommendation 1”.  
 
Table 7-2: Safety recommendations from applying the standardised AcciMap 
approach by safety experts (A) 
Code Safety Recommendations Parties 
Responsible 
S-R1 System review and redesign into prescribing of high-risk 
medications. Consideration of appropriate alarm limits to prevent 
alert fatigue and appropriate raising of alert and forcing functions 
to prevent incorrect medication dosage. Include alerting on drugs 
being prescribed and units (e.g., mg/kg). 
UCSF and First 
Databank 
S-R2 Local environment design and set up where 
prescribing/checking/administering to prevent contending 




S-R3 Including workload considerations around staff being required to 




S-R4 Implementing standardised guidance on communication between 




S-R5 Implementing standards/usability assessment of electronic systems 




   
 
Table 7-3: Safety recommendations from applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach by safety experts (B) 
Code Safety Recommendations Parties 
Responsible 
P-R1 Conduct a root and branch thorough analysis of the usability of the 
EPIC system focussing on displays and warnings on default values, 
which must be driven by user-centred design and appreciation of 
how staff uses the system in practice. 
Hospital 
Management 
(UCSF) and First 
Databank 
P-R2 The software should be developed and user-tested before being 
bought and mandated by local hospitals. 
Hospital 
Management 
(UCSF) and First 
Databank 
P-R3 Ensure that Safety Monitoring System (SMS) is in place, followed, 




(UCSF) and First 
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Code Safety Recommendations Parties 
Responsible 
Databank 
P-R4 Ensure that there is an audit of workplace stress on staff and 
proper workload analysis, especially for key staff, e.g., pharmacy 









P-R6 Redesign continual training in IT systems to ensure all clinical staff 
are aware of medication errors common with IT systems such as 
EPIC. Appropriate training and evaluation on a system that has 
been designed from staff up to be effective 
Hospital 
Management 
(UCSF) and First 
Databank 
P-R7 Ensuring that appropriate legal/regulatory frameworks are in place 
to ensure that EMPA systems are fit for purpose and are procured 
on that basis, including the need for incorporating human 
factors/user-centred design into the process 
Hospital 
Management 
(UCSF) and First 
Databank 
   
 
In observing broad themes from both sets of safety recommendations, aspects 
regarding prevention of patient risks include training or improving existing 
training modules on awareness of medication risks relating to IT systems (P-R6). 
Other common themes from both results include “the re-evaluation focusing on 
the implementation of appropriate alarm alerts and warnings” (S-R1 and P-SR1) 
and “usability testing focusing on user-centred design of IT systems before 
deployment” (S-R4 and P-R2). An additional safety recommendation identified 
from both sets includes the need for “reducing cognitive load and stress of 
medical personnel by improving their local environment (pharmacy)” (S-R2 and 
P-R4). Safety recommendations uniquely identified after applying the standard 
AcciMap version include improving communication between medical staff (S-R3). 
For the proposed AcciMap approach, the inclusion of a safety management 
system (SMS) relating to the configuration of IT systems was formulated (P-R3). 
Finally, safety recommendation (P-R5) concerns the auditing of the workplace 
environment (P-R4). Based on the incident, the design of the pharmaceutical 
environment, noise and distractions impeded the pharmacist’s effectiveness.  
 
7.6 Validity Assessment Results 
This section details the validity assessment outcomes from applying the 
standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap versions by professional participants 
compared with safety expert results. Causal/contributing factors, causal 
relationships, and safety recommendations were compared between each 
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AcciMap approach. Index of concordance (IoC) measurement was applied after 
independent coding, and a mutual consensus was achieved by experienced 
human factors specialists based at the HSIB (UK) and Australia.  
 
7.6.1 Quantitative Analysis – Criterion-Referenced Validity 
Contributing factors, causal relationships, and safety recommendations were 
designated with alphanumeric values for each AcciMap result produced by the 
professional participants. Safety expert results were also labelled for comparison 
with both professional groups. For the validity assessment, each participant's 
outcomes were compared with each contributing factor, causal link, and safety 
recommendation of safety experts (Appendix E-6). Categorical values were then 
assigned for each result aspect based on the coding rules for validity assessment 
(standardised AcciMap approach) as follows: 
1.) Any contributing factor similarly identified between pairs (expert and 
professional is indicated as (Y:1). Any partially identified factor between 
pairs is indicated as (1/2:0.5) and factors not identified between pairs 
(N:0) 
2.) Any causal link and safety recommendation similarly identified between 
expert and participant is indicated as (Y:1) and not identified between 
pairs is indicated as (N:0). 
 
For the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy, the validity coding rules are summarised 
below: 
1.) Any contributing factor similarly identified and classified in the same sub-
category between pairs (expert and participant) is indicated (Y:1) (fully 
identified). Contributing factors similarly identified but classified under a 
different sub-category between safety experts and professionals are 
indicated (1/2:0.5) (partially identified). Finally, contributing factors not 
similarly identified and classified between pairs are indicated (N:0). 
2.) Coding rules for causal relationships and safety recommendations are 





7.6.2 Quantitative Results 
An additional rater independently analysed the AcciMap data to minimise bias 
regarding contributing factors, causal relationships, and safety 
recommendations. The second rater also had experience using the AcciMap 
method and quantitative coding involving the reliability of classification 
schemes. After mutual consensus regarding the data differently coded, validity 
assessment was applied to the participants' result set. The same set of values 
assigned for “agreement (1)”, “partial agreement (0.5)”, and disagreement (0)” 
from the reliability assessment was used to calculate the validity scores. The 
following subsections summarise the validity scores between the standardised 
and Medi-Socio AcciMap approaches for the professional participants. 
 
7.6.2.1 Contributing Factors Results 
The summary of validity scores for contributing factors identified by professional 
participants compared to expert findings are summarised in tables 7-4 and 7-5. 
The mean validity scores for the application of the standard AcciMap is 46%, and 
for the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach resulted in 32%.  
 
Table 7-4: Validity scores of causal/contributing factors between professional 
participants (A) (n = 3) and safety experts (A) - Standardised AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Validity Score (IoC) % 
Expert and A 43% 
Expert and B 52% 
Expert and C 43% 
  
Mean Validity 46% 
 
Table 7-5: Validity scores of causal/contributing factors between professional 
participants (B) (n = 3) and safety experts (B) - Medi-Socio AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Validity Score (IoC) % 
Expert and A 16% 
Expert and B 52% 
Expert and C 28% 
  
Mean Validity 32% 
 
7.6.2.2 Causal Relationship Results 
Causal relationships identified by professional participants were compared with 
those of the safety experts. The first subgroup compared with the experts’ 
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standardised AcciMap application (27 links produced). The second group 
compared with 42 links identified by another set of experts who applied the 
Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. The summary of results is shown in tables 7-6 and 
7-7 for each respective AcciMap method. The mean validity score was 6 % for the 
standardised AcciMap version and 10% for the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach.  
 
Table 7-6: Validity scores of causal relationships between professional 
participants (A) (n = 3) and safety experts (A) - Standardised AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Validity Score (IoC) % 
Expert and A 11% 
Expert and B 4% 
Expert and C 4% 
  
Mean Validity 6% 
 
Table 7-7: Validity scores of causal relationships between professional 
participants (B) (n = 3) and safety experts (B) - Medi-Socio AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Validity Score (IoC) % 
Expert and A 5% 
Expert and B 12% 
Expert and C 12% 
  
Mean Validity 10% 
 
7.6.2.3 Safety Recommendation Results 
Safety recommendations produced by professional participants indicated the 
mean validity score of 40% (uniform score from all professionals) was achieved 
using the standardised AcciMap by the first subgroup, as shown in table 7-8. The 
mean validity score based on the Medi-Socio AcciMap version produced 24% 
based on the average scores shown in table 7-9.  
 
Table 7-8: Validity scores of safety recommendations between professional 
participants (A) (n = 3) and safety experts (A) - Standardised AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Validity Score (IoC) % 
Expert and A 40% 
Expert and B 40% 
Expert and C 40% 
  




Table 7-9: Validity scores of safety recommendations between professional 
participants (B) (n = 3) and safety experts (B) - Medi-Socio AcciMap approach 
Professional Pairing Validity Score (IoC) % 
Expert and A 14% 
Expert and B 29% 
Expert and C 29% 
  
Mean Validity 24% 
 
7.7 Discussion 
In understanding the differences in outcomes and recommendations produced by 
the professional participants compared to results produced by safety experts, 
the following subsections discuss the results from the analyses. 
 
7.7.1 Validity - Contributing factors 
There are several reasons for the low validity scores after applying the proposed 
AcciMap approach compared to the standardised version. First, identification 
and classification of causal/contributing factors into sub-categories showed 
differences where factors were similarly recognised by safety experts and 
professionals but classified differently. This observation is seen from the matrix 
tables 7-10 (standardised approach) and 7-11 (Medi-Socio AcciMap approach). 
For the standardised AcciMap version, the red boxes indicate “fully similar” 
factors, and the yellow boxes indicate “partially similar” factors. For the Medi-
Socio AcciMap taxonomy, black bolded red boxes indicate “similarly identified 
and classified” factors with experts. The broken lighter coloured boxes indicate 
“similar but differently classified” factors from experts.  
 
Generally, the visual representation of identified and classified factors between 
experts and professionals showed fewer instances of agreement using the Medi-
Socio AcciMap version than the standardised version. For example, contributing 
factor E-7 (“medical staff (pharmacist) working environment being busy and 
tight”) was classified under the sub-category P-EN1 (“Physical layout”) and two 
out of three professionals identified this factor. However, only one professional 
categorised this factor (E-7) in the same sub-category as the experts. Likewise, 
two out of three professionals identified contributing factor E-9 (“trust between 
Pharmacist and Paediatrician based on past relationships”). However, none of 
them classified this factor in the same sub-category as the experts (P-SI0 – 
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“Other”). Another factor at the physical level was E-3 (“Nurse administering a 
high dose of Septra”). Only two out of three professionals identified this factor 
but were classified differently from experts (P-SI2 – “Compliance with 
Procedures”).  
 
At the organisational level (both technical and health management), 
contributing factor E-13 (“Multiple alerts produced by the EPIC system not being 
sensible to clinicians”) were identified by only two professionals (B) (none 
similarly classified). Other factors, including E-16 (“EPIC system providing no 
guidance on its current mode (mg or mg/kg)”), were identified by only one 
professional with no similar classification with experts (O-HC3 - “Usability-
Design Consistency”). No professional participant identified contributing factors 
relating to E-17 (“default settings for the EPIC system on children’s weight less 
than 40kg”). The contributing factor E-21 (“UCSF’s decision in having the EPIC 
system default to mg/kg for weights of children < 40kg based on weight policy”) 
was identified by all three professionals, with only one classifying similarly with 
safety experts. External contributing factors recognised by safety experts, like 
E-24 (“Lack of regulatory oversight on risk management for configuration of 
health IT systems”) and E-25 (“Lack of Safety Management Systems”), were not 
identified by any professional participant. These two factors were also not found 





Table 7-10: Contributing factor matrix between safety experts (A) and professional participants (A) - Standardised AcciMap Approach 
 

























































































PHYSICAL -ACTOR EVENTS AND PROCESSES
Fully identified factor Partially identified factor
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Table 7-11: Contributing factor matrix between safety experts (B) and professional participants (B) - Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy 
Approach 
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These instances indicate that while multiple participants identified factors 
similar to what experts did, the use of the taxonomy to classify them showed 
differences. For example, there were instances where a contributing factor that 
may be classified as a system functional issue may then be categorised as a 
management or oversight issue regarding how the health IT system was utilised. 
Overall, validity scores were low regarding contributing factors, and the main 
reason for this can be attributed to their understanding and interpretation of the 
incident report's events. An additional reason for the low outcomes will be both 
professionals and safety experts understanding of the nano codes and how they 
applied them in classifying contributing factors. This second point relates to how 
they determined contributing factors within the context of the incident 
regarding what and why they occurred.  
 
7.7.2 Validity - Causal Relationships 
A closer observation of causal links from professional participants AcciMap 
models compared with safety experts generally indicated very few instances of 
causal link similarity from applying both AcciMap approaches. This observation 
corroborates the quantitative results where professional participants identified 
causal links between causal/contributing factors compared with experts’ 
findings indicated the validity scores for the standardised AcciMap (6%) and 
Medi-Socio AcciMap (10%), respectively. Comparing causal relationships (direct 
and indirect) between standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap versions showed 
more similar links for the latter than the former, particularly at the 
physical/actor activities level. Also, in cases where contributing factors 
identified by safety experts that were not found by any professional meant no 
causal relationships were identified. For example, in applying the proposed 
AcciMap version, contributing factor E-24 (“lack of safety management 
systems”) linking to E-25 (“lack of regulatory oversight for configuration of 
health IT systems”) at the external level was not identified in any of the 
professionals AcciMap models. Another instance includes E-23 (“tacit acceptance 
that the EPIC system was effective”) linking to E-14 (“lack of evaluation 
regarding the effectiveness of the EPIC system for any risks”) (Organisational 
levels). These examples were similar in the case of the standardised AcciMap 
version, where no participant identified contributing factors with their causal 




7.7.3 Validity - Safety Recommendations 
The matrix of safety recommendations by professional users compared with 
safety experts based on the observation of safety recommendation data between 
safety experts and professionals are shown in tables 7-12 and 7-13. Safety 
recommendations formulated after applying the standardised AcciMap version 
showed that all professionals agreed with experts regarding the systematic 
review of the health-IT system (EPIC). This recommendation denoted as “S-R1” 
(standardised - recommendation one) compared to professionals, shows that it 
encompassed multiple recommendations formulated by different participants 
that, if combined, will have a similar meaning to the expert’s safety 
recommendation.  
 
Table 7-12: Matrix of safety recommendations between safety experts (A) and 
professional participants (A) - Standardised AcciMap Approach 
 
 
This scenario was also similar after applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. 
All professional participants agreed with the first expert recommendation (P-
R1), which focused on conducting a root and branch analysis on the health-IT 
system(s). This recommendation also encompassed the need for setting up dose 
limits, setting up appropriate alerts to avoid alert fatigue, re-designing screens 
based on human factors principles, and using colour codes to indicate dose 
severity. However, no professionals identified other safety recommendations, 




(“implementing standardised guidance on communication”), and S-R5 
(“implementing standardised assessment of IT systems”). However, relating to 
this recommendation (S-R3) was the second measure, S-R2 (“prevention of 
contending cognitive demands and distractions through effective local 
environment design”), which all three professionals also developed.  
 
Safety recommendations were formulated after applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach (see table 7-13). Aside from the first recommendation (P-R1), only one 
professional developed each remaining measure P-R3 (“Safety monitoring system 
is in place, followed and covering configuration of health IT systems”) and P-R6 
(“Redesigning continual training in using IT systems”). The professional 
participants did not identify the remaining safety proposals, including P-R4 
(“Auditing workplace stress and workload analysis”), which is similar to the 
safety recommendation (S-R3) from the standardised AcciMap analysis. 
 
Table 7-13: Matrix of safety recommendations between safety experts (B) and 
professional participants (B) - Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy Approach 
 
 
Finally, the only safety proposal formulated by safety experts that no 
professional participant identified was P-R7 (“Ensuring appropriate 
legal/regulatory frameworks are in place”). This measure was based partly on 
the external contributing factor relating to E-24 (“Lack of regulatory oversight 




similarly identified by either group. Overall, the difference between validity 
scores with each professional subgroup regarding safety recommendations, 
despite having low scores, showed a notable difference between them (40% vs 
24%). One prominent reason was that the first professional participant identified 
only one safety recommendation related to reviewing and improving the health 
IT component. 
 
Regardless of the AcciMap version used in this study, identifying contributing 
factors, including how they were classified, causal links between factors or 
classified factors and safety recommendations depend on participants’ 
understanding and interpretation of the incident. In the case of applying the 
taxonomy guidance notes, this will also extend to how professional participants 
and safety experts interpreted each subcategory when determining and 
classifying causal/contributing factors. This process ultimately affects how they 
depict causal relationships and formulate safety recommendations from their 
analyses. 
 
7.8 Limitations of the Study 
Similar to limitations encountered in the reliability study in the previous 
chapter, only one incident could be used for the validity assessment. After one 
of the professional participants was unable to complete the QMC incident 
analysis, only the results from the Septra incident analysis were used to compare 
with safety experts’ findings. Comparison with safety experts’ AcciMap outcomes 
was based on comparing each result set, quantitatively determining its validity 
score, and obtaining the overall mean validity score. While Branford (2007) and 
Goode et al. (2017) applied this measure, its limitation is that each individual 
AcciMap result may not include contributing factors or factors classified under 
the same sub-categories from experts’ results. An alternative approach would be 
to combine individual AcciMap outcomes, mainly contributing factors identified 
(standardised AcciMap version) and classified contributing factors (Medi-Socio 
AcciMap version) and compare them to safety experts’ results.  
 
However, combining causal links will not be practically feasible because it will 
require a team-based analysis. This process essentially means having a multi-




and re-analysed to produce a final group AcciMap output. Nevertheless, this 
approach could potentially improve validity scores and must be considered for 
future research.  
 
7.9 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the validity assessment of the application Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach compared to the standardised AcciMap method in answering 
the final research question. Based on findings from comparing outcomes 
between professional participants with safety experts, the validity score (%) of 
the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach was lower than the standardised AcciMap 
approach. Furthermore, the validity score (%) was lower for the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach regarding contributing factors and safety recommendations 
but higher in causal relationships. Reasons were also discussed as to what could 
have contributed to the validity scores from the standardised AcciMap version 
being lower than the proposed version.  
 
However, like the reliability study, the validity results are from a singular 
incident analysis. Therefore, it will require further studies applying and testing 
the Medi-Socio approach with other incidents. More importantly, this study also 
highlights the need to improve the current iteration of the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
taxonomy and subsequently re-evaluate the approach. This step requires a series 
of further iteration and evaluation cycles to achieve an acceptable validity 
score. Finally, this measure will require the involvement of clinical safety and 
health IT practitioners both at local and national levels as part of the overall 













8.0 CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusions, Discussion, and Future Work 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
As stated in the thesis, the overall objective is to compare the reliability and 
validity of Branford’s standardised AcciMap and the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
taxonomy for health-IT analysis. The thesis statement made at the beginning of 
this research was that developing a health-specific taxonomy will enhance the 
reliability and validity of the AcciMap approach. However, results from both 
reliability and validity studies did not support this statement. The following 
table 8-1 summarises reliability and validity scores based on the outcomes 
produced by professional participants.  
 
Table 8-1: Summary of the quantitative reliability and validity assessment based 
on the application of both AcciMap approaches on case incident (Septra 
overdose) 
 Grand Mean Reliability (IoC) % – Professionals (6) 




Contributing Factors 39% 26% 
Causal Relationships 16% 26% 
Safety Recommendations 73% 45% 
   
 Grand Mean Validity (IoC) % – Professionals (6) 




Contributing Factors 46% 32% 
Causal Relationships 6% 10% 
Safety Recommendations 40% 24% 
   
 
Findings relating to each of the three research questions are also summarised in 
the following subsections. 
 
8.1.1 Thesis research question one 
Studies from Chapters Three and Four addressed the first research question, 
“What is the perception of using the standardised AcciMap approach for 
accident investigation in the National Health Service (NHS)?”. Results based on 
quantitative (survey questionnaire) and qualitative (case study analysis) 
indicated a general acceptance of the AcciMap approach for accident analysis. 




allocated for the training and group analysis were insufficient to get a firmer 
opinion on the benefits of using the AcciMap approach. Chapter Four sought to 
address the limitations from Chapter Three by conducting a series of training 
workshops with an experienced clinical domain expert. Chapter Four mainly 
focused on a case study analysis of a health IT-related study (CPOE medication 
error) with findings compared between a clinical expert and the AcciMap expert 
who developed the standardised AcciMap method. Conclusions were drawn from 
the interview with the participant on the experiences, advantages, and demerits 
of applying a systemic approach compared to using RCA techniques.  
 
8.1.2 Thesis research question two 
The second research question, “Does the application of a contributory factor 
AcciMap taxonomy improve the reliability of results from health IT analysis 
compared to Branford’s AcciMap approach?” The answer based on the results is 
no. Chapter Six addressed the reliability of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy 
involving clinical safety practitioners. The results were drawn after applying 
both AcciMap approaches and qualitatively (content analysis) and quantitatively 
(inter-rater reliability) analysed and compared. Findings from the reliability 
study indicated that the reliability score (%) of the Medi-Socio AcciMap was 
lower than the standardised AcciMap regarding contributing factors and safety 
recommendations. However, results regarding causal relationships indicated a 
moderately higher reliability score than the standardised AcciMap approach, 
although the scores were generally very low for both methods. Limitations from 
this study included an insufficient sample size of participants involved and short 
time relating to training and analysis, which only allowed a singular case 
incident to be used.  
 
8.1.3 Thesis research question three 
The third (final) research question, “Does the application of a contributory 
factor AcciMap taxonomy improve the validity of results from health IT analysis 
compared to Branford’s AcciMap approach?” The answer based on the study 
results is no. Chapter Seven addressed the validity assessment of the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach compared to the standardised AcciMap version based on 
results from Chapter Six. This study mainly compared experts’ analysis of the 




after applying both AcciMap approaches. Outcomes from this study also 
indicated that the standardised AcciMap version was higher than those obtained 
from the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach regarding contributing factors and safety 
recommendations. However, causal relationships between experts and 
participants indicated a higher validity score for the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach than the standardised AcciMap version.  
 
8.2 Discussion 
The application of the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach based on feedback, 
practical benefits, and limitations in addition to research goals and study design 
are discussed in the following subsections. 
 
8.2.1 Application of the Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy Approach 
Feedback on their experiences applying both standardised AcciMap and the Medi-
Socio AcciMap versions are discussed based on the core usage characteristics; 
usability, reliability (research question 2), and validity (research question 3). It 
was also essential to ascertain the participants' perspectives (NHS patient safety 
practitioners) on their experiences in using the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. 
Therefore, an evaluation questionnaire (Appendix H-1) was developed and 
distributed to professional participants regarded as “intended end-users” 
through email correspondence. Out of the six patient safety practitioners, only 
four responded to the survey questionnaire. This survey was also distributed to 
another set of participants; NHS attendants were involved in an AcciMap training 
workshop in NHS, Durham, and the safety experts (HSIB) engaged in the validity 
study. From the AcciMap seminar, only six attendants responded to the 
evaluation via email, out of the fourteen participants invited during the “World 




The Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy’s usability was not formally evaluated in this 
thesis. However, it is crucial to highlight users’ experience using the proposed 
version during the reliability study. Regarding usability (ease of use), utility 




usefulness of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy. Utility, in this case, will apply 
to the proposed AcciMap approach’s applicability to not just health IT-related 
incidents but also to non-IT incidents. For instance, the AcciMap outcome seen 
in Appendix F-4 was from the QMC (Queens Medical Centre) adverse incident 
analysis, which indicates that the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy is not limited to 
just health IT-related cases. However, their results were not analysed for the 
reasons stated in Chapter Six (see the limitation of the study in section 6.11). 
There were generally mixed opinions regarding its ease of use, similar to the 
first AcciMap training workshop (Chapter Three). One of the professionals noted 
from her experience using the HFACS approach in her practice that: 
 
“Familiarity makes the tool easier to use. Initially, I was struggling with 
fitting the tool around my knowledge of HFACS, but it added more 
context in" (Professional-4) 
 
One of the attendants from the AcciMap workshop (NHS, Durham) also indicated 
an advantage of using the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach in terms of how suitable 
it can be in analysing complex socio-technical systems: 
 
"This approach can be used to identify the cause of errors in a changing 
healthcare organisation where there is a complex socio-technical 
environment has" (Attendant-6) 
   
However, issues/limitations regarding its ease of use in analysing incidents were 
also noted by some other participants. Several factors may be attributed, 
including the clarity of guidelines regarding the taxonomy needed for the 
analysis and the restrictive nature of contributing factor categories. This last 
factor is a feature typically associated with taxonomy/classification schemes 
(e.g., HFACS) (Salmon, Cornelissen and Trotter, 2012). To further bolster these 
factors, another professional participant commented on the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
taxonomy: 
 
"It could limit the number of factors identified if people stick with trying 
to fit factors into the available categories rather than having free reign" 
(Professional-3) 
 
This point supports using the standardised AcciMap approach over the Medi-Socio 




safety experts (Health Safety Investigation Branch) also responded to the 
questionnaire. Before the expert analysis, a field meeting took place at HSIB 
headquarters, where the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy was presented. Relating 
to its structure, the first safety expert responded with the following: 
 
“It provides a far more structured and comprehensive taxonomy for the 
creation of an AcciMap. Original AcciMap is less structured and therefore 
more difficult to apply without background knowledge; the prototype 
helps this.” (Safety Expert-1) 
 
This comment is considered a benefit, especially for beginners and those with 
knowledge of using taxonomies (i.e., HFACS) for incident analysis. However, 
both experts noted areas needed to improve the usability of the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap approach. One such aspect includes using a template or an example 
AcciMap as a guide in illustrating how it is applied. Also, the second expert 
commented on the guidance material associated with the proposed AcciMap 
version: 
 
“The guidance document is lengthy. If this was incorporated into an e-
system with prompts, it may reduce the burden on the user to identify and 
select the correct categorisation.” (Safety Expert-2) 
 
This point refers to an earlier comment from the Clinical Safety Officer (Chapter 
Four) on the need for developing a software toolkit specifically for AcciMap 
analysis. This idea also works in tandem with the need for refining the Medi-
Socio AcciMap taxonomy, and any changes made will need to be reflected on any 
associated documentation.  
 
8.2.1.2 Reliability 
The Medi-Socio AcciMap approach's reliability was lower than the standardised 
AcciMap approach for contributing factors and safety recommendations but 
higher for causal relationships between factors. Reasons for why the reliability 






1.) The number of sub-categories associated with each system category of the 
Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy (see subsection 8.2.3 for further 
explanation). 
2.) The nature and interpretation of the incident report used for the AcciMap 
analysis. This point was discussed in Chapter Six (see subsection 6.10.2) 
regarding the professional group that analysed the Septra overdose 
incident. Despite their expertise and experience, their first-time 
application of both AcciMap approaches produced variations in contributing 
factors (including wordings and level of detail), causal links between them, 
and safety recommendations.  
3.) The methodology of the AcciMap analysis on the incident. This point 
presents a scenario where no pre-determined number of 
causal/contributing factors was extracted from the incident report and 
used for classification for the reliability and validity studies. This process is 
usually the first step applied to determine taxonomy's reliability, where 
multiple analysts classify pre-determined factors under different categories 
(Goode et al., 2017, 2018). However, each participant had the freedom to 
apply both AcciMap approaches to analyse the incident from scratch. As a 
result, their AcciMap outcomes were affected by their interpretation of the 
incident regarding similarities and variations. 
 
Concerning the proposed AcciMap version’s reliability in tandem with its 
usability, the first participant noted how reliable the proposed version could be 
compared to the standardised version: 
 
"It reduces the subjectivity and would be helpful in codifying incidents 
across an organisation into specific themes" (Professional-1) 
 
However, despite professional participants having the taxonomy guidance notes 
on all sub-categories, causal/contributing factors were classified under different 
sub-categories despite having similar meanings. The main reason for differences 
in classification is their interpretation of factors from the incident report and 
understanding of causal relationships between those factors, as noted earlier. 
Another reason could be how participants applied Branford’s AcciMap guidelines 
and the taxonomy code guidance in their analyses. For example, at the 




workload and busyness” was identified by all three professionals that applied 
the proposed AcciMap approach. However, while this factor was classified under 
the same system category (P-EN: “Environmental factors”), it was categorised 
into two different sub-categories (P-EN3: “workload and shift patterns”) and (P-
EN5: “time pressure”).  
 
Another similar instance was in system categories relating to the health-IT 
systems (e.g., EPIC software system) in identifying contributing factors. For 
example, factors relating to software’s default settings on dosage mode (mg or 
mg/kg) were classified under different categories; Information technology (O-
IT1: “software functionality” and O-IT2: “software configuration”), Human-
Computer (O-HC1: usability-information display), and Health-IT vendor (O-HV3: 
“software design processes”). These differences are because of how participants 
interpreted that factor and associated it with the sub-category that best 
described it. From the evaluation survey data, the question on how the Medi-
Socio AcciMap taxonomy’s reliability could be enhanced was particularly 
informative. From two of the four safety experts, based in the Health Safety 
Investigation Branch (HSIB) who participated in the Septra incident analysis, the 
first expert opined that: 
 
“For individual incident analyses, I don’t worry about reliability too much 
as long as it is valid. It is more important if you are comparing themes 
across various incidents.” (Safety Expert-1) 
 
The second expert user’s comment was centred on the need for further 
reliability assessment based on multiple uses of the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach as stated below: 
 
“This would need an evaluation from multiple users to determine the 
variability and improvements that could be made. I cannot say from my 
experience what would improve the reliability from a single-use”. 
(Safety Expert-2) 
 
Comments from other professionals (patient safety practitioners) who 
participated in the AcciMap training workshop (NHS, Durham) generally indicated 
a need for further formal training and understanding of the approach to 




considered the time allocated for training and applying both AcciMap versions 
insufficient to provide concrete feedback. However, comments from professional 
participants that took part in the reliability study also revealed the need for 
further testing. For example, based on one of the participants comments: 
 
“It would have been helpful to have had another person to agree on the 
codes, in order to reduce bias” (Professional-4) 
 
This comment is considered very insightful concerning one of the limitations of 
the reliability study. In an ideal situation, a sufficient number of participants 
would have allowed for a team-based analysis using the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach on case incidents. Branford had argued in her thesis the benefits of 
adopting a team-based approach to accident analysis instead of individual-based 
analysis to reduce potential biases and enhance understanding of events that 
unfolded (Branford, 2007).  
 
8.2.1.3 Validity 
Similar to reasons identified regarding reliability, validity scores relating to 
causes/contributing factors and safety recommendations were lower using the 
Medi-Socio AcciMap than the standardised AcciMap version. From the Septra 
overdose case incident, the only factor that all professional participants agreed 
on was the need for a systematic review of the UCSF’s EPIC software system. 
Aspects that multiple participants agreed with experts were from sub-categories 
associated with human-computer interactions on the system's usability and 
software configuration and functionality issues. Safety experts identified other 
factors that were not identified and classified by all professionals after applying 
the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. These include factors recognised by experts at 
the external level (implementation of a safety management system and risk 
assessment in configuring health-IT systems). It is also important to reiterate 
that while there was no “gold standard” with which to use for the validity 
assessment, using safety expert analysis to compare with the findings of 
participants is not without drawbacks. As Branford noted, even experts may not 
identify causal/contributing factors that in reality played a role in the adverse 
outcome and include factors that did not contribute to it (Branford, 2007). 




participants and their outcomes compared again with experts' results (intra-
reliability). However, the learning effect from such repeated studies would need 
to be considered for such research. Branford also opined that improving the 
validity of results will require setting up a multi-disciplinary team, implementing 
strict requirements regarding analysis especially around how conclusions are 
derived with supporting evidence. Additionally, full transparency must be 
provided regarding which contributing factors are known versus those that are 
inferred according to Branford. 
 
On the flip side of this argument and despite the results from these studies, the 
fact that causal/contributing factors and safety recommendations may not be 
highly reliable may not necessarily mean the information is not useful. This view 
was argued in the study that compared safety recommendations by different 
accident investigators using a common methodology (Johnson, Oltedal and 
Holloway, 2013). Variations in identified contributing factors can potentially 
allow health organisations to identify other system weaknesses that may not 
have happened if the focus is solely on factors similarly identified between 
multiple users. This point is where the benefit of conducting a team-based 
AcciMap analysis becomes very important. Individual outcomes could be 
developed at an initial stage and then compared to determine similar factors 
and factors different from each AcciMap output. The results of discussions and 
mutual consensus reached can then produce a more refined AcciMap result. 
However, this process is potentially time-consuming and resource-intensive, and 
so it can only be best recommended for analysing significant incidents. 
 
8.2.2 Benefits of the Medi-Socio AcciMap Approach 
Despite the reliability and validity scores from applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
approach, there were merits from its use for incident analysis. Several 
professional participants from the AcciMap studies and the training workshop 
linked the benefits to its usability. Based on the evaluation survey, there were 
notable opinions regarding the advantages of applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap 
version. According to one of the attendants: 
 
“This is a very descriptive analysis with a standardised approach, and the 




relation to the system and re-introduce recommendations for their 
minimisation.” (Attendant-1) 
While this proposed AcciMap version provides both quantitative and qualitative 
means of analysing a set of multiple incidents or a singular case incident, its 
taxonomy allows specific aspects of a healthcare system to be analysed and 
provides recommendations to address them effectively. Furthermore, although 
the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach is a retrospective approach, it's not limited to 
just health-IT analysis. The long-term benefit of adopting this approach based on 
the response of another safety expert from HSIB are as follows: 
 
“I believe the greatest benefit is in post-incident analysis. The system 
offers a greater prompt to consider a variety of factors in the creation of 
the AcciMap. However, it then allows for coding and categorisation that 
can be used to identify broader themes and trends that may arise from a 
series of individual incidents.” (Safety Expert-2) 
 
The Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy can be structured to suit speciality areas 
within healthcare, as illustrated in adopting the HFACS approach for the Acute 
Hospital in the NHS, Nottinghamshire (Woodier and Shale, 2017). A more recent 
example was the development of an investigation toolkit, the Patient Handling 
Injuries Review of Systems (PHIRES) in Australia (Newnam et al., 2020). One way 
to improve and maintain the taxonomy will be to continuously test it with 
clinical safety practitioners (local and national levels) on a set of new incidents. 
This process will help determine categories or sub-categories that were either 
missed or existing ones that need clarification or combined to form a broader 
sub-category. In addition, feedback from practitioners can serve as a means of 
maintaining the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. 
 
8.2.3 Limitations of the Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy Approach 
The first reason why the proposed AcciMap version produced lower reliability 
scores than the standardised version may be regarding the number of 
subcategories associated with each system category. While the Medi-Socio 
AcciMap taxonomy may be comprehensive, it may come at the cost of applying 
the proposed AcciMap effectively when analysing an incident. In addition, 
despite the taxonomy guidance material briefly describing each subcategory, 




based on their background and experience. This limitation could also have led to 
a case of possible mental fatigue when trying to classify contributing factors.  
From the feedback from participants (surveys and discussions) after the AcciMap 
workshop, there were scenarios where “overlaps” were encountered, 
particularly regarding which sub-category best identifies and classifies a 
contributing factor. For example, one attendant (AcciMap workshop, NHS, 
Durham) noted this from the AcciMap analysis exercise: 
 
“Yes, sometimes it was hard to identify if the contributing factor lay 
from a technical issue or operational issue from not knowing the 
organisation too well.” (Attendant-3) 
 
Several professionals confirmed this observation, particularly with the second 
professional based on the following comment: 
 
“Yes, some things could be classified by a number of codes. I analysed 
the same as with Branford and then tried to code. Maybe others may use 
the codes to identify relevant factors so less overlap?” (Professional-2) 
 
However, while the professionals did not explicitly indicate any scenarios of 
overlapping categories in their analyses, there was an occurrence (professional 
2B) where one contributing factor was classified under multiple categories. This 
scenario also presents another limitation in close relation to the overlapping of 
contributing factors. Regarding the current Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy, 
participants generally noted how they revised their initial outcomes to 
determine if they classified their factors in the appropriate system category and 
sub-category. Despite these limitations, there is still room for further improve 
the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy approach regarding reliability, validity, and 
usefulness. The recommendation section addresses this (see section 8.4). 
 
8.2.4 Research Design Challenges 
The reliability and validity studies implemented in this thesis, results, and 
conclusions were based on analysing a singular narrative incident. Despite the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis outcomes, it was also imperative to 
acknowledge these studies' limitations in answering the second and third 
research questions. It's also essential to determine why results from these 




reasons and limitations of the reliability and validity assessment will allow for 
recommendations for further studies. In terms of the research goals of this 
thesis, particularly the research questions, it would indicate that the inclusion of 
a domain-specific taxonomy synthesised with the AcciMap approach did not 
address the subjective nature associated with using the standardised AcciMap 
version.  
 
When considering the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy, including categories and 
sub-categories was supposed to help users systematically identify contributing 
factors when analysing factors. Also, in analysing incident reports, system 
categories and sub-categories incorporated at each AcciMap level were to help 
reduce producing subjective outcomes. However, when observing AcciMap 
output models from participants after applying the proposed AcciMap version, 
contributing factors were interpreted and classified differently despite the 
description provided for each sub-category (Appendix D-9). The differences in 
outcomes were particularly observable at the organisational level (both 
technical and management levels). However, two out of three professionals 
classified contributing factors were virtually identical at the physical/actor & 
processes level, as seen in the reliability study (Chapter Six). Time allocation 
must also be considered a factor in learning and understanding how to correctly 
apply the guidelines when using both AcciMap approaches. In addition, the 
development of the taxonomy guidance manual explaining each category and its 
sub-categories, while necessary, most likely contributed to participants’ 
cognitive load when determining factors and where they felt was most 
appropriately classified.  
 
Challenges were highlighted and discussed when considering the research 
methods in chapters relating to reliability and validity assessment. Regarding 
research design, the case study approach was considered the most appropriate 
method for conducting qualitative research. Although, it has been acknowledged 
that one of the disadvantages of using this method is the possibility of 
researcher bias when interpreting case study conclusions. Other disadvantages 
include difficulties in generalising findings from case analysis and the lack of 
objective criteria to compare with results from participants, especially relating 




the case study approach is that it allows for a thorough understanding, 
especially from safety practitioners who may not have had any prior knowledge 
or experience applying the AcciMap method.    
 
Another challenge relating to applying the case study methodology was the 
sample size of professional participants involved in the reliability study. The 
number of professional participants was insufficient to perform group analyses 
(i.e., multiple teams) for the reliability assessment. Instead, individual AcciMap 
results were used for comparative purposes. According to Branford (2007), 
adopting a team approach when conducting a reliability assessment is beneficial. 
For example, if the sample size were sufficient, a group-based analysis, 
specifically where multiple teams are formed, would have been used in the 
reliability study. However, to fully realise this advantage, especially regarding 
health IT analysis in practical settings, it is essential to have a team composed of 
practitioners experienced in applying systemic accident methods and those with 
clinical IT safety backgrounds. Also, if the reliability is to be investigated in 
health practice, a controlled case study methodology can be applied, similar to 
the process implemented in Branford’s thesis. In this setting, practitioners would 
be given the same incident information and time limit to analyse while their 
interactions are observed and audio-recorded. Thematic analysis is then applied 
to extract data and determine how members reached consensus on contributing 
factors, causal links and safety measures. Also, insights regarding the nature and 
significance of observed variations of outcomes can be gained to determine 
where and why they happened. Finally, the AcciMap approaches (standardised 
and Medi-Socio) in the first analysis stage would be randomised in the reliability 
study instead of the case incidents between the professional subgroups. This 
alternative approach could have influenced the reliability outcomes, especially 
when taking the learning effect into account.  
 
8.2.5 Research Goals – Reflections 
Previous sections have discussed the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy, and while 
there were benefits, there were also limitations. This research presents the first 
comparative study between Branford’s standardised AcciMap and a domain-
specific taxonomy-based AcciMap version applying the methodology adapted 




(8.2.3) also explained why the proposed AcciMap taxonomy performed less than 
the standardised AcciMap version. In focusing on this research, it is clear that 
synthesising a taxonomy based on the AcciMap methodology did not enhance the 
reliability and validity of the AcciMap method. However, each chapter 
(particularly Chapters Six and Seven) highlighted its limitations and must be 
considered relating to the study outcomes, especially if this research is to be 
repeated in practice.  
 
Regarding reliability and validity, particularly relating to the need for accident 
analysis methods to possess high or at least acceptable levels of these 
properties, there is still an ongoing need to address these aspects. This point 
was discussed in a recent paper comparing the criterion-referenced concurrent 
validity of AcciMap with other approaches (STAMP-CAST and AcciNet) (Hulme et 
al., 2021). The study had initially noted the argument that the reliability and 
validity of SAA methods are less important, especially considering their ability to 
produce useful information when analysing isolated incidents (Waterson et al., 
2017; Hulme et al., 2021). However, from a research standpoint, the authors 
firmly stated that these properties ultimately affects other aspects, including 
scientific processes (e.g., the internal validity of experiments) and confidence in 
their ability to provide meaningful results that impact practice (Hulme et al., 
2021). Another article provided perspectives on the reliability and validity of 
Human Factors and Ergonomics (HFE) methods by the paper’s co-authors 
(Salmon, Read, et al., 2020). The co-authors acknowledged the issue and agreed 
that the evidence of these attributes is a critical requirement for HFE system 
methods. They also largely agreed that the challenging nature of reliability and 
validity studies contributes to this problem requiring a considerable amount of 
resources and the existing barriers, including limited knowledge and guidance on 
implementing these studies (Salmon, Read, et al., 2020). According to the co-
authors, potential solutions included improving guidance for conducting 
reliability and validity studies and stricter requirements when assessing system 
methods (Salmon, Read, et al., 2020). 
 
While the thesis’s outcomes would indicate that the AcciMap approach did not 
produce reliable and valid results, the findings will need to be shared with the 




step will foster discussions to gain new insights regarding their experiences using 
the AcciMap method and where the taxonomy and guidelines need to be 
improved. If the reliability and validity studies are to be repeated, the first step 
will be to liaise with relevant clinical safety stakeholders at local and national 
levels (highlighted in the recommendations section). This measure will require 
sustained training and applying the AcciMap and iterated taxonomy versions, a 
considerable amount of time to implement them in their practices before 
retesting the approaches. While the inter-rater reliability testing was the 
reliability assessment, the intra-rater reliability assessment can also be applied 
where the same set of participants repeat their analyses after a considerable 
time from the initial evaluation. Again, however, this assessment type is 
potentially time-consuming and resource-intensive. Despite these study 
challenges and issues raised, there is an ongoing need for further research to 
improve the reliability and validity of the AcciMap method and, generally, other 
systemic accident analysis methods. 
 
8.3 Study Limitations 
Each chapter had its challenges and limitations in addressing the reliability and 
validity of the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach compared to Branford’s 
standardised AcciMap version. While chapters regarding reliability and validity 
studies discussed differences between participants’ AcciMap results (contributing 
factors, causal links, and safety recommendations), they did not explicitly judge 
the significance of any found variations. The concluding chapter of Branford’s 
thesis discussed extensively regarding different types of variations that can exist 
when analysing AcciMap results summarised as follows: 
1.) Insignificant and potentially avoidable variations 
2.) Significant and potentially avoidable variations 
3.) Insignificant and unavoidable variations 
4.) Significant and unavoidable variations are further broken down into: 
a. Accidental omissions of relevant factors 
b. Interpretations of ambiguous data 
c. Selection of outcomes 
 
A future research study can potentially consider these aspects in re-evaluating 




practitioners sample size. This process will further determine these aspects from 
the AcciMap results that could be of practical significance. During the research, 
one reoccurring issue was the unavailability of clinical risk/human factors 
practitioners for AcciMap training and analysis. A larger sample size of safety 
practitioners would have been beneficial and allowed for a broader range of 
outcomes for similarities and variations to be analysed from the case incident. 
As explained in Chapter Six, challenges regarding reliability assessment study 
included very few patient safety practitioners available to participate in the 
evaluation. Several attempts were made to organise an AcciMap workshop in an 
NHS trust (NHS Nottinghamshire) after invitations were sent. However, due to a 
major NHS alert, many of them had to withdraw from the exercise. The second 
workshop was subsequently organised following the incident, but very few 
practitioners (2) were available after over fifty (50) participants were invited by 
the NHS trust’s patient safety Lead.  
 
In addition, the time allocated for each workshop was insufficient for training 
and analysis processes. To circumvent this limitation, each participant who 
agreed to the study analysed the incidents separately to have enough time to 
investigate and formulate their safety recommendations adequately. This 
arrangement required that all six professionals apply both AcciMap approaches 
on the first incident (first round) to be able to learn and gain experience before 
applying them again on the second incident (second round). Five out of six 
participants completed both analysis rounds. However, the remaining 
professional could not complete the analysis on the second incident (QMC case 
report), so the second set of AcciMap results was exempted from evaluation.  
 
8.4 Recommendations/Future Directions 
Before any further evaluation of the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach, its taxonomy 
will need to be revised, and maintaining a balance between granularity and 
completeness is crucial. Nevertheless, based on findings after applying the Medi-
Socio AcciMap taxonomy, several recommendations are proposed in improving 
the proposed AcciMap approach: 
1.) A critical recommendation will be to collaborate with relevant healthcare 




accident analysis in healthcare practices. This measure is particularly 
essential because there haven’t been real-life applications of the AcciMap 
method to investigate severe healthcare incidents (Wheway, 2020; Wheway 
and Jun, 2021). Considering the thesis’s results, safety practitioners, 
including those responsible for health IT systems, must be adequately 
trained in SAA approaches. In addition, collaboration and feedback need to 
be strengthened between practice and researchers (i.e., human factors) 
regarding health IT research and analysis. Implementing the AcciMap 
method for real-world accident analysis will provide valuable information 
on its reliability, validity, and utility, including applying strict testing 
requirements to help narrow the present gap (Salmon, Read, et al., 2020). 
 
2.) Refining the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy approach through a continuous 
cycle of evaluation, reviewing, redesigning, and retesting until higher 
reliability rates are achieved (Goode et al., 2018). This process can be 
implemented in two ways; the first is a continuous evaluation with 
frontline staff by providing feedback on sub-categories that may appear 
similar. The other way will be to reduce sub-categories by merging sub-
items to form new and broader sub-categories, thus creating a lite version 
of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy. This step was applied in developing 
the lite version of the TRACEr (Technique for the Retrospective and 
Predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors in Air Traffic Control) (Isaac, 
Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002; Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002; Shorrock, 2003) 
approach and is very applicable in this case. The lite version of the Medi-
Socio AcciMap taxonomy could be used for analysing single significant 
incidents and could potentially improve reliability and validity. The full 
Medi-Socio AcciMap version can be applied to analysing multiple incident 
data.  
 
3.) Developing an automated means of applying the AcciMap approach for 
incident analysis. This measure is in response to the outcomes from 
Chapter Four and a crucial step in incorporating and encouraging more 
health organisations to apply systems thinking for accident analysis. 
Developing a software-based AcciMap tool incorporating an improved Medi-




developing and implementing an incident reporting database system based 
on the AcciMap methodology can benefit NHS practices and NHS Digital to 
analyse incidents relating to using Health IT systems. This measure has 
already been practically implemented for Led Outdoor Activities (Salmon et 
al., 2017) and most recently for analysing patient injuries (Newnam et al., 
2020), both based in Australia. 
 
4.) Closely related to the first proposal, the final recommendation will be 
developing a new profession within local healthcare systems that support 
SAA approaches on major incidents (including those relating to health IT). 
While the Health Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB), as a national body, 
uses SAA approaches, local safety groups working in tandem with resident 
health practices can help with applying these systemic methods for 
incident analysis. This measure also includes supporting safety 
recommendations in a structured manner that is open to challenge 
regarding practical significance in reducing risks and preventing 
reoccurrence. 
 
8.5 Research Contributions 
This research presented the development of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy, a 
health-specific classification scheme based on Branford’s standardised AcciMap 
method. This proposed taxonomy consists of socio-technical aspects, including 
clinical software systems and interactions with medical practitioners in 
healthcare organisations. The approach is applicable for analysing software-
related (IT) and non-IT related incidents in healthcare. Therefore, the continual 
development and evaluation of the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach can benefit 
health organisations, including providing a systematic and socio-technical 
analysis of systemic factors associated with IT systems utilised in healthcare.  
More importantly, this thesis also demonstrated the adoption of Branford’s 
methodology involving measuring the reliability and validity to evaluate and 
compare both standardised and the Medi-Socio AcciMap versions. Also, the 
proposed AcciMap approach was presented and discussed in a field meeting with 
safety practitioners at the Health Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB) 




journey, the following papers (journals and conferences) published in addition to 
the study cited in this thesis (Igene and Johnson, 2019), include: 
1.) Igene, O.O., Johnson, C.W., and Long, J. (2021). ‘An evaluation of the 
formalised AcciMap approach for accident analysis in healthcare’. 
Cognition, Technology & Work, pp 1-21. 
2.) Igene, O.O., and Johnson, C.W. (2018). ‘Comparing HFACS and AcciMaps in 
a Health Informatics Case Study – The Analysis of a Medication dosing 
error’. Safety and Reliability – Safe societies in a changing world: 
Proceedings of European Safety and Reliability (ESREL 2018), pp 3-10. 
3.) Igene, O.O., Johnson, C.W., Long, J., Yinuo, L. (2017). ‘Is the AcciMap 
Method an effective approach for analysing adverse events in the National 
Health Service, Scotland?’ Proceedings in the 12th International Symposium 
on Human Factors in Organisational Design and Management, pp 447-457. 
 
8.6 Closing Remarks 
Beyond the objectives and research questions regarding assessing the reliability 
and validity of the proposed AcciMap approach, its taxonomy will require 
refinement to make it more intuitive and less time-consuming. This process 
requires further collaboration with health-based stakeholders, including human 
factors specialists, IT specialists, and clinical risk managers within the NHS 
system. In addition, this will require improving training workshops and 
specifically applying rigorous requirements for testing the proposed AcciMap 
during live incident investigations. Valuable feedback can be obtained from 
clinical safety practitioners using the approach in live accident investigations 
and could help improve its reliability and validity.  
 
Finally, while national regulatory bodies (i.e., HSIB and the NHS Digital) apply 
various SAA approaches for investigating significant incidents across NHS, there 
is a need for firmer collaborations with clinical risk management teams at local 
NHS practices. Their experience and access to incident data, including data 
relating to software/IT-related incidents, will further help improve the Medi 
Socio AcciMap taxonomy and potentially adopt it across different NHS trusts and 
boards in the United Kingdom. This process is crucial in increasing the awareness 
of the unintended consequences that health-IT systems can introduce and how 




Appendix A: Accident Analytical Techniques and 




A-1 Accident Analysis Approaches 




• Accident Evolution and Barrier Function (AEB) 
• Cause-Consequence Diagram Method (CCDM) 
• Causal Tree Method (CTM) 
• Deviation Analysis (Integrated Safety Investigation 
methodology (OARU)) 
• Event Trees 
• Failure Tree Analysis (FTA) 
• Multilinear Events Sequencing (MES) 
• Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
• Sequential Timed event Plotting (STEP) 
• Why-Because Analysis (WBA) 
 Flow Charts and 
Taxonomies 
• Management Oversight and Risk Trees (MORT) 
• Prevention and Recovery Information System for 
Monitoring and Analysis (PRISMA) 
• Human factors and Classification System (HFACS) 
 Elicitation and 
Analysis Techniques 
• Barrier Analysis 
• Change Analysis 
Epidemiological  • Control Change Cause Analysis (3CA) 
• Australian Transport Safety Board (ATSB) 
• Casualty Analysis Methodology for Maritime 
Operations (CASMET) 
• Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM) 
• IPICA (Integrated Procedure for Incident Cause 
Analysis) 
• Integrated Safety Investigation Methodology (ISIM) 
• PG Diagram 
• PHARM-2E 
• Reason/Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) 
• SCAT (Systemic Cause Analysis Technique) 
• SOL (Safety through Organisational Learning) 
• STEP (Sequentially Timed Events Plotting) 
• TEM (Threat and Error Management) 
• Tripod β 
 Argumentation 
Techniques 
• Why-Because Analysis (WBA) 
• Conclusion, Analysis and Evidence (CAE) Network 
Other  • 3D-Analysis 
• Critical Incident Technique 
• Elementary Event Analysis Method 
• Multi-Incident Analysis (MIA) 
• Performance Shaping Factor (PSF) 
• Software, Hardware, Environment, Livewire 
(SHEL) 
• Variation Tree 
• Viable Systems Model (VSM) 
• Work Accidents Investigation Technique (WAIT) 





A-2 Accident Causation Model classification 
Accident Causation Models 
Linear Accident 
Models 
• Heinrich Domino Theory 
• Bird’s Model 
• Kitagawa’s Model 
• Orbit Intersecting Theory 
• Swiss Cheese Model 
• Stewart’s Model 
• Occupational Accident Model 
• Offshore Oil and Gas Process Model 





• Human-based Accident 
Models 
• Accident Prone Tendency (APT) 
• Accident Liability (AL) 
• Surry’s Model 
• Hale’s Model 
• Wigglesworth’s Model 




• Accident Pyramid Model 
• Energy-based Accident 
Models 
• Energy Transfer Theory (ETT)/Energy 
Accident Release Model (EARM) 
• Tripod Beta Model 
• Bow-Tie Model 
• Systems-based Accident 
Models 
• Accident Epidemiology Model (AEM) 
• 3M and 5M 
• Socio-technical System and AcciMap 
• Systems-Theoretic Accident Model 
and Processes (STAMP) 
• Cognitive Reliability and Error 
Analysis Method (CREAM) 
• Integrated Procedure for Incident 
Cause Analysis (IPICA) 
• Functional Resonance Analysis 
Method (FRAM) 
• Teleo – Centric System Model for 
















A-3 Generic Complex Sociotechnical Safety Control Structure (STAMP model) 
(Adapted from Leveson, 2011) 
Congress and Legislatures
Government regulatory agencies, Industry 










Government regulatory agencies, Industry 



















































































A-4 AcciMap Studies between 2000 to 2015 (Adapted from Waterson et al., 
2017) 
No. Title of Paper Author(s) 
1 Lessons From Longford: The Esso Gas Plant Explosion Hopkins (2000) 
2 Sociotechnical systems, risk management, and public health: 
comparing the North Battleford and Walkerton outbreaks 
Woo and Vicente 
(2003) 
3 Why-Because analysis of the Glenbrook, NSW rail accident and 
comparison with Hopkin's AcciMap 
Ladkin (2005) 
4 The Walkerton E. coli outbreak: a test of Rasmussen's framework for 




5 An investigation into the loss of the Brazilian space programme's 
launch vehicle VLS-1 V03 
Johnson and de 
Almeida (2008) 
6 Cassano-Piche et al. (2009) A test of Rasmussen's risk management 
framework in the food safety domain: BSE in the UK 
Cassano-Piche et 
al. (2009) 




No. Title of Paper Author(s) 
infection outbreaks 
8 Systems-based accident analysis in the led outdoor activity domain: 
application and evaluation of a risk management framework 
Salmon et al. 
(2010) 
9 Systems-based analysis methods: a comparison of Accimap, HFACS and 
STAMP 
Salmon et al. 
(2012) 
10 A systemic approach to accident analysis: A case study of the 
Stockwell shooting 
Jenkins et al. 
(2010) 
11 What could they have been thinking? How sociotechnical system design 
influences cognition: a case study of the Stockwell shooting 
Jenkins et al. 
(2011) 
12 Accident in a French dynamite factory: An example of an 
organisational investigation 
Le Coze (2010) 
13 Using Accimaps to describe the emergence of critical work situations e 
a systemic approach to analyse evaluation 
Andersson 
(2010) 
14 Seeing the big picture of mishaps e applying the AcciMap approach to 
analyse system accidents 
Branford (2011) 
15 Assessing organisational factors in aircraft accidents using a hybrid 
Reason and AcciMap model 
Debrincat et al. 
(2013) 
16 The crash at Kerang: Investigating systemic and psychological factors 
leading to unintentional non-compliance at rail level crossings 
Salmon et al. 
(2013) 
17 Systems thinking, the Swiss Cheese model and accident analysis: a 
comparative systems analysis of the Grayrigg train derailment using 
the ATSB, Accimap and STAMP models 
Underwood and 
Waterson (2014) 
18 The driver, the road, the rules … and the rest? A systems-based 
approach to young driver road safety 
Scott-Parker et 
al. (2015) 
19 An integrated graphic taxonomic associative approach to analyse 
human factors in aviation accidents 
Lei et al. (2014) 
20 Impromaps: Applying Rasmussen's Risk Management Framework to 
improvisation incidents 
Trotter et al. 
(2014) 
21 A systems approach to examining disaster response: Using Accimap to 
describe the factors influencing bushfire response 
Salmon et al. 
(2014) 
22 Safety in System-of-Systems: Ten key challenges Harvey and 
Stanton (2014) 
23 Applying the AcciMap methodology to investigate a major accident in 




24 Analysis for Yangmingtan bridge collapse Fan et al. (2015) 




26 Systems-based approach to investigate unsafe pedestrian behaviour at 
level crossings 
Stefanova et al. 
(2015) 
27 An AcciMap analysis on the China-Yongwen railway accident Chen et al. 
(2015) 












Appendix B: Survey and AcciMap Results from Case 





B-1 AcciMap Training Manual (Branford, 2007) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCIMAP ANALYSIS 
AcciMaps can be developed using a whiteboard, large sheet of paper, sticky notes, or 
electronically using Microsoft Visio, depending on the analyst's preference. The 
following steps are included: 
Step 1 - Create a blank AcciMap format on which to arrange the causes:  Separate 
the file in Visio or on any large sheet of paper into the four sections of the AcciMap, 
with the heading s of the four levels on the left–hand side and horizontal lines 
separating each level. 
Step 2 - Identify the Outcome (Accident): (1) From the accident data, identify the 
negative outcome(s) to be analysed: and (2) insert the outcome(s) into the “Outcomes” 
level of the AcciMap. 
Step 3 - Identify the causal factors: On a separate page, make a list of all causes in the 
accident data, that is, all the factors for which you can say, “had this been otherwise, 
the accident would (probably) not have occurred”. If you are unsure as to whether or 
not a factor is a cause, include it in the list – it can always be eliminated at a later 
stage. 
Step 4 - Identify the appropriate AcciMap level for each cause: Next to each cause, 
write down the name of the AcciMap level to which it belongs. Then, refer to table 1 to 
determine the correct level. The first column in Table 1 defines the levels of an 
AcciMap and the second provide examples of the types of causes that may be found at 
each level. 
I. Level Definitions II. Categories of Causes 
The EXTERNAL level 
includes causes that 
are beyond the 
control of the 
organisation(s). this 
level includes 
factors relating to 
GOVERNMENT, for 
example: 


















• Safety standards 
• Enforcement of 
regulations 
• Auditing 
SOCIETY, for example: 
• Market forces 
• Societal values, 






• Historical events. 




causes relating to 
organisational 
processes. Factors 
are placed in this 
level if they are 




FINANCIAL ISSUES, for example: 
• Organisational budgeting, cost-
cutting. 
• Resource allocation problems. 
 
EQUIPMENT AND DESIGN, for 
example: 
• Design problems (such as 
ergonomic issues, 
inaccessibility). 
• Equipment problems (such as 
poor quality, defective, 
ageing, untidy, missing or 
poorly maintained equipment 
or tools) 
• Equipment not used as 
ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE, for 
example: 
• Incompatible goals (between 
safety and production or safety 
and budget, etc.). 
• Organisational acceptance or 
encouragement of shortcuts, non-
compliance, etc. 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT, for example, 
inadequate: 
• Hazard identification or risk 
assessment. 
• Hazard or defects reporting. 





I. Level Definitions II. Categories of Causes 
designed. 
 
DEFENCES, for example, 
inadequate, insufficient, or 
missing: 
• Proactive system defences 
(such as alarms, warnings, 
barriers, personal protective 
equipment). 
• Reactive system defences (such 
as hazard containment, 




INFORMATION, for example, 
inadequate: 
• Information or knowledge. 
• Flow or organisation of 
information. 
• Communication of instructions, 
hazards, priorities, objectives, 
etc. 
 
AUDITING AND RULE 
ENFORCEMENT, for example, 
inadequate: 
• Implementation and 
enforcement of rules, 
regulations, or procedures. 
• Internal auditing, inspection. 
 
• Awareness of risks. 
• Security (such as protection from 
unauthorised access). 
 
MANUALS AND PROCEDURES, for 
example: 
• Inadequate, ambiguous, 
conflicting, outdated, absent or 
difficult to follow procedures, 
rules, regulations or manuals. 
 
HUMAN RESOURCES, for example, 
inadequate or insufficient: 
• Supervision, management, 
coordination, staff numbers. 
• Delegation, accountability. 
• Staff selection procedures or 
criteria 
 
TRAINING, for example, inadequate 
or insufficient: 
• Training, training equipment, 
training exercise. 






CONDITIONS are the 
immediate 
precursors to the 
outcome(s) and 
should include 
factors relating to 
PHYSICAL EVENTS, PROCESSES 
AND CONDITIONS, for example: 
• The physical sequence of 
events (including technical 
failures). 
• Environmental conditions and 
factors relating to physical 
surroundings which are 
necessary for making sense of 
the sequence of events 
ACTOR ACTIVITIES AND 
CONDITIONS, for example: 
• Human errors, mistakes, 
violations, actions, activities, etc. 
• False perceptions, 
misinterpretations, 
misunderstandings, loss of 
situational awareness, etc. 
• The physical and mental status of 





Step 5 - Prepare the causes: Write each identified cause on a sticky note (or 
equivalent), making sure that you: 
1.) Keep it brief 
2.) Use wording that makes it clear how things might have been different, that is, 
don’t just say “training” or “operator actions”, say “inadequate training” or 
“operator failed to monitor temperature” so that what went wrong is clear; and 
 
3.) Use wording that suits the level that the cause is located in: 
a. Causes at the “Physical/actor events, processes and conditions” level 




events that led to the accident (for example, “life raft failed to inflate” 
or “pilot failed to adjust heading”); and 
b. Causes at the “Organisational” level and above should not focus on the 
particular individuals involved (for example, say “Inadequate pilot 
training”, not “Pete Smith had not been adequately trained”). 
Insert each sticky note (cause) into its appropriate level in the AcciMap.  
If you have identified any causes which are not of practical significance but which need 
to be included so that the AcciMap make sense, draw an oval around these factors to 
distinguish them from the other causes. 
Step 6: Insert the causal links: Rearrange the causes in the AcciMap so that the causes 
lie directly above their effects (whether the effects are in the same level or in the 
level(s) below). 
Consider each cause in the diagram and insert ca causal link between a cause and its 




If one cause does not obviously lead on to the next, leave a space where the missing 
information can be inserted later. 
There is no limit to the number of causes to be included in any causal chain, and there 






Causes do not have to be linked to effects in the same level or in the level immediately 










Some causes may be linked with more than one effect. Conversely, several causes may 
be linked to one common effect. This means that no cause ever needs to be listed more 
than once in an AcciMap: 
Cause B
Cause A




Cause C Cause D
 
Step 7: Fill in the gaps: At this point, there may be gaps left in the causal chains where 
information is missing. These gaps must be filled so that the causal chains are unbroken 
from the earliest identified causes in each chain all the way down to the outcome(s) 
and so that every cause relevant to the accident is included in the AcciMap. 
In order to uncover any missing causes, look at each cause on the AcciMap and ask why 
it occurred. Your AcciMap must include all factors which caused its occurrence or which 
failed to prevent it from occurring. Refer to Table 1 for help at this point. Table 1 is not 
an exhaustive list, but it will serve as a guide to the types of factors that may be 
relevant. 
Aim to follow each causal chain as far as possible. Each chain should extend at least to 
the “Organisational” level (with the exception of the oval-shaped causes). 
Be sure to include as many (but only as many) factors as are necessary so that someone 
reading your AcciMap will be able to understand the sequence of events and conditions 
without difficulty. 
Step 8 - Check the causal logic: Go through each cause in the diagram and make sure 
that, had it not occurred, the factor(s) it is linked to (and the accident itself) would 
probably not have occurred. 
Go through each causal chain in the diagram and make sure that: 
1.) Anyone reading the AcciMap will have no difficulty in making sense of the 
sequence of events; 
2.) All of the arrows are facing downwards, towards the outcome(s); and  
3.) No cause is listed more than once. If you have two or more similar causes, see if 
they can sensibly be combined into one more general cause. For instance, the 




AcciMap), to simplify the diagram and to highlight that the SRA’s application of 
the published SMS was inadequate in a number of respects and is therefore a 
problem area that should be addressed. 
SRA’s application of the 
SMS did not identify 
deficiencies in the medical 
standards applied to SRA 
employees
SRA’s application of the 
SMS did not identify need 
to address deadman 
system deficiencies
SRA’s application of the 
SMS did not identify need 
to consider additional 
system defences against 
driver incapacitation
SRA medical standards 
were inadequate for 
anticipating and managing 
risk of incapacitation in 
safety-critical personnel
Known deadman system 
deficiencies were not 
addressed
Vigilance control system 
was not installed
 
Can be combined as follows (as they are in the sample AcciMap), to simplify the diagram 
and to highlight that the SRA’s application of the published SMS was inadequate in a 
number of respects and is therefore, a problem area that should be addressed. 
 
SRA’s failed to ensure 
appropriate application of 
the published SMS
SRA’s medical standards 
were inadequate for 
anticipating and managing 
risk of incapacitation in 
safety-critical personnel
Known deadman system 
deficiencies were not 
addressed




Step 9 - Formulate safety recommendations: Go through each of the causal factors in 
your AcciMap and identify those which could potentially be changed, controlled or 
compensated for so that a similar outcome could not occur again. Safety 
recommendations must also be practical to implement: 
• Formulate safety recommendations that identify what specifically should be 
done to change, control or compensate for each cause. 
• Consider whether or not there is a more general problem area that should also 
be addressed (for example, if there are one or more problems relating to a 
certain part of a manual, it may be beneficial to recommend that the manual be 
reviewed, as well as the particular problem parts, to ensure that any 
inadequacies are addressed); and 
• Identify the party responsible for making the required changes. 
 
Note: Recommendations should aim to prevent similar accidents from occurring 
regardless of the individuals involved or the particular circumstances. 
Compile a list of recommendations, grouped according to the partiers for carrying out 
the actions (as in figure 3). Each recommendation should be numbered and should 




you identified in the first part of step 9 has been addressed by one or more 
recommendations, if appropriate. 
 
Note: Not all recommendations will necessarily be accepted by those responsible for 
implementing them. Issues of practicality, redundancy and cost-effectiveness may be 
relevant, and alternate solutions may be taken into consideration. 
 
 
B-2 Summary of Events (Wrong Patient) 
Time Event (s) 
6:15 am  The electrophysiology nurse (RN1) logged into the laboratory computer to 
check on morning schedules, called in the Telemetry unit to request for the 
patient (Jane Morrison) but was incorrectly told that the patient was moved to 
the Oncology floor. 
  
6:20 am RN called the Oncology floor (Joan Morris was transferred after her cerebral 
angiography) and was mistakenly notified that the patient was to be 
transferred to the electrophysiology laboratory). 
  
6:30 am The second nurse (RN2) agreed to transport the patient for the procedure but 
was informed about the plan by the charge nurse or Joan Morris’s nurse from 
the previous evening. RN2 also informed the patient that she could refuse the 
procedure. 
  
6:45 a.m. The doctor spoke with the patient (Ms Morris), who was brought in by RN2. 
The patient expressed reluctance in undergoing the procedure due to feeling 
nauseated and general unwellness. The doctor (the attending) was surprised 
due to having met with the patient the night before. After speaking with the 
patient, intravenous prochlorperazine was administered to the patient to help 





RN1 noticed no consent indicated in the patient’s chart even though it was 
stated in the daily schedule that the consent was obtained. The nurse also 





The electrophysiology fellow then reviewed the patient’s chart and was 
surprised regarding the lack of important information. The fellow then 
discussed the nature of the procedure, and the patient then signed the 
consent for the EP study with both possible ICD (Implantable cardiac 
defibrillator) and PM (Pacemaker) replacements. 
  
7:10 a.m. RN1 informed the electrophysiology charge nurse that an earlier patient had 





RN3 proceeded to attach the devices, including monitors on the patient, while 
also explaining the procedure. The patient (Ms Morris) indicated fainting to 
the nurse, who surmised it as a reason for the electrophysiology procedure. 
  
7:30 a.m. The resident (neurosurgery team) came in for morning rounds and discovered 
that the patient (Ms Morris) was not available in the room. The resident then 
learned about the procedure and enquired to know why it was the case. 




Time Event (s) 
that the patient was being taken as the first case after being bumped twice. 
The resident then left, assuming that the attending had ordered the EP study 
without his knowledge. 
  
8:00 a.m. RN4 (an additional nurse) and the electrophysiology attending arrived. The 
latter could not see the patient’s face at the computer console due to her 
head being draped. The fellow then initiated the procedure by inserting 




- 8: 45 
a.m. 
RN5 from the telemetry floor then telephoned the electrophysiology 
laboratory to enquire why the patient (Jane Morrison, who was the correct 
patient) was not called. After consultation with RN4 regarding the expected 
completion time for Joan Morris, RN5 was then advised to send Ms Morrison by 
10 a.m.  
  
8:30 a.m. 
- 8: 45 
a.m.  
The electrophysiology charge nurse took note of “Joan Morris” not matching 
any of the five names listed in the morning log. She queried the fellow 
regarding the patient names in the electrophysiology laboratory. However, 
due to the state of the procedure, further conversations did not occur as the 




- 9: 15 
a.m.  
An interventional radiology attending went into Ms Morris’ room and was 
surprised to find it empty. A call was then made to the electrophysiology 
laboratory to find out why the patient was undergoing the procedure. The 
electrophysiology attending indicated to the nurse that the call was 
concerning the patient named Morris, but instead, Jane Morrison was currently 
on the table. However, the electrophysiology charge nurse corrected him that 
it was Jane Morris who was on the table. The attending (electrophysiology) 





The procedure was then aborted, and the patient was subsequently returned 
in a stable condition back to the oncology unit. The patient was then kept 
under observation and was discharged the following day. The error detected 
was also explained to the patient and the family. Outpatient neurosurgical 
follow-up was then arranged for the patient, and surgery was also scheduled 
















B-3 AcciMap Evaluation Questionnaire 
Your Name (Optional):  
Your Participant Number:  
Your Team Number:  
Before attending the introductory AcciMap training workshop  
 
Q1.) Were you familiar with 
“systems thinking”?  
 
 
Yes [ ]  
 
No [ ]  
Q2.) Where you aware of the 
AcciMap method?  
 
Yes [ ]  No [ ]  
Q3.) Had you previously used the 
AcciMap method in your NHS 
board before?  
 
Yes [ ]  No [ ]  
Questions on the use of the AcciMap Approach 
The following is a set of statements about using the AcciMap method. For each statement, please say 
whether you:  
[6] – Strongly agree  
[5] – Agree  
[4] – Slightly agree  
[3] – Neutral  
[2] – Slightly disagree  
[1] – Disagree  
[0] – Strongly disagree  
 




  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
Q4.) AcciMap is a suitable method 
for analysing accidents  
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q5.) AcciMap effectively describes 
the timeline of events leading to 
the accident  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q6.) AcciMap effectively analyses 
the contributing factors to an 
accident from:  
 
       
a) Technical components, 
e.g., hardware, software  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
b) Human factors issues, e.g., 
workload, fatigue  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
c) Organisational issues, e.g., 
policies and procedures  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
d)Environmental issues, e.g., 
climate and noise levels  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
e) External issues, e.g., lack of 
oversight, budget allocation  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q7.) AcciMap provides a 
comprehensive description of an 
accident  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q8.) AcciMap effectively represents 
causal relationships between each 
level  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 








  Neutral   Strongly 
Agree 
the causes of an accident  
 
Q10.) AcciMap can be applied to 
analyse any type of accident in NHS 
trust  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q11.) AcciMap is an easy method to 
understand  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q12.) The terms and concepts used 
in the AcciMap method are clear 
and unambiguous  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q13.) It is easy to identify 
contributing factors that led to the 
accident  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q14.) It is easy to identify unsafe 
decisions that led to the accident  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q15.) AcciMap is an easy method to 
use for accident analysis  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q16.) AcciMap is easy to use in a 
team-based analysis  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q17.) AcciMap promotes team 
collaboration during analysis  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q18.) AcciMap’s graphical diagram 
is a useful communication tool  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q19.) It would be easy for me to 
become skilled at using the AcciMap 
method  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q20.) AcciMap analysis can be 
completed in an acceptable 
timescale (within a few hours of the 
training workshop)  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q21.) AcciMap method is time-
consuming  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Q22.) I received sufficient 
introductory training in the use of 
the AcciMap method to effectively 
use this method.  
 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 


















Appendix C: Case Incident Two (CPOE Medication 




C-1 Case Description: CPOE Medication Error 
The patient was initially hypokalemic and was examined by the first physician 
(Provider A). A decision was then made to immediately replete the potassium by 
administering an intravenous (IV) bolus injection. As the events unfolded, the 
physician realised that the patient already had an IV and administered the KCI as 
an additional treatment. Several events took place that resulted in the patient 
receiving a higher KCI dosage than what was intended. A new dosage order was 
written after an initial dosage order was detected to be higher than what the 
hospital policy allowed and so was discontinued. However, this new dosage order 
was entered correctly into the CPOE system, and it did not contain the maximum 
volume of the fluid to be administered (Horsky, Kuperman and Patel, 2005). 
 
On the next day, there was a changeover between the first physician and the 
incoming one (Provider B). The second provider was already notified to check 
the patient’s KCI levels from the system but did not realize that the laboratory 
results were from before the last potassium repletion. As a result, the second 
provider thought that the KCI levels of the patient was low and so ordered an 
additional IV injection even when the KCI from the previous delivery had not 
finished running. The case was subsequently analysed within the health 
organisation, and safety recommendations were developed for their continuous 
learning process. 
 







40 mEq KCI IV 
injection over 4 
hr Decision 
Correct order 
The provider wants 
to change IV 
injection of KCI to a 




DC Drip D5W non-
medicated fluid 
Discontinues an older 
standing order (not 
in table) 
2 
ACT Drip D5W with 40 mEq 
KCI 1,000 mL @ 
75 mL/hr 
Intended for 1 L of 
fluid only; free text 
volume limit, auto-
stop in 7 days 
3 
DC Drip Preceding order 
discontinued 
Realizes the 
preceding order [3] 
was incorrect and 
discontinues 
4 
ACT Drip D5W non-
medicated fluid 
Enters order 
identical to the one 
just discontinued [2] 
5 
ACT Drip D5W with 100 
mEq KCI 1,000 mL 
@ 75 mL/hr 
Second attempt to 
enter drip order, 
similar to order [3]; 
now with a higher 





Time Provider Action Type Description Notes/Findings Order No. 
DC IV 
Injection 
KCI 20 mEq Meant to discontinue 
order [1] but 
discontinued an 
expired order from 2 
days before (not in 
table) 
7 
                                                                                    49-min 
time lag 
Pharmacy calls to 
warn about the order 
[6], which has dose 
over the limit (100 




14: 26 (16 
min) 
A 




order [5] in response 
to the call from the 
pharmacy 
8 
DC Drip D5W with 100 
mEq KCI 1,000 mL 
@ 75 mL/hr 
Discontinues 
erroneous drip order 
[6] in response to the 
call from the 
pharmacy 
9 
ACT Drip D5W with 80 mEq 
KCI 1,000 mL @ 
75 mL/hr 
Enters recommended 
80 mEq. Intended for 
1 L only, but no stop 
time entered; auto 
stop in 7 days 
10 




DC Drip D5W with 80 mEq 
KCI 1,000 mL @ 
75 mL/hr 
The preceding order 
[10] discontinued 
11 
ACT Drip D5W with 80 mEq 
KCI 1,000 mL @ 
75 mL/hr 
The same order [cf 
10, 11] re-entered, 
runs for 36 hr and 
delivers 216 mEq KCI 
12 
27-hr time lag 










values as current; 
did not notice 
running KCI drip [12] 
13 






40 mEq KCI IV 
injection 





60 mEq KCI IV 
injection 
Increased IV 
injection dose to 60 
mEq 
15 





40 mEq KCI IV 
injection 
Another IV injection 
of KCI ordered; 
however, no clear 





Time Provider Action Type Description Notes/Findings Order No. 
administered 
 ACT – Activate 
DC – Discontinue 















Appendix D: Development of the Medi-Socio 









D-2 The Eight-Dimensional Socio-technical Model 
 
Dimension Description 
Hardware and Software Computing infrastructure used to support and operate clinical 
applications and devices 
Clinical content Includes text, numeric data and images that constitute 
‘language’ of clinical applications, including clinical decision 
support 
Human-Computer Interface Includes all aspects of technology that users can see, touch or 
hear as they interact with it 
People Comprises of persons involved with patient care and interacts 
in some way with healthcare delivery (including technology). 
This includes patients, clinicians and other healthcare 




Processes to ensure that patient care is carried out 
effectively, efficiently and safely 
Internal organisational 
features 
Policies, procedures, the physical work environment and the 
organisational culture that govern how the system is 
configured, who uses it, where and how it is used 
External rules and 
regulations 
Federal or state rules and billing requirements that facilitate 
or constrain the other dimensions 
Measurement and 
Monitoring 
Evaluating both intended and unintended consequences 
through a variety of prospective and retrospective, 









D-3 The framework of Contributory Factors influencing Clinical Practice  
FACTOR TYPES CONTRIBUTORY INFLUENCING FACTOR 
 
Patient Factors • Condition (complexity and seriousness) 
• Language and Communication 
• Personality and social factors 
Task and Technology Factors • Task design and clarity of structure 
• Availability and use of protocols 
• Availability and accuracy of test results 
• Decision-making aids 
Individual (staff) Factors • Knowledge and skills 
• Competence 
• Physical and mental health 
Team Factors • Verbal communication 
• Written communication 
• Supervision and seeking help 
• Team structure (congruence, consistency, leadership) 
Work Environmental Factors • Staffing levels and skills mix 
• Workload and shift patterns 
• Design, availability and maintenance of equipment 
• Administrative and managerial support 
• Environment 
• Physical 
Organisational and Management 
Factors  
• Financial resources and constraints 
• Organisational structure 
• Policy, standards and goals 
• Safety culture and priorities 
Institutional Context Factors • Economic and regulatory context 
• National health service executive 
























D-5 Human Factors Classification Framework (HFCF) 
Contributing Factor Categories Sub-categories 
Medical equipment • Lack of equipment 
 • Medical equipment failure – design 
 • Medical equipment failure or breakage 
 • Medical equipment (not classified elsewhere) 
 • Non-medical equipment or medical supplies 
  
Work environment • Light  
 • Noise 
 • Physical layout 
 • Work environment (not classified elsewhere) 
  
Staff action factors • Communication or documentation issues 
 • Medical task failure 
 • Monitoring 
 • Delay 
 • Misdiagnosis 
 • Medication issue 
 • Staff action (not classified elsewhere) 
  
Patient • Physical health-pre-existing 
 • Health state 
 • Communication issues 
 • Medication  
 • Toxicology 
 • Patient (not classified elsewhere) 
  
Organisational factors • Work practices, policies or guidelines 
 • Supervision 
 • Organisational resources 
 • Work pressure 
  
Individual factors • Experience 
 • Training 
 • Fatigue 
 • Stress 
 • Individual factors (not classified elsewhere) 









































D-8 The Understanding, Prevention and Learning Outdoor Activities System 




D-9 Taxonomy guidance notes/description for each AcciMap level (Citations from existing taxonomies/frameworks) 
 
ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 








Comprises of actions, 
decisions and 
contributing factors 
that played a role in 
combination with other 
factors leading to 
increased risk and 
adverse outcomes.  
Communication  
 
❖ This consists of verbal or written communication between patients and medical staff, including doctors, nurses, etc. 
❖ Contributing factors include non-existing, inefficient, inadequate communication or miscommunication with medical staff. 
 
Medical condition (Complexity and seriousness) 
 




❖ This refers to actions, slips committed by the patient that resulted in an undesired outcome. 
 
Unsafe acts - Violations (Non-concordance) 
 
❖ This refers to any evidence of any form of deviation from existing rules or standards of practice by the patient that directly 










Comprises of actions, 
decisions and 
contributing factors 
that directly or 
indirectly affected 
patient safety. This 
Communication and feedback 
 
❖ Includes both verbal and written communication between clinicians and patients, between other medical colleagues and 
management. 
❖ It also consists of a lack of communication, ineffective/inadequate feedback or miscommunication that resulted or 
contributed to the adverse event.  
 





ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
element focuses on 
individual decisions 
taken by different 
medical personnel. 
 
❖ This describes existing clinical procedures that medical personnel are required to adhere. 
❖ Causes/contributing factors may include individual personnel not complying with existing safety-related procedures or not 
being carried out ineffectively, which led to patient harm. 
❖ Non-compliance could be unintentional or intentional. 
Unsafe acts 
 
❖ Describes actions taken by individual medical staff that directly or indirectly led to the adverse outcome. 
❖ These are acts that cause adverse events could either be intentional acts that do not yield a positive outcome or 
unintentional acts that unwittingly deviates from planned intentions 
 
Unsafe acts - Violations (Non-concordance) 
 
❖ Describes any evidence of wilful deviation from existing rules or standards of practice by individual staff members which 
directly caused an adverse outcome.  
❖ These violations could either be routine (creating workarounds due to time pressure and that is tolerated by management) 
or exceptional violations (isolated departure from rules and not tolerated by management). 
 
Physical and mental condition 
 
❖ Refers to the individual staff’s physical and mental state that directly resulted or contributed to a negative outcome.  
❖ Contributing factors include issues relating to cognitive resources involving working memory involved in, for example, 
learning and using health IT systems. Relying on memory could cause unintentional errors to be made. 
 
Judgement and Decision making 
 




❖ Refers to the awareness of the staff (individual personnel) of their surroundings and how they contributed or affected the 
patient's safety. 
Experience and competence 
 




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
as designed. 




❖ Refers to causes or contributing factors that could not be classified under the “Staff-Individual” element. 
  
Staff – Team-related 
Factors 
 
Comprises of actions, 
decisions and 
contributing factors 
that are directly or 
indirectly affecting 
patient safety. This 
element focuses on 
decisions taken by a 
group of medical 
personnel. 
Communication and feedback  
 
❖ This consists of both verbal and written communication between different staff members and management.  
❖ Contributing factors can include miscommunication, lack of feedback, and ineffective feedback mechanisms within teams 
and higher authorities. 
Compliance with procedures 
 
❖ Describes existing clinical procedures that medical teams are required to adhere to. 
❖ Causes/contributing factors may include a team of medical staff not complying with existing safety-related procedures or 
procedures carried out ineffectively, which led to patient harm. 
❖ Non-compliance could be unintentional or intentional. 
Unsafe acts 
 
❖ Describes actions taken by medical staff in teams or groups that directly or indirectly led to the adverse outcome. 
❖ These acts could be intentional acts that do not yield a positive outcome or unintentional acts that unwittingly deviates 




❖ Refers to the number of staff members assigned to handle clinical tasks. This also can include the adequacy of the team 





ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
Teamwork and coordination 
 





❖ Refers to causes/contributing factors that could not be classified under the “Staff-team” element. 
  




Comprises of actions, 
decisions and 
contributing factors 
that are directly or 
indirectly affecting 
patient safety. This 
element focuses on 
decisions taken by 
supervisors who 
coordinate other staff 
where the adverse event 
occurred. 
 
Communication and feedback 
 
❖ Communication (both verbal and written) between staff supervisors/clinical heads and subordinates that directly and 
indirectly contributed to the adverse outcome. 
❖ Contributing factors can include miscommunication, lack of feedback and ineffective feedback mechanism between 
supervisors, clinical staff and higher authorities. 
 
Compliance with procedures 
 
❖ Describes existing clinical procedures that are required to be adhered to by supervisors/clinical heads. 
❖ Causes/contributing factors may include supervisors not complying with existing safety-related procedures or ineffectively 
carrying out the processes, which led to patient harm. 
❖ Non-compliance could be unintentional or intentional. 
 
Unsafe acts  
 
❖ Refers to local clinical management's actions, events, and errors that directly contributed to the adverse outcome. 
 
Unsafe acts - Violations (Non-concordance) 
 
❖ Describes supervisors’ actions of departure from existing rules or standards of practice that directly caused an adverse 
outcome. These violations could either be routine or exceptional. 
 
Physical and mental condition 
 




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
the adverse outcome. 
❖ Contributing factors include issues relating to cognitive resources involving working memory involved in, for example, 
learning and using health IT systems. 
 
Judgement and decision making 
 




❖ Refers to the awareness of the staff (supervisors/clinical) of their surroundings and how they contributed or affected the 
patient's safety. 
 
Experience and competence 
 
❖ This describes the experience and competence of the local management personnel (supervising staff) involved with either 
patient, individual staff or teams. 





❖ Refers to how individual staff/teams are monitored by local management to ensure compliance and achieving safety 









Consists of contributing 
factors relating to both 
the physical 
characteristics of the 
Physical layout 
 
❖ Describes physical and structural settings (e.g., ICU rooms, surgical rooms) where medical staff work and use Health 
software systems and other equipment. 






ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
workplace where health 
practitioners perform 
both clinical and other 
related tasks and work 
conditions of the 
environment. This also 
includes the state and 
availability of 
equipment used for 
clinical purposes. 
 
Staffing levels and skill mix 
 
❖ This describes both the number of available staff and level, the relevance of skill and experience applying those skills for 
different tasks. 
❖ Contributing factors include lack of staff experienced in using health IT systems, inadequate staff for clinical activities, and 
inadequately experienced staff etc. 
 
Workload and shift patterns 
 
❖ This refers to the amount of work carried out by staff and how they work to achieve the organisation's productivity and 
patient safety needs. 









❖ Refers to the pace of work (clinical activities) and time associated with those tasks that need to be completed to achieve 
expected safety performance standards and productivity. 
❖ Time pressure is considered a major contributing factor associated with demands created by the hospital management, 
which could lead to consistent errors. 
 
Clinical equipment and IT systems availability 
 
❖ Refers to existing systems and equipment that are available for health practitioners to carry out their activities. 




❖ Other categories associated with the “Environment” element that could not be mapped in the preceding categories. 
 
   




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 









relating to the design, 
implementation and use 
of Health IT systems 
(software/hardware) for 
clinical purposes. This 
element is also within 
the control of the 
health organisation that 
provides them. 
 
❖ Refers to the software component of the health IT system operating as designed and intended for clinical operations. 
❖ Contributing factors in this category include software malfunction, bugs, programming errors (e.g., patch installation), and 
slow response times. 
❖ The functionality of software systems could also be too complex and not intuitive enough, especially for new/inexperienced 
users. 
 
Software - configuration 
 
❖ Refers to the ability to alter the settings of the clinical software by end-users to improve their tasks, e.g., setting alerts. 
❖ Contributing factors in this category can include limited settings or difficulties in changing operational settings of clinical 
software.  
 
Hardware - functionality 
 
❖ Refers to the hardware component of the health IT system operating as designed and intended for clinical operations. 
❖ Contributing factors include  
 
Hardware – configuration 
 
❖ Refers to the hardware component of the health IT system operating as designed and intended for clinical operations. 
 
Network configuration and availability 
 
❖ This refers to contributing factors relating to network communication devices. 
❖ Contributing factors can include, e.g., network temporarily unavailable, slow network, inadequate IT network, limited 
security, configuration issues, etc. 
Health IT system workflow integration 
 
❖ Refers to the ability of health IT systems to integrate within real-world clinical workflow without compromising patient 
safety. 
❖ Contributing factors can include, for example, existing clinical workflows being affected in unanticipated ways when IT 
systems are implemented. 
 




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
 
❖ This refers to the features/functions of Health IT systems being available and ready for clinical use. 
❖ Contributing factors can include functions not being easily accessible or difficulty in implementing specific functions of 
Health IT systems. 
 
Interoperability of health IT systems 
 
❖ Refers to its ability to seamlessly work with other health IT systems from different health units/departments.  
❖ It also includes the ability to exchange relevant health information between health IT products and across organisational 
boundaries. 
❖ Contributing actors would include ineffective, inadequate or non-existing interoperability between existing IT systems, 












relating to the 
management of new and 
existing health IT 
infrastructure by health 
IT professionals and 
hospital management. 
Communication and feedback 
 
❖ Refers to both verbal and written (electronic) communication issues between Health IT vendors, health IT professionals 
(within the clinical practice), hospital management and clinicians who use these systems. 
❖ Contributing factors include gaps in communication, miscommunication between IT management and staff that utilises 
health IT systems, inefficient feedback mechanisms. 
Delivery of IT training and services 
 
❖ Refers to the provision and effectiveness of training and services (e.g., repairs and updates) for clinicians in effectively 
using Health IT systems for clinical purposes. 
❖ Contributing factors relating to inadequate delivery of IT systems that fit with existing clinical workflows and quality of 
training regarding the use of new IT systems. 
 
Selection of Health IT systems 
 




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
medical units. 
❖ Contributing factors include issues relating to the selection of appropriate IT systems that are useful for medical staff. 
 
Evaluation of Health IT systems 
 
❖ Refers to activities for measuring the reliability of health IT systems, e.g., system usability, system functionality. 
❖ Contributing factors include, for example, inadequate or non-existing tools for evaluating IT systems. 
 
Safety and risk management processes 
 
❖ Refers to clinical risk management activities, including risk identification, risk analysis (potential hazard identification and 
estimation), risk evaluation and risk control 
❖ Contributing factors include, for example, issues relating to non-implementation of risk management activities during the 
life cycle of health IT systems deployed and the inadequate or inconsistent application of these activities. 
 
Maintenance of Health IT systems 
 
❖ Refers to activities including ensuring that health IT systems are functional, up-to-date and improving clinical efficiency and 
workflow. 
❖ Lack of implementation or inadequate maintenance activities including not having efficient and timely updates, especially in 
situations where IT systems crash, not adapting to ever-changing user environments and technologies 
 
Health IT implementation processes 
 
❖ Refers to a set of interrelated activities regarding implementing Health IT systems that potentially contributed to increased 
patient harm.  
❖ This section also includes inadequate, inefficient or existing processes not correctly carried out, for example, when 
implementing new IT systems. 
 
Procurement of health IT systems 
 
❖ Refers to the management ensuring that Health IT systems and manufacturers comply with existing policies regarding the 
availability of clinical safety case reports in aiding risk analysis. 






ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
 






This system element 
constitutes contributing 
factors relating to the 
interactions between 
users (clinical staff) and 
health IT systems. 
 
Usability – Information display/interpretation 
 
❖ Refers to the ease of how information is processed, displayed and interpreted by clinical staff. 
❖ Contributing factors, e.g., staff missing critical results due to the structure of table list (long) or the options menu, poor 
data display, poor alert display, use of abbreviations (or truncated items), etc.  
 
Usability – Data entry and selection 
 
❖ Refers to how data is entered by clinical staff and the ease of carrying out this function. 
❖ Contributing factors include issues relating to the selection of items from menus, difficulties in entering appropriate data 
due to inconsistent measurements. 
 
Usability – Design Consistency 
 
❖ Contributing factors can include inconsistency of expressions (e.g., metrics for patient’s height), inappropriate button 
names, unclear label names, inconsistent user interface component placement etc. 
 
Usability – Interface design  
 
❖ Refers to the design and feel of clinical software systems. 
❖ Contributing factors can potentially include inflexibility of health IT systems, poorly designed scope and content of IT 




❖ Other categories associated with the “Human-Computer “element that could not be mapped in the preceding categories. 
  




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 





relating to non-IT 




❖ Refers to maintenance activities in place to keep medical equipment operational for clinical purposes. 
❖ Lack of implementation or inadequate maintenance activities, including efficient and timely updates, not adapting to ever-
changing user environments and technologies 
 
Suitability of clinical equipment 
 
❖ Refers to how suitable and applicable medical equipment is for staff to use in clinical settings. 
❖ Contributing factors include existing equipment not practicable or not fitting in with clinical procedures or workflow of 
medical units. 
 
Functionality of clinical equipment 
 
❖ Refers to how efficient and well the equipment performs its given operations as designed. 
❖ Contributing factors potentially include parts or the whole equipment not operating properly or as it should be operated. 
  
Access/availability of clinical Equipment 
 
❖ Refers to how accessible the equipment is and if they are available for operations. 
❖ Contributing factors can include equipment not being available when needed. 
 
Design of clinical equipment 
 
❖ Refers to how the equipment is designed and if it fulfils its operation. 




❖ Other categories associated with the patient that could not be mapped in the preceding categories. 











Communication and feedback 
 
❖ This refers to the flow (both verbal and written) of information (for example, communication of instructions) with clinical 
staff.  




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
Planning factors indicating latent 
conditions regarding 
decisions and existing 
policies on clinical risk 
management and safety 
practices that are 
within their control. 
 





❖ Refers to how clinical personnel are monitored by management to ensure compliance and achieving safety standards.  
❖ Examples of potential contributing factors can include inadequate oversight of staff, lack or inadequate provision of 
training, appropriate orientation, and safety information regarding clinical tasks, including using IT systems. 
 
Judgement and decision making 
 
❖ This refers to clinical and safety decisions taken by hospital management in conjunction with different stakeholders.  
❖ This can include decisions on if the implementation of Health IT fits in with existing clinical workflow, appropriate training 
regarding their use and recruitment of experienced staff, e.g., people who may have extensive IT knowledge in addition to 
their medical expertise. 
 
Internal auditing and inspection 
 
❖ Refers to internal processes/activities to assess, evaluate, and improve the care and safety of patients. This also includes 
evaluating the performance of medical personnel and the IT systems used by them. This forms part of clinical governance. 
❖ Contributing factors can include ineffective auditing or none existing procedures regarding staff periodic inspection and IT 
performance. 
 
Enforcement of rules and procedures 
 
❖ Refers to a set of activities carried in ensuring that rules and procedures are effectively carried out by staff as part of 
enhancing patient safety. 
❖ Contributing factors may include issues relating to the lack of enforcement of procedures for maintaining safety in the 




❖ Refers to processes both within and between other organisations to get things done (e.g., safety and quality programs) and 
identify any systemic issues. 
❖ Contributing factors may include inadequate or non-rigorous processes (existing) for identification of systemic issues, 




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 




❖ This includes contributing factors relating to limited funding and a constrained budget, leading to limited staff recruitment, 
availability of clinical IT systems and training in their safe use. 
 
Policies, protocols and procedures 
 
❖ Describes existing management policies/procedures that are meant to guide and promote patient and system safety and 
governance in clinical practice. 
 
Safety culture and priorities 
 
❖ Describes the “way safety processes are carried out” in health organisations.  
❖ This also includes what areas need to be improved upon to enhance the safety of patients, systems, and assets. This can be 
from incident reporting. 
❖ Contributing factors potentially include culture allowing staff to create “workarounds” when using IT systems which could 
put patients at risk. Lack of incident reporting is also a reflection on the state of the safety culture of the health 
organisation. 
 
Staff training and evaluation 
 
❖ This subcategory relates to the quality of training and can include the following: 
1.) Applicability of Training 
2.) Recency of Training 
3.) Level of Training 
4.) Applicable operational experience 
5.) Language or cultural barriers to training 




❖ Other categories associated with the hospital (high-level) management element that could not be mapped in the categories. 
 
  




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 









clinical purposes. This 
element is also within 






❖ This refers to communication (both verbal and written) and feedback based on the clinical software system's operation, 
including the system's design for its intended purpose. 
❖ Contributing factors include communication issues between hospital management, clinical IT management, Health IT 
vendors/manufacturers and stakeholders. 
 
Knowledge of clinical processes 
 
❖ This relates to the adequacy and knowledge of the clinical processes in the development of clinical IT systems. 
❖ Contributing factors potentially include, for example, inadequate transference of existing or new clinical processes into the 
designing and updating of health IT systems.  
 
Software design processes 
 
❖ This describes the processes involved in the programming and development of the clinical software for its intended purpose. 
❖ Activities include requirement activities, software development and designing of user interface activities. 
❖ Contributing factors include, for example, issues relating to software requirement analyses (e.g., performance), lack or 
insufficient prototype testing and safety analyses. 
 
Health IT system testing processes 
 
❖ Relates to testing activities for the clinical software system developed for any errors and bugs that may exist and operating 
as expected. 
❖ Contributing factors include, for example, issues relating to testing protocols for new health IT systems before deployment 
and during the system’s life cycle.  
❖ This also includes insufficient failsafe mechanisms and systems testing not being extensive enough, especially when dealing 
with actual data under realistic conditions. 
 
 
Health IT implementation processes 
 
❖ This relates to activities relating to software deployment, maintenance and upgrade. 
❖ Contributing factors include issues relating to lack of participation with clinical users before deployment, inadequate 
mechanisms for identifying areas for needed maintenance 
 




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
 
❖ Relates to activities in ensuring that Health IT systems (Software and hardware) and other medical equipment are up to the 
standard required for clinical operations. 
❖ Contributing factors can include, for example, issues relating to adherence to standards and best practices in developing IT 
systems that are useful for medical staff.  




❖ This relates to legal issues regarding the development of clinical IT systems. 
❖ Contributing factors in this category include legal obligations on health IT vendors facilitating the lack of information 




❖ Other categories associated with the health IT vendor element that could not be mapped in the defined categories. 




Consists of contributing 
factors, including 
actions, decisions, and 
policies from 
government-based 
entities that affect the 
system and patient 
safety. These factors 
and beyond the control 





❖ This includes Communication (both verbal and written) between government entities and healthcare stakeholders regarding 
patient and system safety. 
❖ It also includes contributing factors relating to inadequate or lack of communication between these entities regarding 
policies and guidelines, etc. 
 
Policies and legislation 
 
❖ This refers to existing policies and legislation from the government regarding promoting safety practices in health 
organisations. 
❖ Contributing factors include, for example, existing policies on testing, deployment and safe use of health IT systems 
throughout its life cycle. This also includes policies regarding risk assessment and incident reporting. 
 
Funding and budgeting 
 
❖ This relates to financial resources budgeted for health organisations, including hiring and training of existing staff and the 




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
❖ Contributing factors include limited resources for staff recruitment, budget priorities that could potentially compromise 
quality in the development of technologies and risk management. 
 
Operational oversight (via certification) 
 
❖ This consists of regulations and certifications to ensure clinical software systems meet specific standards in their operation. 
❖ Contributing factors include a lack of oversight from government stakeholders on patient safety and safe use of Health IT 
systems. 
 
Standardisation (via guidelines) 
 
❖ This includes existing standard guidelines relating to clinical operations and risk management practices. 
❖ Contributing factors may include, for example, issues relating to safety standards not rigorously applied in the design of 









Consists of contributing 
factors relating to 
decisions and influences 
from regulatory bodies 
responsible for ensuring 
acceptable levels of 
patient safety and 
continuous monitoring 
and improvement of 
safety standards. 
 
Communication and feedback 
 
❖ This refers to verbal and written (electronic) communication between regulators and health management. 





❖ Refers to processes used by health professional bodies to assess, evaluate, and improve the care and safety of patients. This 
forms part of clinical governance. 
❖ Contributing factors include inadequate auditing procedures from regulatory bodies on safety and performance from medical 
staff and management. 
 





ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
❖ This refers to rules/directives relating to the safety and effective use of clinical IT systems by staff and management. 
❖ Contributing factors may include, for example, a lack of enforcement regarding regulations on the safe use of health IT 
systems. 
 
Safety monitoring measures 
 
❖ This refers to the process of measuring patient and system safety. This can also include measuring how safely Health IT is 
used for delivering care and its effects on the patient. 
❖ Contributing factors can include ineffective safety monitoring measures and a lack of appropriate regulations regarding 
implementing safety and incident reporting tools. 
 
Clinical risk management processes 
 
❖ This includes all risk management activities, including risk analysis, risk evaluation and risk control. These activities are also 
applied to health IT systems used. 
❖ Contributing factors include the inadequate, inefficient or inconsistent application of these activities in identifying 










Consists of contributing 




and best practices for 
continuous safety 
improvement and 
Communication and feedback 
❖ This refers to verbal and written (electronic) communication between professional bodies/associations, healthcare 
management, and medical staff. 
❖ Contributing factors can consist of gaps in communication and feedback mechanism, lack of clarity, etc. 
 
Current best practices 
❖ Refers to implementing current best practices in improving patient safety, including other aspects like health IT governance. 
❖ Contributing factors include lack of enforcement of best practices, for example, in the safe use of health IT systems. 
 
Current professional guidance 
❖ Refers to existing guidelines that govern all aspects of healthcare, including the implementation and use of Health IT. 




ACCIMAP LEVEL SYSTEM-LEVEL 
(CATEGORIES) 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS (SUB-CATEGORIES) AND DESCRIPTION 
productivity.  
Collaboration  
❖ Refers to collaborative activities with other external stakeholders (regulatory and government). 
 
Other 
❖ Other categories associated with the “Professional Bodies/Associations” element that could not be classified in the 
preceding categories. 
 





Appendix E: Case Incident Three (Septra Overdose) 




E-1 Summary of different metrics for reliability and validity assessment (Goode et al., 2017) 




code in the 
taxonomy 
For each coding task, calculate for each category in the classification scheme: 
 
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑜 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒 (𝑠𝑢𝑏 − 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠
 𝑥 100 
 
This produces a percentage agreement for each category in the taxonomy (O’Connor, 
2008) 
Considered the easiest 
way to identify 
categories (or sub-
categories) with the 
least agreement. 
Produces an inflated 
result as it ignores the 
total number of 





For each pair of participants, a score designated for “agreement” or “disagreement” 
for each pair of codes assigned to each cause/contributing factor in the coding task. 
 




 𝑥 100 
 
Average the Index across all participant pairs to produce a percentage for the coding 
task (Goode, Salmon, Taylor, Lenne and Finch, 2017). 
Accounts for the level 
of agreement and 
disagreement. 
 
Penalises schemes with 
large numbers of 
overlapping categories 







For each pair of participants (e.g., Professional 1, Professional 2), score a “hit”, “miss”, 
“false alarm” or “correct rejection” for each sub-category in the taxonomy for a coding 
task.  
 
Hit                                = Category is selected by both Professional 1 and Professional 2; 
Miss                              = Category is selected by Professional 1 but not Professional 2; 
False alarm (FA)           = Category is selected by Professional 2 but not Professional 1; 
Correct rejection (CR)  = Category is not selected by Professional 1 or Professional 2. 
Sensitivity index 
accounts for trade-offs 
between hits, misses, 
false alarms and correct 
rejections. 
Sensitivity is artificially 
inflated by large 
numbers of correct 
rejections in schemes 


























E-2 Consent Form (Chapter Six - Reliability Study) 
PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM: ACCIMAP TRAINING WORKSHOP AND CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
The objective of this study is the evaluation of the proposed Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy for 
accident analysing Health-IT related case studies. This will be achieved through a training 




The information regarding the AcciMap Training Workshop will involve the following activities: 
1.) A brief introduction of both the standardised AcciMap approach and the proposed Medi-
Socio AcciMap taxonomy approach. 
2.) Analysing an existing case incident in NHS using the AcciMap approach. 
3.) Analysis of another case incident, “Overdose - Harm in a wired Hospital”, using the 
proposed model (after the workshop) 
 
BENEFITS 
The application of system’s thinking, in particular the AcciMap approach, will allow the provision 
of a ‘big picture’ of accidents that can occur within complex sociotechnical systems. More 
importantly, it will help users to identify areas for improvement within the health care system. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The information collected from the training workshop, including the participant’s response 
record, will be kept confidential and can only be accessed by this research conductor. No 




Your participation in this study is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw at 
any time without penalty or risk. 
 
CONTACT 
If you have questions about the study, please contact:  
Mr Oseghale O. Igene 
Tel: 01413306056 
Email: o.igene.1@research.gla.ac.uk  
School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow 
 
Prof Chris Johnson 
Tel: 01413306053 
Email: Christopher.Johnson@glasgow.ac.uk    
School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow 
 
DECLARATION 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information above. I agree to participate in 
this study with the understanding that I may withdraw at any time.”  
 













E-3 Case Incident 2 - Septra Overdose in a wired Hospital 
This case incident occurred in one of the most recognised teaching hospitals in the United States 
in 2013 (Watcher, 2015). It describes a series of events from different perspectives about a 
patient diagnosed with a rare genetic disease called the NEMO syndrome resulting in a lifetime 
of reoccurring infections and bowel inflammations. The patient was previously admitted to the 
University of California San Francisco (UCSF) Medical Centre’s Benioff Children’s hospital in the 
early morning of July 27th, 2013. The hospital went digital a few years before this incident. This 
case incident was extracted from the original report book (Wachter, 2015) from different 
sections, including the Error itself, the System, the Doctor, the Pharmacists, the Alerts, the 
Robot, the Nurse, and the Patient 
 
The summary of the timeline of events following the admission which culminated in the error 
taking place is summarised in the following table below: 
Time Event(s) 
9:00 pm  Prior to when the patient was admitted to the hospital in the morning, he had 
already taken his evening medications to treat his immune deficiencies and 
infections 
  
1:00 am At around this time, the patient experienced numbness and discomfort in his 
body and the nurse who attended initially thought that his discomfort was due to 
the bowel cleansing solution (GOLYTELY). This solution was given to him in 
preparation for a procedure. 
  
3:00 am Around this time, the patient’s (Pablo) condition grew worse, and the senior 
nurse (Levitt) came in to assess the situation. The chief resident had to be 
called in to check on the patient’s physical condition. He then assessed the 
patient’s electronic medical record and checked the medication list. The chief 
resident became very surprised after noticing that the nurse had given the 
patient an overdose of Septra pills, 38 ½ times the dosage! This discovery 
caused the resident to contact the hospital’s poison control centre, but no one 
there was familiar with this type of accidental dosage, and this incident has 
never been reported in the medical literature. 
  
5:32 am The senior nurse then ran back into the room after hearing a scream and, within 
a few moments, saw the patient reacting and shaking violently back and forth 
with clenched teeth as signs of a grand mal seizure. This prompted a call for the 
Code Blue team, but the patient stopped breathing as they arrived.  
 
 
E-4 Septra Overdose - Additional Information 
• The System: The UCSF Medical Centre, at the time of the incident, was operating a 
hospital-wide software system, EPIC, which was installed in 2012 after over ten years 
since installing their first computer system (GE’s EHR system) in 2000 (Wachter, 
2015). At the time of the incident, there was strong evidence suggesting that the 
EPIC system was fulfilling requirements and goals for medical practitioners. This 
included the system providing computerised checklists, which assisted clinicians to 
implement safety practices and preventing thousands of medication errors using 
barcoding systems. Like every other system implementation, the hospital 
experienced challenges when implementing EPIC, including changes in workflow and 
communication. Installing the EPIC system was not as straightforward as installing an 




hospital regarding how the system will operate. This included setting the frequency 
of alerts and maximum dose limits in the system according to existing policies. 
Although in this case, the UCSF decided not to set limitations because many patients 
who had rare diseases were on research protocols like “overdoses”. Additionally, 
setting up multiple hard stops could create scenarios where medical practitioners 
(doctors and pharmacists) will be stressed and could lead to overriding these 
settings. Other policy decisions also played a significant influence in setting and 
operating the EPIC System. These included decisions regarding weight-based dosing, 
which was expressed in milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg), and conversion of weight-
based doses into pills. The maximum dosage allowed was also set depending on how 
many alerts were triggered. This is was particularly important in the paediatrics 
department, and based on the decision taken by the hospital committee, weight-
based dosing was required for all children less than 88 pounds (approx. 40 kilograms). 
The UCSF, before they installed the EPIC system, also had the advantage of learning 
from the experiences of other academic medical centres that had also installed EPIC 
before 2012. Based on the feedback from those centres, they decided to disable 
thousands of alerts which were also designed into the EPIC’s drug database system. 
However, there were still multiple alerts triggered, and this was particularly stressful 
for the paediatrics department. While these decisions taken by the hospital 
committee was to enhance safety improve workflow, it also created unintended 
consequences which potentially left the system vulnerable. 
 
• The Doctor: The paediatric resident who was assigned to the patient’s case was 
considered an excellent medical graduate student. Furthermore, she was trained in 
how to operate computer systems, including the EPIC system, which seemed usable 
and similar to what she had used in her prior medical school. It was also noted that 
every training program incorporated the hospital’s policies and had a hidden 
curriculum regarding how processes are done. This highly suggests an established 
culture where medical staff created “workarounds” in being more efficient, 
especially in the matter of alerts (alerts fatigue). Lucca (the paediatric resident) was 
initially not comfortable with the status quo but felt that was the only way she could 
be more efficient in her work. On the day of the incident, she attended to the 
patient, who was with his mother. Lucca also accessed the patient’s EMR and 
ordered the usual medications, including the GoLYTELY and his monthly infusion of 
immunoglobulins. She then ordered Septra, which the patient was taking twice daily 
and based on the existing weight-based dosing policy, the medication was in 
milligrams per kilogram. This was because the patient weighed about 38.6 kilograms 
which is equivalent to about 85 pounds. When the order was made into the EPIC 
system, Lucca was prompted to select from two dosing options, and she chose the 
“double-strength” option, which was 5 mg/kg of trimethoprim. The computer system 
calculated this dose, which should have been 193 mg of trimethoprim (38.6kg x 5 
mg/kg), but the nearest tablet size was a double strength Septra containing 160mg. 
The computer system then recommended the dose to be rounded as a single tablet 
double strength Septra, which Lucca accepted as she intended. However, this action 
turned out to be a fatal one. 
 
• The Pharmacist: Benjamin Chan was the resident paediatrics pharmacist, and his 
responsibility was to sign off on all medication orders placed on the paediatric 




from the doctor’s electronic signature to the administering nurse directly (Wachter, 
2015). Orders prescribed for children were processed differently from orders for 
adults, and this was carried by specialised paediatric pharmacists (Chan) who also 
works in satellite pharmacies. After the order was given for the patient, Chan 
received it from his computer screen and noticed that the order given was already 
above the hospital policy. Chan was required to contact Lucca to make changes to 
the initial order given, and after she received the text from Chan, she re-opened the 
medication ordering screen. Based on the text message of rounding up the dosage to 
160 mg, Lucca typed in “160” into the dosage box and confirmed changes. However, 
there were subtle issues relating to the density of the screen as well as the default 
settings of the ordering process. The EPIC system can also order in either milligram 
(mg) or milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg), although a decision was made to keep the 
default settings the same. This led to a situation where Lucca’s screen, which was 
being set at “mg/kg”, Lucca ended up ordering the dose at “160 mg per kg”, which 
turned out to be 381/2 of them (Wachter, 2015).  
 
• The Alerts: As crucial as setting alerts in health IT systems as a safety measure, it 
can become a source of hindrance affecting the performances of medical staff. This 
is especially evident when there are thousands of alerts set up in these systems 
administering medication doses. Although there wasn’t strong evidence to suggest 
that alerts played a direct role, it does present itself as a contributing factor (latent 
condition). This can lead to a situation called “alert fatigue”.  
 
• The Robot: A Swiss-based pharmacy robot was installed at the UCSF’ Mission Bay 
satellite campus in 2010, costing $7 million. It was programmed to carry out specific 
tasks including “pulling off medications from shelves, inserting pills into shrink-
wrapped, bar-coded packages; binding these packages together with little plastic 
rings and sending them to locked cabinets on the patient floors by van” (Wachter, 
2015). It was considered a very critical step in preventing potential human error. For 
example, the robot accurately collected 381/2 Septra tablets, placing them on a half-
dozen rings and sending them to Pablo’s floor for the nurse to administer them at the 
designated time. However, according to the paediatric resident, there weren’t any 
checks regarding the robot’s activities (Chan). 
 
• The Nurse: Brooke Levitt, who had worked as part of the nursing staff at UCSF for 
approximately ten months, was assigned to Pablo’s case.  
 
E-5 Qualitative Coding Instructions 
The coding rules to be applied by reviewers on case incident (Septra overdose) 
are summarised based on the application of the Standard and Proposed AcciMap 
as follows: 
Standardised AcciMap approach (Contributing factors) 
1.) Each table of contributing factors identified from participants’ AcciMap 
outcomes is assigned a code and a colour (i.e., C1). 
2.) Assign the alphanumeric code and colour to the contributing factors 




3.) Any other contributing factors not commonly identified should be assigned 
the codes based on the tables for each respective AcciMap result. 
Medi-Socio AcciMap approach (Contributing factors) 
1.) The same process described in number (1) for the standardised AcciMap 
approach 
2.) Assign the alphanumeric code, colour AND a black-bolded box for any 
common contributing factor (similar in meaning) that was classified in the 
SAME sub-category. 
3.) Assign the alphanumeric code, colour AND a black-bolded broken box for 
any common contributing factor (similar in meaning) that was classified in 
DIFFERENT sub-categories. 
4.) Any other factors not commonly identified should be assigned the codes 
based on the tables for each respective AcciMap result. 
Causal Relationships (application to both AcciMap approaches) 
1.) Indicate the same link number (i.e., link-1) and indicate the link with a 
bold red colour for any causal relationships identified between commonly 
identified factors. 
2.) Compare direct links (between commonly identified factors) (i.e., A – B) 
and multiple links (A-C–B) as long as A and B are similar to other 
participants’ A and B factors. 
Safety Recommendations (application to both AcciMap approaches) 
1.) The same process applies to safety recommendations using both AcciMap 
approaches. Use the table of safety recommendation themes to 
determine similar meanings in recommendations by each participant 
(Professionals). 
2.) Use the denoted safety recommendation code and colour code to 
highlight safety recommendations similarly identified by multiple 
participants (you can use MS Word colour schemes to highlight them). 
 
E-6 Coding Rules for Validity and Reliability Assessment 
Case Incident: Septra Overdose 
The case incident summarises a patient admitted to the UCSF hospital but was given a 
very high dose of Septra medication (38.5) times the intended dose. Based on 
identifying contributing factors and safety recommendations formulated by professional 
participants, similarities and differences in how these factors were presented need to 
be noted.  
For the Actors (medical staff) that were involved with the patient, the following words 
based on the qualitative analyses from all participants are shown below: 
1.) Physician/Paediatrician/Doctor refers to the actor “Lucca.” 
2.) Staff member A refers to “Lucca” (Doctor). 




4.) Pharmacist refers to the actor “Chan” or “Benjamin Chan (BJ)”. 
5.) The nurse refers to the actor “Levitt”. 
6.) The term “System” used within the context of issues relating to its design and 
production of multiple alerts or any IT-related issues refers to the “EPIC 
software system”. 
 
VALIDITY ASSESSMENT (Standardised AcciMap Approach) 
Causal/Contributing Factors 
1.) Did they identify a cause (contributing factor) with the same meaning as the 
expert’s cause? (Y/N). If yes, identify the cause (e.g., Y:3 or Y:2,3 of ½:2) 
 
Example expert cause: “Lucca types “160” under the assumption of ordering one 
Septra tablet and accepts next task on long lists” 
CODE CAUSAL/CONTRIBUTING FACTOR CODING EXAMPLE 
Y: Number • If they identified a cause (contributing factor) that means the same thing 
as the correct cause, whether or not the wording is identical. 
o e.g., “The paediatrician inputs “160” assuming she ordered one 
Septra tablet.” 
 
• If they identified a cause, that means the same thing as the correct 
cause, but also had additional information (that is not a cause). 
o e.g., “The paediatrician inputs “160” assuming she ordered one 
Septra tablet before accepting the next task.” 
 
• If they identified a cause, that means the same as the correct cause and 
included another cause in the same sentence. 
o e.g., “The paediatrician (Lucca) inputted “160”, and she assumed 
that she had ordered one Septra tablet AND disregards disregarded a 
warning alert.” 
 
• If they identified multiple causes that, together, mean the same thing as 
the correct cause (if so, include both cause numbers) 
o e.g., “The paediatrician (Lucca) inputted “160”, and she assumed 
that she had ordered one Septra tablet.” 
 
½: Number • If they identified half, but not all, of the cause 
o “The paediatrician (Lucca) inputs “160”” 
 
N • If they did not identify a cause, that means the same thing as the 
correct cause 
• If the correct cause was implied in the causes, they did identify but 
was not explicitly identified 
 
VALIDITY ASSESSMENT (Medi-Socio AcciMap Approach) 
Causal/Contributing Factors 
1.) Did they identify a cause (contributing factor) with the same meaning and 
classification as the expert’s classified cause/contributing factor? (Y/N). If yes, 
identify the cause (e.g., Y:3 or Y:2,3 of ½:2) 
 
Example expert classified cause: P-SI6 (“Lucca types “160” under the assumption of 




CODE CAUSAL/CONTRIBUTING FACTOR CODING EXAMPLE 
Y: Number • If they identified a cause (contributing factor) that means the same thing 
as the correct cause, whether or not the wording is identical. 
o e.g., P-SI6 (“The paediatrician inputs “160” assuming she ordered 
one Septra tablet”) 
 
• If they identified a cause, that means the same thing as the correct 
cause, but also had additional information (that is not a cause). 
o e.g., P-SI6 (“The paediatrician inputs “160” assuming she ordered 
one Septra tablet before accepting next task”) 
 
• If they identified multiple causes that, together, mean the same thing as 
the correct cause (if so, include both cause numbers) 
o e.g., P-SI6 (“The paediatrician (Lucca) inputted “160”, and she 
assumed that she had ordered one Septra tablet”) 
 
½: Number • If they identified half, but not all, of the cause (contributing factor) 
o P-SI6 (“The paediatrician (Lucca) inputs “160”) 
 
• If they identified the factor similar to the expert factor but classified it 
under a different sub-category from the expert 
o P-SI3 (“The paediatrician (Lucca) inputs “160” assuming she ordered 
one Septra tablet”) 
 
N • If they did not identify a classified cause/contributing factor, that means 
the same thing as the correct classified cause 
• If the correct cause/contributing factor was implied in the causes, they 
did identify but was not explicitly identified 
 
Causal Relationships (Links) – Standard and Medi-Socio AcciMap 
1.) Did they identify a similar causal link with the expert’s causal link? (Y/N). If yes, 
identify the causal link (e.g., Y: Number).  
a. If the participant identified a similar causal link that has intermediate 
links (similarity between A-B will be similar to A-B-C, as long as A and B 
have similar cause and effect contributing factors). 
b. If there are no causal links identified that are similar between participant 
and expert, indicate N. 
2.) The above rules apply in determining the validity of causal links regarding using 
the Medi-Socio AcciMap approach. 
 
Safety Recommendations (Standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap Approaches) 
1.) Did they identify a recommendation with the same meaning as the expert’s 
recommendation? (Y/N). If yes, identify the cause (e.g., Y:3 or Y:2,3 or ½:2) 
 
Example expert recommendation: “Redesign continual training in IT systems to 
ensure all clinical staff are aware of medication errors that are common with IT 
systems such as EPIC. Appropriate training and evaluation on a system that has 







CODE SAFETY RECOMMENDATION CODING EXAMPLE 
Y: Number • If they identified a recommendation that means the same thing as the 
correct recommendation, whether or not the wording is identical. 
o “Redevelopment of continuous training for clinical staff in using IT- 
systems on medication errors that common with such systems”. 
 
• If they identified a recommendation that means the same thing as the 
correct recommendation but also had additional information (that is not a 
cause). 
o “Redesign continual training in IT systems to ensure all clinical staff 
are aware of medication errors that are common with IT systems 
such as EPIC to help staff to be able to easily identify and avoid 
making such errors”.  
 
• If they identified a recommendation that means the same thing as the 
correct recommendation and also included another recommendation in the 
same sentence. 
o “Redesign continual training in IT systems to ensure all clinical staff 
are aware of medication errors that are common with IT systems 
such as EPIC. Appropriate training and evaluation on a system that 
has been designed from staff up to be effective.” 
 
• If they identified multiple recommendations that, together, mean the 
same thing as the correct recommendation (if so, include both 
recommendation numbers) 
o “Redesign continual training in IT systems to ensure all clinical staff 
are aware of medication errors that are common with IT systems 
such as EPIC.”  
 
N • If they did not identify a recommendation that means the same thing as 
the correct recommendation 
 
• If the correct recommendation was implied in the recommendations, they 
did identify but was not explicitly identified 
 
• If they identified the same recommendation but directed it at a different 
party so that the actual actions are not the same 
 
 
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT (Standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap Approaches) 
Standardised AcciMap - Causal/Contributing Factors  
❖ AcciMap results from both groups of participants have been printed with 
different shades of grey colour for each participant. Causal/contributing factors 
are also arranged in the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet by its reference number 
and according to each participant (Professionals).  
❖ The aim is to arrange these contributing factors so that those with the same 
meaning are grouped together. Leave those that don’t have the same meaning as 
a separate file. Try using the same judgements as involved in the validity 
assessment. 
❖ Based on the number of professionals (3 per incident analysis), each AcciMap 
result are to be compared in pairs of two (AB, AC, BC), resulting in a total of 3. 
❖ When deciding if two causes have a similar meaning, consider whether they 
mean the same thing within the context. It is not necessary to check that every 
component in one cause is present in the other – just that they are referring to 




o Refer to the table on the validity of contributing factors, on if 
contributing factors identified by the first pair (e.g., A and B) are similar 
in meaning (Y: Number) 
o If they partially identified the factor and not all (1/2: Number) 
o If they did not identify the factor (N) 
 
❖ However, if the first analyst includes two or more causes in one box, and the 
second analyst identified only one of them, underline the causes in the first 
analyst’s box that the second analyst missed. 
 
Medi-Socio AcciMap - Causal/Contributing Factors 
❖ AcciMap results from both groups of participants have been printed with 
different shades of grey colour for each participant. Causal/contributing factors 
are also arranged in the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet by its reference number 
(REF) and according to each participant (Professionals).  
❖ The same rules apply when arranging factors that have already been classified, 
for as long as they convey similar meanings AND are classified under the same 
sub-category from the taxonomy (refer to the table on the validity of the Medi-
Socio AcciMap). 
o Refer to the table on the validity of contributing factors, on if 
contributing factors identified by the first pair (e.g., A and B) are similar 
in meaning (Y: Number) 
o If they partially identified the contributing factor or if they identified the 
factor but placed it in a different sub-category (1/2: Number) 
o If they did not identify the factor and were not placed in the appropriate 
sub-category (N) 
❖ The same rules apply when comparing two pairs from the subgroups of 
professional participants (see the section on contributing factors).  
❖ The same rules apply when determining similarity in meanings. However, if the 
first analyst includes two or more causes in one box (sub-category), and the 
second analyst identified only one of them, underline the causes in the first 
analyst’s box that the second analyst missed. 
 
Causal Relationships (Links) – Standard and Medi-Socio AcciMap 
❖ Causal relationships are denoted as links between causes/contributing factors and 
with the outcome (accident). Each link is designated a number for each AcciMap 
result. 
❖ For reliability assessment, causal links between two pairs of results (similar process 
with contributing factors) are to be compared using each link from the first pair 
with the second pair (see Excel spreadsheet for the format). 
❖ The following rules are to be applied when comparing links: 
o If the causal relationship exists between two factors (i.e., A and B) from 
between two pairs, indicate it with the link number (i.e., Y: 1).  
o If there exists a causal relationship between contributing factors from both pairs 
that are not similar in a structure of A and B, then indicate the corresponding 
link numbers as long as they convey similar meaning (i.e., Y:1, 3, 4). See the 




o If there are no similar meanings between causal links, then indicate N. 
 
Safety Recommendations (Standardised and Medi-Socio AcciMap approaches) 
❖ The same rules apply when determining similar recommendations between 

































Appendix F: AcciMap Outputs (Septra Overdose 
Incident) and Safety Recommendations – 




F-1 ACCIMAP RESULTS (PROFESSIONALS A) – Standardised AcciMap 















F-2 ACCIMAP RESULTS (PROFESSIONALS B) – Medi-Socio AcciMap approach 
















F-3 Safety recommendations developed based on the application of both 
AcciMap and Medi-Socio AcciMap approaches 
Case Incident Two (Septra Overdose) 
Standardised AcciMap Approach 
Professional 1 (A) 
1.) Dose limits should be applied – the EPIC committee should be responsible for this. 
2.) Error alerts should be rationalised, and the design of these alerts reviewed using Human 
Factors principles to ensure they are effective – the EPIC committee should be responsible 
for this 
3.) Dose ordering only be allowed in mg, not mg/kg, to avoid confusion. The EPIC committee 
should be responsible for this change to the system 
4.) Pharmacy working environment and tasks should be reviewed in terms of reducing 
distractions and providing an environment to allow safe and effective working – pharmacy 
should be responsible for this recommendation. Specifically, when prescriptions are being 
checked, or high-risk procedures are undertaken, these should be performed in an 




Professional 2 (A) 
1.) EPIC/trust IT team 
a. Design screens on EPIC to clearly differentiate between prescribing in mg or mg per kg. 
b. Review the multiple alert screens – would it be possible to distinguish between a small 
discrepancy and a large discrepancy? What would constitute ‘small’ or ‘large’? Is this a 
viable distinction? In some medications, a small discrepancy may still have significant 
consequences. 
c. Review current alert screens – are there too many? Can these be rationalised? 
d. Review alert screens – can they be clearer re actual dose being prescribed 
2.) Pharmacy 
a. Review the decision not to set ‘maximum’ doses – should there be maximum doses in 
some cases? Set such as to minimise the ‘alerts’ but keep patients safe? 
b. Review the pharmacists working environment. Look at protected space for tasks that 
require concentration; remove distractions; short periods on tasks that require high 
concentration; and rotate staff around. 
3.) Nursing management 
a. Need further information to understand why the nurse did not challenge a prescription 
requiring 38 tablets. Is this lack of knowledge? A culture around a challenge? 
 
 
Professional 3 (A) 
1.) Training for staff across the organisation on the basics of Human Factors, including a focus 
on just culture 
2.) The only error messages should be safety-critical (as defined by the organisation),   , 
maximum doses or chance of significant harm 
3.) Reduce distractions in Pharmacy; the environment design does not support an organised and 




Medi-Socio AcciMap Approach 
Professional 1 (B) 
1.) Ensuring the user interface of the EPIC system displays units of medication in a consistent 
way. The use of ecological interface design should be considered. 
 
 
Professional 2 (B) 





2.) Review the evidence base for weight-related dose age calculations 
3.) Redesign the system interface to introduce better visual clues for both data entry (drug 
orders) and alerts/confirmation of dose changes. 
4.) Have the EPIC provide metrics for the number of incidents of a similar type that have 
happened but been picked up – that should help inform the introduction of correct triggers 
for overdose. 
5.) Review policy for challenging perceived incorrect medication doses – links to what is now 
known as the professional duty of candour. 
 
 
Professional 3 (B) 
1.) UCSF Management should reconsider the roles of the dosing of the IT system for managing 
drugs. 
2.) The pharmacist should change his/her working environment for a quieter one. 
3.) The physician should never bypass alert signs of the program again. 
4.) Alert signs of the program should be changed according to the severity of overdosing (some X 
sign with red colour). 
5.) One dedicated pharmacist should accept and give orders on the program and be trained 
appropriately. 
6.) The physician should discuss any decision making with another backup physician when 









Appendix G: Expert Analysis of the Septra Overdose 











G-2 Safety expert analysis of the Septra overdose incident (Medi-Socio 










Appendix H: Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy Survey 
(Clinical Patient Safety Practitioners, NHS Patient 
Safety Attendants, and Experts (HSIB)) (Appendix 





H-1 Questionnaire on Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy Evaluation – Patient 
Safety Practitioners/AcciMap Training 






4.) Job role/Responsibility  
5.) How many years of experience in Accident Investigation and Analysis (in general)? 
 
6.) How many years of experience conducting Accident analysis in healthcare?  
Section Two: Evaluation of the application of the Standardised AcciMap approach 
7.) Are you familiar with the concept of "Systems Thinking"? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
8.) Prior to this workshop, were you familiar with the AcciMap approach? 
c. Yes 
d. No 


















13.) Briefly highlight strengths you found using the standardised AcciMap approach 
 






Section Three: Application of the Medi-Socio AcciMap Taxonomy approach 
15.) Did the use of the contributory classification scheme of the Medi-Socio AcciMap and its 




16.) Were there cases of overlapping categories when classifying contributing factors at the 
Physical Actor and Processes level? (Briefly explain) 
 
17.) Were there cases of overlapping categories when classifying contributing factors at the 
Organisational level (Technical and Operational Management)? (Briefly explain) 
 
18.) Were there cases of overlapping categories when classifying contributing factors at the 
Organisational level (Health Management)? (Briefly explain) 
 
19.) Were there any cases of overlapping categories when classifying contributing factors at 
the External level? (Briefly explain) 
 
20.) What were the strengths or advantages in applying the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy 
compared to the original AcciMap approach? 
 
21.) What were the limitations in the application of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy 
compared to the original AcciMap approach? 
 
22.) Briefly highlight areas of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy that can be improved in 
terms of usability for incident analysis. 
    
23.) Briefly highlight areas of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy that can be improved in 
terms of reliability of the analysis. 
 
24.) Briefly highlight areas of the Medi-Socio AcciMap taxonomy that can be improved in 
terms of the validity of the analysis. 
                










Agrawal, A. (2016) Safety of Health IT - Clinical case studies, Safety of Health 
IT. Edited by A. Agrawal. Chicago, USA: Springer. 
Ash, J.S., Sittig, D.F., Dykstra, R.H., Guappone, K., Carpenter, J.D. and 
Seshadri, V. (2007) ‘Categorizing the unintended sociotechnical 
consequences of computerized provider order entry’, International Journal 
of Medical Informatics, 76(SUPPL. 1), pp. S21–S27. 
Baber, C. and Stanton, N.A. (2002) ‘Task analysis for error identification: 
Theory, method and validation’, Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 
3(2), pp. 212–227. 
Baysari, M.T., Caponecchia, C. and McIntosh, A.S. (2011) ‘A reliability and 
usability study of TRACEr-RAV: The technique for the retrospective analysis 
of cognitive errors - For rail, Australian version’, Applied Ergonomics, 
42(6), pp. 852–859. 
Beaubien, J.. M. and Baker, P.D. (2002) ‘A review of selected aviation human 
factors taxonomies, accident/incident reporting systems, and data 
reporting tools’, International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies, 2(2), 
pp. 11–36. 
Begun, J.W., Zimmerman, B. and Dooley, K. (2003) Health care organizations as 
complex adaptive systems, Advances in Health Care Organization Theory. 
Edited by S.M. Mick and M. Wyttenbach. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Belmonte, F., Schön, W., Heurley, L. and Capel, R. (2011) ‘Interdisciplinary 
safety analysis of complex socio-technological systems based on the 
functional resonance accident model: An application to railway traffic 
supervision’, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 96(2), pp. 237–249. 
Bengtsson, M. (2016) ‘How to plan and perform a qualitative study using content 
analysis’, NursingPlus Open, 2, pp. 8–14. 
Bowie, P., Skinner, J. and De Wet, C. (2013) ‘Training health care professionals 
in root cause analysis: A cross-sectional study of post-training experiences, 
benefits and attitudes’, BMC Health Services Research, 13(50), pp. 1–10. 
Bowker, G.C. and Star, S.L. (1999) Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its 
Consequences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Braithwaite, J., Westbrook, M.T., Mallock, N.A., Travaglia, J.F. and Iedema, 
R.A. (2006) ‘Experiences of health professionals who conducted root cause 
analyses after undergoing a safety improvement programme’, Quality and 
Safety in Health Care, 15(6), pp. 393–399. 
Branford, K. (2007) An investigation into the validity and reliability of the 
AcciMap approach. The Australian National University. 
Branford, K. (2011) ‘Seeing the big picture of mishaps: Applying the AcciMap 
approach to analyze system accidents’, Aviation Psychology and Applied 
Human Factors, 1(1), pp. 31–37. 





In A. Hopkins (Ed.), Learning from High Reliability Organisations. Sydney: 
CCH., pp. 193–212. 
Brindley, F. and White, S. (2016a) Clinical risk management: Its application in 
the deployment and use of health IT systems - implementation guidance, 
NHS Digital. Available at: 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/isce/publication/isb0129. 
Brindley, F. and White, S. (2016b) Clinical risk management: Its application in 
the deployment and use of health IT systems - specification, NHS Digital. 
Available at: http://www.hscic.gov.uk/isce/publication/isb0129. 
Buntin, M.B., Burke, M.F., Hoaglin, M.C. and Blumenthal, D. (2011) ‘The benefits 
of health information technology: A review of the recent literature shows 
predominantly positive results’, Health Affairs, 30(3), pp. 464–471. 
Cacciabue, P.C. and Vella, G. (2010) ‘Human factors engineering in healthcare 
systems: The problem of human error and accident management’, 
International Journal of Medical Informatics, 79(4), pp. e1–e17. 
Canham, A., Thomas Jun, G., Waterson, P. and Khalid, S. (2018) ‘Integrating 
systemic accident analysis into patient safety incident investigation 
practices’, Applied Ergonomics, 72, pp. 1–9. 
Carthey, J. (2013) ‘Understanding safety in healthcare: the system evolution, 
erosion and enhancement model’, Journal of Public Health Research, 2(3), 
pp. 144–149. 
Cassano-Piche, A., Vicente, K.J. and Jamieson, G.A. (2006) ‘A sociotechnical 
systems analysis of the BSE epidemic in the UK through case study’, 
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 
50, pp. 386–390. 
Chang, A., Schyve, P.M., Croteau, R.J., O’Leary, D.S. and Loeb, J.M. (2005) ‘The 
JCAHO patient safety event taxonomy: A standardized terminology and 
classification schema for near misses and adverse events’, International 
Journal for Quality in Health Care, 17(2), pp. 95–105. 
Chang, Y.K. and Mark, B.A. (2009) ‘Antecedents of severe and nonsevere 
medication errors’, Journal of Nursing Scholarship, 41(1), pp. 70–78. 
Chang, Y.K. (2007) Testing a theoretical model for severe medication errors. 
University of North Carolina. 
Chassin, M.R. and Becher, E.C. (2002) ‘The wrong patient’, Annals of Internal 
Medicine, 136(11), pp. 826–833. 
Cheung, K.C., van der Veen, W., Bouvy, M.L., Wensing, M., van den Bemt, 
P.M.L.A. and de Smet, P.A.G.M. (2014) ‘Classification of medication 
incidents associated with information technology’, Journal of the American 
Medical Informatics Association, 21(E2). 
Cohen, T.N. (2017) A human factors approach for identifying latent failures in 






Cornelissen, M., McClure, R., Salmon, P.M. and Stanton, N.A. (2014) ‘Validating 
the strategies analysis diagram: Assessing the reliability and validity of a 
formative method’, Applied Ergonomics, 45(6), pp. 1484–1494. 
Cresswell, K.M., Bates, D.W. and Sheikh, A. (2013) ‘Ten key considerations for 
the successful implementation and adoption of large-scale health 
information technology’, Journal of the American Medical Informatics 
Association : JAMIA, 20, pp. e9–e13. 
Diller, T., Helmrich, G., Dunning, S., Cox, S., Buchanan, A. and Shappell, S. 
(2014) ‘The Human Factors Analysis Classification System (HFACS) Applied 
to Health Care’, American Journal of Medical Quality, 29(3), pp. 181–190. 
Dixon, K., Waterson, P. and Barnes, J. (2018) ‘A comparison of three systemic 
accident analysis methods using 46 SPAD (Signals passed at danger) 
incidents’, in Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing. Springer 
Verlag, pp. 1097–1108. 
Donovan, S.L., Salmon, P.M. and Lenné, M.G. (2015) ‘The leading edge: A 
systems thinking methodology for assessing safety leadership’, Procedia 
Manufacturing, 3, pp. 6644–6651. 
Elliott, M., Page, K. and Worrall-Carter, L. (2012) ‘Reason’s accident causation 
model: Application to adverse events in acute care’, Contemporary Nurse, 
43(1), pp. 22–28. 
Emslie, S., Knox, K. and Pickstone, M. (2002) ‘Improving Patient Safety: Insights 
from American, Australian and British healthcare’, in Proceedings of a joint 
ECRI and Department of Health conference to introduce the National 
Patient Safety Agency. London: Emergency Care Research Institute and 
Department of Health, pp. 1–183. 
Ferjencik, M. (2011) ‘An integrated approach to the analysis of incident causes’, 
Safety Science, 49(6), pp. 886–905. 
Finkelstein, A. (1993) ‘Report of the inquiry into the London Ambulance Service’, 
in International workshop on software specification and design case study, 
pp. 1–62. 
Fleishman, E.A. and Quaintance, M.K. (1984) Taxonomies of human 
performance. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) Making social science matter: Why social inquiry fails and 
how it can succeed again. Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge. 
Fu, G., Xie, X., Jia, Q., Li, Z., Chen, P. and Ge, Y. (2020) ‘The development 
history of accident causation models in the past 100 years: 24Model, a more 
modern accident causation model’, Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, 134, pp. 47–82. 
Glass, R.L. and Vessey, I. (1995) ‘Contemporary application-domain taxonomies’, 
IEEE Software, 12(4), pp. 63–76. 
Goncalves Filho, A.P., Jun, G.T. and Waterson, P. (2019) ‘Four studies, two 
methods, one accident – An examination of the reliability and validity of 






Gong, L., Zhang, S., Tang, P. and Lu, Y. (2014) ‘An integrated graphic-
taxonomic-associative approach to analyze human factors in aviation 
accidents’, Chinese Journal of Aeronautics, 27(2), pp. 226–240. 
Goode, N., Read, G.J.M., van Mulken, M.R.H., Clacy, A. and Salmon, P.M. (2016) 
‘Designing system reforms: Using a systems approach to translate incident 
analyses into prevention strategies’, Frontiers in Psychology, 7, pp. 1–17. 
Goode, N., Salmon, P.M., Lenné, M.G. and Finch, C.F. (2015) ‘The UPLOADS 
project: Development of an Australian national incident dataset for led 
outdoor activities’, Wilderness and Environmental Medicine. Elsevier Ltd, 
pp. 574–576. 
Goode, N., Salmon, P.M., Lenné, M.G. and Finch, C.F. (2018) ‘Evaluating 
reliability and validity’, in Translating Systems Thinking into Practice. 
London: CRC Press, pp. 115–134. 
Goode, N., Salmon, P.M., Taylor, N.Z., Lenné, M.G. and Finch, C.F. (2017) 
‘Developing a contributing factor classification scheme for Rasmussen’s 
AcciMap: Reliability and validity evaluation’, Applied Ergonomics, 64, pp. 
14–26. 
Gordon, R., Flin, R. and Mearns, K. (2005) ‘Designing and evaluating a human 
factors investigation tool (HFIT) for accident analysis’, Safety Science, 
43(3), pp. 147–171. 
Habli, I., White, S., Sujan, M., Harrison, S. and Ugarte, M. (2018) ‘What is the 
safety case for health IT? A study of assurance practices in England’, Safety 
Science, 110, pp. 324–335. 
Harrington, L., Kennerly, D. and Johnson, C. (2011) ‘Safety issues related to the 
electronic medical record (EMR): Synthesis of the literature from the last 
decade, 2000-2009’, Journal of Healthcare Management, 56(1), pp. 31–43. 
Harrison, M.I., Koppel, R. and Bar-Lev, S. (2007) ‘Unintended Consequences of 
Information Technologies in Health Care-An Interactive Sociotechnical 
Analysis’, Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 14(5), 
pp. 542–549. 
Health and Safety Executive (2004) Investigating accidents and incidents, Health 
and Safety Executive. 
Heathfield, H., Pitty, D. and Hanka, R. (1998) ‘Evaluating information 
technology in health care: barriers and challenges’, BMJ : British Medical 
Journal, 316, pp. 1959–1961. 
Henriksen, K., Dayton, E., Keyes, M.A., Carayon, P. and Hughes, R. (2008) 
‘Chapter 5: Understanding Adverse Events: A Human Factors Framework’, 
in Patient Safety and Quality: An Evidence-Based Handbook for Nurses. 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (US), pp. 1–67. 
Herrick, D.M., Gorman, L. and Goodman, J.C. (2010) ‘Health information 
technology : Benefits and problems’, National Center for Policy Analysis, 





Hicks, R.W., Becker, S.C., Krenzischeck, D. and Beyea, S.C. (2004) ‘Medication 
errors in the PACU: a secondary analysis of MEDMARX findings’, Journal of 
PeriAnesthesia Nursing, 19(1), pp. 18–28. 
Hignett, S. and McDermottt, H. (2015) ‘Qualitative methodology for 
ergonomics’, in Wilson, J.R. and Sharples, S. (eds) Evaluation of Human 
Work. 4th edn. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press (Taylor & Francis Group), pp. 
119–138. 
Holden, R.J., Carayon, P., Gurses, A.P., Hoonakker, P., Hundt, A.S., Ozok, A.A. 
and Rivera-Rodriguez, A.J. (2013) ‘SEIPS 2.0: a human factors framework 
for studying and improving the work of healthcare professionals and 
patients’, Ergonomics. NIH Public Access, pp. 1669–1686. 
Hollnagel, E. (2004) Barriers and Accident Prevention. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Hollnagel, E. (2008) ‘Risk + barriers = safety?’, Safety Science, 46(2), pp. 221–
229. 
Hollnagel, E. (2012) FRAM, the functional resonance analysis method: modelling 
complex socio-technical systems. Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd. 
Hollnagel, E. and Speziali, J. (2008) Study on developments in accident 
investigation methods : A survey of the “State-of-the-Art”, SKI Report. 
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D.D. and Leveson, N. (2006) Resilience engineering: 
Concepts and precepts, Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts. 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
Horsky, J., Kuperman, G.J. and Patel, V.L. (2005) ‘Comprehensive analysis of a 
medication dosing error related to CPOE’, Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association, 12(4), pp. 377–382. 
Hruschka, D.J., Schwartz, D., St.John, D.C., Picone-Decaro, E., Jenkins, R.A. 
and Carey, J.W. (2004) ‘Reliability in Coding Open-Ended Data: Lessons 
Learned from HIV Behavioral Research’, Field Methods, 16(3), pp. 307–331. 
Hulme, A., Stanton, N.A., Walker, G.H., Waterson, P. and Salmon, P.M. (2019) 
‘What do applications of systems thinking accident analysis methods tell us 
about accident causation? A systematic review of applications between 
1990 and 2018’, Safety Science, 117, pp. 164–183. 
Hulme, A., Stanton, N.A., Walker, G.H., Waterson, P. and Salmon, P.M. (2021) 
‘Are accident analysis methods fit for purpose? Testing the criterion-
referenced concurrent validity of AcciMap, STAMP-CAST and AcciNet’, 
Safety Science, 144, pp. 1–15. 
Igene, O.O. and Johnson, C. (2019) ‘Analysis of medication dosing error related 
to Computerised Provider Order Entry system: A comparison of ECF, HFACS, 
STAMP and AcciMap approaches’, Health Informatics Journal, 26(2), pp. 
1017–1042. 
Institute for Medicine (1999) To err is human: Building a safer health system. 





Institute for Medicine (2001) Crossing the quality chasm: A new health system 
for the 21st century. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Institute for Medicine (2012) Health IT and patient safety: Building safer 
systems for better care, Health IT and Patient Safety: Building Safer 
Systems for Better Care. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
Isaac, A., Shorrock, S.T. and Kirwan, B. (2002) ‘Human error in European air 
traffic management: The HERA project’, Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety, 75(2), pp. 257–272. 
Itoh, K., Omata, N. and Andersen, H.B. (2009) ‘A human error taxonomy for 
analysing healthcare incident reports: Assessing reporting culture and its 
effects on safety performance’, Journal of Risk Research, 12(3–4), pp. 485–
511. 
Ives, C. and Hillier, S. (2015) Human factors in healthcare: Common terms. 
Clinical Human Factors Group. 
Johnson, C.W. (2002) ‘Reasons for the Failure of Incident Reporting in the 
Healthcare and Rail Industries’, in Components of System Safety. Springer 
London, pp. 31–57. 
Johnson, C.W. (2003) ‘Chapter 10: Causal Analysis’, Failure in Safety-Critical 
Systems: A Handbook of Accident and Incident Reporting, pp. 353–354. 




Johnson, C.W. and de Almeida, I.M. (2008) ‘An investigation into the loss of the 
Brazilian space programme’s launch vehicle VLS-1 V03’, Safety Science, 
46(1), pp. 38–53. 
Johnson, C.W., Oltedal, H.A. and Holloway, C.M. (2013) ‘Comparing the 
identification of recommendations by different accident investigators using 
a common methodology’, in Proceedings of the 7th IET Conference on 
Systems Safety and CyberSecurity, Edinburgh, Scotland. Savoy Place, 
London, pp. 1–6. 
Kanis, H. (2014) ‘Reliability and validity of findings in ergonomics research’, 
Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 15(1), pp. 1–46. 
Kaplan, S. and Garrick, B.J. (1981) ‘On The Quantitative Definition of Risk’, Risk 
Analysis, 1(1), pp. 11–27. 
Kassarjian, H.H. (1977) ‘Content analysis in consumer research’, Journal of 
Consumer Research, 4(1), pp. 8–18. 
Kim, J.W. and Jung, W. (2003) ‘A taxonomy of performance influencing factors 
for human reliability analysis of emergency tasks’, Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, 16(6), pp. 479–495. 
Kim, M.O., Coiera, E. and Magrabi, F. (2017) ‘Problems with health information 





systematic review’, Journal of the American Medical Informatics 
Association : JAMIA, 24(2), pp. 246–250. 
Kirwan, B. (1992) ‘Human error identification in human reliability assessment. 
Part 2: Detailed comparison of techniques’, Applied Ergonomics, 23(6), pp. 
371–381. 
Klein, L. (2014) ‘What do we actually mean by “sociotechnical”? On values, 
boundaries and the problems of language’, Applied Ergonomics, 45(2 Part 
A), pp. 137–142. 
Kohn, L.T., Corrigan, J.M., Donaldson, M.S. and Washington, D.C. (2000) To Err 
Is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Washington DC, USA: National 
Academies Press. 
Koppel, R. (2006) ‘Defending computerized physician order entry from its 
supporters’, The American journal of managed care, 12(7), pp. 369–370. 
Koppel, R. and Kreda, D. (2009) ‘Health care information technology vendors’ 
“hold harmless” clause: Implications for patients and clinicians’, JAMA, 
301(12), pp. 1276–1278. 
Koppel, R., Metlay, J.P., Cohen, A., Abaluck, B., Localio, A.R., Kimmel, S.E. and 
Strom, B.L. (2005) ‘Role of computerized physician order entry systems in 
facilitating medication errors’, Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 293(10), pp. 1197–1203. 
Kozlowski, S.W.J. and Hattrup, K. (1992) ‘A disagreement about within-group 
agreement: Disentangling issues of consistency versus consensus’, Journal 
of Applied Psychology, 77(2), pp. 161–167. 
Kushniruk, A., Beuscart-Zéphir, M.C., Grzes, A., Borycki, E., Watbled, L. and 
Kannry, J. (2010) ‘Increasing the safety of healthcare information systems 
through improved procurement: toward a framework for selection of safe 
healthcare systems.’, Healthcare Quarterly (Toronto, Ont.), 13 Spec No, 
pp. 53–58. 
Kushniruk, A.W., Triola, M.M., Borycki, E.M., Stein, B. and Kannry, J.L. (2005) 
‘Technology induced error and usability: The relationship between usability 
problems and prescription errors when using a handheld application’, 
International Journal of Medical Informatics, 74(7–8), pp. 519–526. 
Ladkin, P. (1999) A quick introduction to Why-Because Analysis. 
Ladkin, P.B. (2005) Why-Because Analysis of the Glenbrook, NSW Rail Accident 
and Comparison with Hopkins’s Accimap. Available at: www.rvs.uni-
bielefeld.de (Accessed: 31 July 2020). 
Lee, T.T. (2016) ‘Evaluation of health information technology - Key elements in 
the framework’, Journal of Nursing Research, 24(4), pp. 283–285. 
Leveson, N.G. (1995) Medical Devices: The Therac-25*. University of Washington. 
Available at: http://sunnyday.mit.edu/papers/therac.pdf. 
Leveson, N.G. (2002) System Safety Engineering : Back To The Future. 





Available at: http://sunnyday.mit.edu/book2.pdf. 
Leveson, N.G. (2004) ‘A new accident model for engineering safer systems’, 
Safety Science, 42(4), pp. 237–270. 
Leveson, N.G. (2011) ‘Applying systems thinking to analyze and learn from 
events’, Safety Science, 49(1), pp. 55–64. 
Lorenzi, N.M., Kouroubali, A., Detmer, D.E. and Bloomrosen, M. (2009) ‘How to 
successfully select and implement electronic health records (EHR) in small 
ambulatory practice settings.’, BMC medical informatics and decision 
making, 9, p. 15. 
Magrabi, F., Liaw, S.T., Arachi, D., Runciman, W., Coiera, E. and Kidd, M.R. 
(2016) ‘Identifying patient safety problems associated with information 
technology in general practice: An analysis of incident reports’, BMJ 
Quality and Safety, 25(11), pp. 870–880. 
Magrabi, F., Ong, M.S., Runciman, W. and Coiera, E. (2010) ‘An analysis of 
computer-related patient safety incidents to inform the development of a 
classification’, Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 
17(6), pp. 663–670. 
Magrabi, F., Ong, M.S., Runciman, W. and Coiera, E. (2012) ‘Using FDA reports to 
inform a classification for health information technology safety problems’, 
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 19(1), pp. 45–53. 
Makeham, M., Magrabi, F., Hibbert, P. and Hardie, R. (2017) Literature review 
and environmental scan on approaches to the review and investigation of 
Health IT-related patient safety incidents. 
Manias, E., Rixon, S., Williams, A., Liew, D. and Braaf, S. (2015) ‘Barriers and 
enablers affecting patient engagement in managing medications within 
specialty hospital settings’, Health Expectations, 18(6), pp. 2787–2798. 
Marhavilas, P.K., Koulouriotis, D. and Gemeni, V. (2011) ‘Risk analysis and 
assessment methodologies in the work sites: On a review, classification and 
comparative study of the scientific literature of the period 2000-2009’, 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Elsevier, pp. 477–523. 
Markóczy, L. and Goldberg, J. (1995) ‘A method for eliciting and comparing 
causal maps’, Journal of Management, 21(2), pp. 305–333. 
Martin, G., Ghafur, S., Cingolani, I., Symons, J., King, D., Arora, S. and Darzi, A. 
(2019) ‘The effects and preventability of 2627 patient safety incidents 
related to health information technology failures: a retrospective analysis 
of 10 years of incident reporting in England and Wales’, The Lancet Digital 
Health, 1(3), pp. e127–e135. 
Martin, P. and Bateson, P. (1993) Measuring Behaviour - An Introductory Guide. 
2nd edn. King’s College, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mawson, D. (2018) Operational clinical safety process, NHS Digital. Available at: 
https://digital.nhs.uk/binaries/content/assets/website-
assets/services/clinical-safety/operational-clinical-safety-process.docx 





McHugh, M.L. (2012) ‘Interrater reliability: The kappa statistic’, Biochemia 
Medica, 22(3), pp. 276–282. 
Meadows, D.H. (2009) Thinking in Systems. Edited by D. Wright. Sterling, 
London: Sustainability Institute. 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M. (1994) Qualitative data analysis: An expanded 
sourcebook. 2nd edn. SAGE Publications, Inc. 
Mitchell, R.J., Williamson, A. and Molesworth, B. (2016) ‘Application of a human 
factors classification framework for patient safety to identify precursor and 
contributing factors to adverse clinical incidents in hospital’, Applied 
Ergonomics, 52, pp. 185–195. 
Mitchell, R.J., Williamson, A.M., Molesworth, B. and Chung, A.Z.Q. (2014) ‘A 
review of the use of human factors classification frameworks that identify 
causal factors for adverse events in the hospital setting’, Ergonomics. 
Taylor and Francis Ltd., pp. 1443–1472. 
Mrosek, R., Dehling, T. and Sunyaev, A. (2015) ‘Taxonomy of health IT and 
medication adherence’, Health Policy and Technology, 4(3), pp. 215–224. 
Nayak, R. and Waterson, P. (2016) ‘“When Food Kills”: A socio-technical systems 
analysis of the UK Pennington 1996 and 2005 E. coli O157 Outbreak 
reports’, Safety Science, 86, pp. 36–47. 
Newnam, S., Goode, N., Read, G.J.M. and Salmon, P.M. (2020) ‘Closing the 
research-practice gap in healthcare: The development and usability 
evaluation of a patient handling incident investigation toolkit’, Safety 
Science, 129, pp. 1–7. 
NHS England (2015) ‘Serious Incidents Framework in the NHS’, pp. 12–15. 




d_5.pdf (Accessed: 3 September 2020). 
NHSScotland (2020) Organisations – Scotland’s Health on the Web. Available at: 
https://www.scot.nhs.uk/organisations/ (Accessed: 14 October 2021). 
Nickerson, R.C., Varshney, U. and Muntermann, J. (2012) ‘A method for 
taxonomy development and its application in information systems’, 
European Journal of Information Systems 2012 22:3, 22(3), pp. 336–359. 
NPSA (2009) ‘Contributory factors classification framework’. National Health 
Service, UK, pp. 1–5. 
Ostrom, L.T. and Wilhelmsen, C.A. (2012) Risk Assessment: Tools, Techniques, 
and their Applications. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Paradies, M. and Busch, D. (1988) ‘Root cause analysis at Savannah river plant’, 
in Proceedings of the 1988 IEEE fourth conference on human factors and 
power plants. United States: IEEE Service Center, pp. 479–483. 





holes in the metaphor?’, BMC Health Services Research, 5(71), pp. 1–7. 
La Pietra, L., Calligaris, L., Molendini, L., Quattrin, R. and Brusaferro, S. (2005) 
‘Medical errors and clinical risk management: state of the art.’, Acta 
otorhinolaryngologica Italica : organo ufficiale della Società italiana di 
otorinolaringologia e chirurgia cervico-facciale, pp. 339–346. 
Pillay, M. (2015) ‘Accident causation, prevention and safety management: A 
review of the State-of-the-Art’, Procedia Manufacturing, 3, pp. 1838–1845. 
Qureshi, Z.H. (2007) ‘A review of accident modelling approaches for complex 
socio-technical systems | University of Queensland’, 12th Australian 
workshop on Safety critical systems and software and safety-related 
programmable systems, pp. 47–59. 
Rasmussen, J. (1997) ‘Risk management in a dynamic society: A modelling 
problem’, Safety Science, 27(2–3), pp. 183–213. 
Rasmussen, J. and Svedung, I. (2000) Proactive Risk Management in a Dynamic 
Society. Swedish Rescue Services Agency, Karlstad, Sweden. Available at: 
http://rib.msb.se/Filer/pdf%5C16252.pdf. 
Raza, S.A. and Standing, C. (2008) ‘Systemic problems in information technology 
adoption and use: A systems thinking perspective’, in Proceedings of the 
14th ANZSYS Conference. Perth: School of Computer and Information 
Science: Edith Cowan University, pp. 1–7. 
Reason, J. (1990) Human Error. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Reason, J. (1995) ‘Understanding adverse events: human factors.’, Quality in 
health care : QHC, 4(2), pp. 80–89. 
Reason, J. (1997) Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. 1st edn. 
London. 
Reason, J. (2000) ‘Human error: Models and management’, British Medical 
Journal. BMJ Publishing Group, pp. 768–770. 
Reniers, G.L.L., Dullaert, W., Ale, B.J.M. and Soudan, K. (2005) ‘The use of 
current risk analysis tools evaluated towards preventing external domino 
accidents’, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 18(3), pp. 
119–126. 
Riccardo, P., Gianluca, D.P., Giulio, D.G. and Francesco, C. (2018) ‘FRAM for 
systemic accident analysis: A matrix representation of functional 
Resonance’, International Journal of Reliability, Quality and Safety 
Engineering, 25(1). 
Ross, A.J., Wallace, B. and Davies, J.B. (2004) ‘Technical note: Measurement 
issues in taxonomic reliability’, Safety Science, 42(8), pp. 771–778. 
Salahuddin, L. and Ismail, Z. (2015) ‘Classification of antecedents towards safety 
use of health information technology: A systematic review’, International 
Journal of Medical Informatics. Elsevier Ireland Ltd, pp. 877–891. 
Salmon, P., Williamson, A., Lenné, M., Mitsopoulos-Rubens, E. and Rudin-Brown, 





domain: Application and evaluation of a risk management framework’, 
Ergonomics, 53(8), pp. 927–939. 
Salmon, P.M., Cornelissen, M. and Trotter, M.J. (2012) ‘Systems-based accident 
analysis methods: A comparison of Accimap, HFACS, and STAMP’, Safety 
Science, 50(4), pp. 1158–1170. 
Salmon, P.M., Goode, N., Taylor, N., Lenné, M.G., Dallat, C.E. and Finch, C.F. 
(2017) ‘Rasmussen’s legacy in the great outdoors: A new incident reporting 
and learning system for led outdoor activities’, Applied Ergonomics, 59, pp. 
637–648. 
Salmon, P.M., Hulme, A., Walker, G.H., Waterson, P., Berber, E. and Stanton, 
N.A. (2020) ‘The big picture on accident causation: A review, synthesis and 
meta-analysis of AcciMap studies’, Safety Science, 126, pp. 1–15. 
Salmon, P.M., Read, G.J.M., Walker, G.H., Stevens, N.J., Hulme, A., McLean, S. 
and Stanton, N.A. (2020) ‘Methodological issues in systems Human Factors 
and Ergonomics: Perspectives on the research–practice gap, reliability and 
validity, and prediction’, Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing 
& Service Industries, pp. 1–14. 
Schneider, E.C., Ridgely, M.S., Meeker, D., Hunter, L.E., Rudin, R., Members, 
T., Davidson, S., Giannini, R. and Harpel, J. (2014) Promoting patient 




Shorrock, S.T. (2003) The Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Human Error 
in Air Traffic Control. University of Nottingham. 
Shorrock, S.T. and Kirwan, B. (2002) ‘Development and application of a human 
error identification tool for air traffic control’, Applied Ergonomics, 33(4), 
pp. 319–336. 
Singh, H. and Sittig, D.F. (2015) ‘Measuring and improving patient safety through 
health information technology: The Health IT Safety Framework.’, BMJ 
quality & safety, (September), pp. 1–7. 
Sittig, D.F. and Singh, H. (2010) ‘A new sociotechnical model for studying health 
information technology in complex adaptive healthcare systems’, Quality 
and Safety in Health Care, 19(Suppl 3), pp. i68–i74. 
Sittig, D.F. and Singh, H. (2011) ‘Defining health information technology–related 
errors new developments since to err is human’, Archives of Internal 
Medicine, 171(14), pp. 1281–1284. 
Snook, S. (2002) Friendly fire: The accidental shootdown of US Black Hawks over 
northern Iraq. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Sparnon, E. and Marella, W.M. (2012) ‘The role of the electronic health record in 
patient safety events’, PA-PSRS Patient Saf Advis., 9(4), pp. 113–21. 
Stanton, N.A. and Salmon, P.M. (2009) ‘Human error taxonomies applied to 





transport systems’, Safety Science, 47(2), pp. 227–237. 
Stanton, N.A., Salmon, P.M., Walker, G.H. and Stanton, M. (2019) ‘Models and 
methods for collision analysis: A comparison study based on the Uber 
collision with a pedestrian’, Safety Science. Elsevier B.V., pp. 117–128. 
Stanton, N.A. and Stevenage, S. V. (1998) ‘Learning to predict human error: 
Issues of acceptability, reliability and validity’, Ergonomics, 41(11), pp. 
1737–1756. 
Stanton, N.A. and Young, M.S. (2003) ‘Giving ergonomics away? The application 
of ergonomics methods by novices’, Applied Ergonomics, 34(5), pp. 479–
490. 
Svedung, I. and Rasmussen, J. (2002) ‘Graphic representation of accident 
scenarios: Mapping system structure and the causation of accidents’, Safety 
Science, 40(5), pp. 397–417. 
Taib, I.A., McIntosh, A.S., Caponecchia, C. and Baysari, M.T. (2011) ‘A review of 
medical error taxonomies: A human factors perspective’, Safety Science, 
49(5), pp. 607–615. 
Taylor-Adams, S. and Vincent, C. (2004) ‘Systems analysis of clinical incidents: 
the London protocol’, Clinical Risk, 10(6), pp. 211–220. 
Thimbleby, H. (2013) ‘Improving safety in medical devices and systems’, 
Proceedings - 2013 IEEE International Conference on Healthcare 
Informatics, ICHI 2013, pp. 1–13. 
Thomadsen, B. and Lin, S.W. (2005) ‘Taxonomic guidance for remedial actions’, 
Advances in Patient Safety: From Research to Implementation (Volume 2: 
Concepts and Methodology), pp. 75–86. 
Thomas, M. and Thimbleby, H. (2018) Computer Bugs in Hospitals: An Unnoticed 
Killer. Gresham Collge, London. Available at: 
http://www.harold.thimbleby.net/cv/files/Computer-bugs-draft.pdf. 
Toft, B. (2001) External inquiry into the adverse incident that occurred at 
Queen’s Medical Centre, Nottingham, 4th January 2001, Inquiry. 
Toft, Y., Dell, G., Klockner, K.K. and Hutton, A. (2012) Models Causation: Safety 
- O H S Body of Knowledge, OHS Body of Knowledge. Tullmarine, Victoria, 
Australia: Safety Institute of Australia Ltd. 
Trotter, M.J., Salmon, P.M. and Lenné, M.G. (2014) ‘Impromaps: Applying 
Rasmussen’s Risk Management Framework to improvisation incidents’, 
Safety Science, 64, pp. 60–70. 
Underwood, P. and Waterson, P. (2013) ‘Systemic accident analysis: Examining 
the gap between research and practice’, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 
55, pp. 154–164. 
Underwood, P. and Waterson, P. (2014) ‘Systems thinking, the Swiss Cheese 
Model and accident analysis: A comparative systemic analysis of the 
Grayrigg train derailment using the ATSB, AcciMap and STAMP models’, 





Underwood, P., Waterson, P. and Braithwaite, G. (2016) ‘“Accident investigation 
in the wild” - A small-scale, field-based evaluation of the STAMP method 
for accident analysis’, Safety Science, 82, pp. 129–143. 
University of California (2018) Accessing Electronic Medical Data at UCSF, 
Clinical Research Resource HUB. Available at: https://hub.ucsf.edu/apex-
stor-ucare (Accessed: 10 September 2020). 
Usman, M., Britto, R., Börstler, J. and Mendes, E. (2017) ‘Taxonomies in 
software engineering: A Systematic mapping study and a revised taxonomy 
development method’, Information and Software Technology. Elsevier 
B.V., pp. 43–59. 
Vicente, K.J. and Christoffersen, K. (2006) ‘The walkerton E. Coli outbreak: A 
test of rasmussen’s framework for risk management in a dynamic society’, 
Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, 7(2), pp. 93–112. 
Vincent, C. (2011) ‘The essentials of patient safety’, in Patient Safety. 2nd edn. 
BMJ Books, Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 1–53. 
Vincent, C. and Amalberti, R. (2016) Safer healthcare: Strategies for the real 
world, Safer Healthcare: Strategies for the Real World. Springer 
International Publishing. 
Vincent, C., Burnett, S. and Carthey, J. (2014) ‘Safety measurement and 
monitoring in healthcare: A framework to guide clinical teams and 
healthcare organisations in maintaining safety’, BMJ Quality and Safety, 
23(8), pp. 670–677. 
Vincent, C., Taylor-Adams, S. and Stanhope, N. (1998) ‘Framework for analysing 
risk and safety in clinical medicine’, British Medical Journal. BMJ 
Publishing Group, pp. 1154–1157. 
Wachter, R.M. (2015) The Digital Doctor: hope, hype and harm at the dawn of 
medicine’s computer age. New York: McGraw-Hill Education. 
Wachter, R.M. (2016) Making IT work : harnessing the power of health IT to 
improve care in England, National Advisory Group on Health Information 
Technology. England. 
Waldman, J.D. (2007) ‘Thinking systems need systems thinking’, Systems 
Research and Behavioral Science, 24(3), pp. 271–284. 
Wallace, B. and Ross, A. (2006) Beyond Human Error: Taxonomies and Safety 
Science. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
Wallace, S.C., Zimmer, K.P., Possanza, L., Giannini, R. and Solomon, R. (2013) 
Anticipating unintended consequences of health information technology 
and health information exchange: How to identify and address unsafe 
conditions associated with health IT. Washington DC, USA. 
Walsh, K.E., Adams, W.G., Bauchner, H., Vinci, R.J., Chessare, J.B., Cooper, 
M.R., Hebert, P.M., Schainker, E.G. and Landrigan, C.P. (2006) ‘Medication 
errors related to computerized order entry for children’, Pediatrics. 





Waterson, P. (2014) ‘Health information technology and sociotechnical systems: 
A progress report on recent developments within the UK National Health 
Service (NHS)’, Applied Ergonomics, 45(2 Part A), pp. 150–161. 
Waterson, P., Jenkins, D.P., Salmon, P.M. and Underwood, P. (2017) ‘“Remixing 
Rasmussen”: The evolution of Accimaps within systemic accident analysis’, 
Applied Ergonomics, 59, pp. 483–503. 
Waterson, P., Robertson, M.M., Cooke, N.J., Militello, L., Roth, E. and Stanton, 
N. a (2015) ‘Defining the methodological challenges and opportunities for 
an effective science of sociotechnical systems and safety.’, Ergonomics, 
58(April), pp. 1–35. 
Waterson, P.E. and Jenkins, D.P. (2010) ‘Methodological considerations in using 
AcciMaps and the Risk Management Framework to analyse large-scale 
systemic failures siderations in using AcciMaps and the Risk Management 
Framework to analyse large-scale systemic failures. IET CD-ROM 
Proceedings MET’, in The 5th IET Interna- tional System Safety Conference 
2010, pp. 18–20. 
Wears, R.L. (2015) ‘Health information technology and victory’, Annals of 
Emergency Medicine. Mosby Inc., pp. 143–145. 
Wears, R.L. and Nemeth, C.P. (2007) ‘Replacing Hindsight With Insight: Toward 
Better Understanding of Diagnostic Failures’, Annals of Emergency 
Medicine. Mosby, pp. 206–209. 
Wheway, J.L. (2020) Systems Models for Patient Safety: utility and usability for 
multiple incident analysis. Loughborough University. 
Wheway, J.L. and Jun, G.T. (2021) ‘Adopting system models for multiple 
incident analysis: Utility and usability’, International Journal for Quality in 
Health Care, 33(4), pp. 1–8. 
White, S. (2018) Clinical risk management: its application in the manufacture of 
health IT systems - specification, NHS Digital. Available at: 
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/isce/publication/isb0129. 
Wiegmann, D.A. and Shappell, S.A. (2003) A Human Error Approach to Aviation 
Accident Analysis: The Human Analysis and Classification System. 
Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. 
Wienen, H.C.A., Bukhsh, F.A., Vriezekolk, E. and Wieringa, R.J. (2017) Accident 
Analysis Methods and Models - a Systematic Literature Review. Centre for 
Telematics and Information Technology (CTIT). Available at: 
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/accident-analysis-methods-
and-models-a-systematic-literature-revi (Accessed: 31 July 2020). 
Wilcox, A.B., Chen, Y.H. and Hripcsak, G. (2011) ‘Minimizing electronic health 
record patient-note mismatches’, Journal of the American Medical 
Informatics Association, 18(4), pp. 511–514. 
Woloshynowych, M., Rogers, S., Taylor-Adams, S. and Vincent, C. (2005) ‘The 
investigation and analysis of critical incidents and adverse events in 





Woltjer, R. (2008) ‘Resilience assessment based on models of functional 
resonance’, 3rd Symposium on Resilience Engineering, pp. 299–303. 
Woodier, N. and Shale, S. (2017) ‘Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS): Coding framework adapted for the NHS Acute Hospital 
setting (v5.1)’. CC BY NC ND 4.0. 
Woodruff, J.M. (2005) ‘Consequence and likelihood in risk estimation: A matter 
of balance in UK health and safety risk assessment practice’, Safety 
Science, 43(5–6), pp. 345–353. 
Woods, D.D., Johannesen, L.J., Cook, R.I. and Sarter., N.B. (1994) Behind 
human error: Cognitive systems, computers and hindsight, Crew System 
Ergonmics Information analysis Center. Available at: 
https://training.weather.gov/wdtd/courses/woc/core/expertise/expertise
/presentation_content/external_files/BehindHumanError.pdf. 
Yin, R.K. (1984) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. California: SAGE 
Publications. 
Yusof, M.M., Kuljis, J., Papazafeiropoulou, A. and Stergioulas, L.K. (2008) ‘An 
evaluation framework for Health Information Systems: human, organization 
and technology-fit factors (HOT-fit)’, International Journal of Medical 
Informatics, 77(6), pp. 386–398. 
 
